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STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR MAINSTREAMING CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT IN WORLD BANK GROUP OPERATIONS

Engaging with Citizens for Improved Results

The objective of this strategic framework is to mainstream citizen engagement in World Bank Group-supported policies, programs, projects, and advisory services and analytics to improve their development results and within the scope of these operations, contribute to building sustainable national systems for citizen engagement with governments and the private sector. Progress toward this objective will be assessed using indicators included in program, project, and corporate results frameworks.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA	Analytical and advisory activity
AFR	Africa region
BBL	Brown-bag lunch
BF	Beneficiary feedback
BP	Bank Procedures
CAO	Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCT	Conditional cash transfer
CDC	Community development council
CDD	Community-driven development
CDF	Community development fund
CE	Citizen engagement
CMU	Country management unit
CO	Country office
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CSO	Civil society organization
DFID	Department for International Development (U.K.)
DPL	Development policy lending
EAP	East Asia and Pacific region
ECA	Eastern Europe and Central Asia region
E-ISR+	External Implementation Status and Results Report
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FY	Fiscal year
GAC	Governance and anticorruption
GP	Global Practice
GPSA	Global Partnership for Social Accountability
GRM	Grievance redress mechanism
HQ	Headquarters (Washington, D.C.)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
ICT	Information and communications technology
IDF	Institutional Development Fund
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMAGE	Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPF	Investment project financing
ISR	Implementation Status and Results report
LCR	Latin America and Caribbean region
LLI	Leadership, Learning, and Innovation (Vice Presidency)
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MIS	Management information system
MNA	Middle East and North Africa region
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OCP	Open Contracting Partnership
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OP	Operational Policies
OPCS	Operations Policy and Country Services
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDU	Presidential delivery unit
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PforR	Program-for-Results
PNPM	PNPM Mandiri (National Program for Community Empowerment)
PPD	Public-private dialogue
PSAR	Performance Standard Achievement Rating
PSIA	Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
SAR	South Asia region
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
SDV	Social Development Vice Presidency
SEED	Save for Education, Entrepreneurship and Down Payment
SMS	Short message service
SPF	Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund
TA	Technical assistance
TTL	Task team leader
WBG	World Bank Group
WBI	World Bank Institute

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

The World Bank Group (WBG) has a long history of multi-stakeholder engagement in the operations it funds. Multi-stakeholder engagement began in the 1970s, was formalized in the 1980s, and deepened throughout the 1990s through participatory approaches in operations. Concepts of social inclusion, social accountability, and governance and anticorruption (GAC) emerged during the early 2000s. The landmark 2004 World Development Report *Making Services Work for Poor People* highlighted the benefits of listening to citizens to improve pro-poor targeting of service delivery. The 2007 GAC Strategy introduced engagement with demand-side actors, and its 2012 Update undertook to "support initiatives that enable greater openness in governments and closer interaction among citizens, the private sector and the state." Also in 2012, the establishment of the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) provided a mechanism for capacity building for civil society organizations (CSOs) to implement social accountability programs in countries where governments have agreed to these approaches. In addition, the Bank, IFC, and MIGA all require engagement with project-affected people and communities as part of their safeguard policies or performance standards.

The purpose of this strategic framework for citizen engagement (CE) is to capture the diverse experiences, assess lessons learned, and outline methods and entry points to provide a more systematic and results-focused approach for the WBG. Its objective is to facilitate mainstreaming of CE in WBG-supported policies, programs, projects, and advisory services and analytics to improve their development results and, within the scope of these operations, to strengthen engagement processes between governments and the private sector and citizens at the national, regional, local, or sectoral level, as applicable.

The WBG Strategy incorporates CE, including beneficiary feedback, specifically in its treatment of inclusion, which entails empowering citizens to participate in the development process and integrating citizen voice in development programs as key accelerators to achieving results. In addition, under the right circumstances, CE can contribute to achieving development outcomes in support of the goals the WBG aims to support through all of the operations it funds: eradicating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. The WBG is therefore committed to mainstreaming CE in operations it supports where it can improve outcomes, and it has made a strong corporate commitment to incorporating CE in 100 percent of projects that have clearly identified beneficiaries ("beneficiary feedback").

This framework builds on stocktaking and lessons learned from WBG-financed operations across regions and sectors. A key lesson is the importance of country context, government ownership, and clear objectives for CE. Certain regions, such as East and South Asia, have a long history of using participatory development processes, while others, including the Middle East and North Africa region have new opportunities to scale up CE as a result of recent political transitions. A stocktaking of World Bank-financed projects shows that the majority of projects with CE activities have been service delivery, natural resource management, and social inclusion projects. CE is less prevalent in public financial management and governance projects. There is an increasing effort to systematically track and report on results, and draw lessons learned from these activities.

Growing evidence confirms that under the right conditions, CE can help governments achieve improved development results. This framework includes a comprehensive review of impact literature, which has found positive links between CE and improved public service delivery, public financial management, governance, and social inclusion/empowerment. Evidence also shows, however, that the outcomes of CE are highly context-specific and sensitive to governments' and citizens' capacity and willingness to engage, as well as to social, political, economic, environmental, cultural, geographic, and other factors, such as gender dynamics.

The approach to mainstreaming CE in WBG-supported operations is guided by five principles: it is results-focused, it involves engaging throughout the operational cycle, it seeks to strengthen country systems, it is context-specific, and it is gradual. As CE is not without cost, opportunities for engaging citizens in WBG-supported operations should be sought where such engagement can contribute to improved development results. While the preparation of WBG-supported operations frequently involves stakeholder consultations, CE during program and project implementation can be enhanced to facilitate ongoing learning and feedback and to allow making adjustments as necessary. A gradual approach to mainstreaming is recommended to avoid the pitfalls of "box-ticking" and tokenistic approaches, build the capacity of governments and citizens to engage on a sustainable basis, including through adequate processes and systems, and continue to learn and make adjustments as necessary.

While mandatory consultations have been the main form of engagement to date, numerous context-specific entry points for CE exist across the World Bank Group product portfolio. Consultations are mandatory in the preparation of Systematic Country Diagnostics, Country Partnership Frameworks, Program-for-Results operations, and investment project financing (IPF) operations that trigger certain safeguards. In IPF, consultations and grievance redress mechanisms are largely motivated by safeguard requirements and are often focused on project preparation[1]. CE during program and project implementation can be scaled up to facilitate ongoing feedback and learning and improved monitoring. There are additional context-specific entry points in Systematic Country Diagnostics, policy dialogue, advisory services and analytics, and IPFs. Much of the work to date on CE has taken place in IPFs—for example, in community-driven development or service delivery projects. Other opportunities include citizen-led monitoring of procurement and other approaches to build feedback into the project cycle. IFC and MIGA engage with stakeholders, including citizens, in the context of their Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, which require consultations and grievance redress mechanisms if specific performance standards are triggered. In addition, IFC is piloting CE in public-private dialogues and results measurement approaches.

Scaling up CE across WBG-supported operations for improved results entails several elements. First, an analysis of the specific country, sector, or program/project context is required to identify the appropriate entry point(s) for CE. Second, the objectives of the engagement need to be clearly defined in the context of the operation's results chain, and clearly communicated. Third, a stakeholder mapping is needed to inform the design of the engagement mechanism through an understanding of the interests, incentives, and objectives of key stakeholders,

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[1] "The draft Environmental and Social Framework proposes that the Borrower will develop and implement a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP). This SEP will describe the timing and methods of engagement with the project-affected communities and other stakeholders (See ESS10, para 14). This is a mandatory requirement. Additional details will be clarified in forthcoming procedures".

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ensuring inclusion and representation, including for women and marginal and vulnerable groups. Fourth, the engagement level and mechanism need to be tailored to the context, objectives, and willingness and capacity of governments and citizens to engage, and they should support existing national processes for CE as much as possible. Finally, the outcomes of mainstreaming CE activities in WBG operations need to be monitored and reported systematically and consistently.

The quality of mandatory consultations can be enhanced, and there is significant scope to scale up collaborative approaches. Consultations need to respect good practice principles, including providing adequate notice periods and closing the feedback loop more systematically. Grievance redress mechanisms are mandatory in IPFs that trigger certain safeguard policies, but they do not always function well during project implementation. In collaboration with client governments, teams can pursue opportunities to scale up collaborative approaches (such as participatory planning and budgeting, and citizen membership in decision-making bodies) and empowering mechanisms for citizen engagement (such as community management of resources) in WBG-supported operations, in the appropriate context and in areas where they can contribute to improved results.

Improved understanding and monitoring of the outcomes of CE in WBG-supported operations is an objective of this framework. Because such monitoring and reporting is not systematic, it is challenging to learn from and evaluate CE activities. To enhance measuring and reporting on CE going forward, therefore, the framework proposes a focus on clarifying results chains and citizen engagement indicators in five outcome areas (a) improved service delivery, (b) public financial management, (c) governance, (d) natural resource management, and (e) inclusion/empowerment. The results chains and indicators have been informed by impact studies and experience with CE within and outside the WBG.

Access to information is a necessary but not sufficient enabling condition for effective citizen engagement. Relevant information needs to be made available to citizens in a timely manner and in a format they can understand. At the same time, information does not automatically lead to engagement or participation, which depend on additional context factors. ICT has the potential to be leveraged for increased outreach and inclusivity at limited cost, but to yield results it needs to be integrated into the design of CE processes. Further work is required to isolate and study the contribution ICT can make to CE processes and outcomes.

Adequate capacity of governments and citizens to engage is an important prerequisite for scaling up CE in WBG-supported operations. Governments need to understand the benefits of engaging with citizens and to have the time and capacity to respond to their feedback. Capacity building of governments should prioritize strengthening existing institutions. Citizens/CSOs need to be able and willing to engage, and they need to acquire an understanding of relevant tools, processes, responsibilities, and constraints. Capacity building for CE initiatives in WBG-supported operations has been successfully integrated into program and project design and implementation, providing valuable lessons for future opportunities.

Scaling up CE in WBG-funded operations needs to be supported by comprehensive staff training and systematic knowledge management. Only a limited number of WBG staff have in-depth understanding of and practical experience with CE processes. Assessing staff capacity and developing staff training is planned as part of the implementation of this framework. In

addition, systematic and pooled knowledge management through a CE knowledge platform and structured knowledge exchange will be important.

Mainstreaming CE in the new WBG structure will require collaboration between the regions and the new Global Practices. As CE is specific to country contexts, the regions will continue to take the lead in identifying country-specific opportunities and demand for CE and, where relevant, will include them in Country Partnership Frameworks. Each of the new Global Practices will be responsible for integrating CE in the operations it manages, including scaling up the use of citizen engagement in IPF to reach the corporate target on beneficiary feedback, which will be monitored by the Presidential Delivery Unit as well as through the World Bank Corporate Scorecard and the IDA Results Measurement System. IFC will monitor progress through its Performance Standard Achievement Rating. An institutional coordination mechanism is envisioned to facilitate implementation of the agreed results-focused approach, monitor progress, and facilitate knowledge exchange and training across Global Practices and regions.

The implementation of a more systematic approach to CE, as laid out in this framework, will benefit from the continued guidance of an external Citizen Engagement Advisory Council, which includes representatives of government, academia, civil society, the private sector, and development partners. The Advisory Council has engaged with the Bank to inform the design of this framework, assist in assessing lessons of experience, and providing advice on implementation for the next two years. In addition, opportunities for exchange of experience with CSOs and other partners will be sought throughout the implementation of this framework.

I. Context and Objectives

1.	**The World Bank Group (WBG) Strategy sets out a framework to align all the WBG's public and private sector interventions to the goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner.** The goals emphasize the importance of economic growth, inclusion, and sustainability. Inclusion entails empowering citizens to participate in the development process, removing barriers against those who are often excluded and ensuring that the voice of all citizens can be heard (World Bank, 2013c).

2.	**Supporting client engagement with citizens where such engagement can improve development outcomes is a key component of the WBG's strengthened focus on results.** As part of this approach, the WBG is strengthening its focus on results and evidence of what works in development. Citizen engagement (CE) entails working with the WBG's direct clients—whether government or private sector—to find ways to include citizens to assess priorities for interventions, learn about design and implementation to adjust as necessary, contribute to monitoring, and ultimately improve outcomes. This framework builds on evidence of impact that shows that CE can help governments and the private sector improve development outcomes, as well as lessons learned from WBG-supported CE activities. It proposes to systematically scale up CE where such engagement can contribute to improved development results. It also involves strengthening technical support to WBG task teams and clients to design and implement sustainable CE activities for improved development impact.

3.	**In Country Opinion Surveys, many respondents consider increased civic participation to be a key area in which the WBG can strengthen its impact.** In the most recent Country Opinion Survey, 32 percent of respondents pointed to an inadequate level of citizen/civil society participation in World Bank-assisted reform efforts as the most important reason these efforts fail or are slow to implement, ahead of government inefficiencies and political obstacles. Similarly, the assessment of the effectiveness of WBG collaboration with groups outside the government shows room for significant improvement.[2]

4.	**In supporting clients to engage with citizens for improved results, the WBG can draw on experiences from a history of multi-stakeholder engagement**, **participation, governance, social accountability, and transparency work** (see Box 1.1). Over time, the institutional approach has evolved from multi-stakeholder consultations to one focused on participation, social accountability, and improved governance, combined with increased transparency. The challenge of enhancing CE is to understand in which contexts it can contribute to improved results, such as improved quality and access to services for the poor or more efficient resource allocation and use.

5.	**Increasing feedback from the direct beneficiaries of WBG-supported projects is part of the WBG's approach to scaling up CE in 100 percent of projects that have clearly identified beneficiaries**. Feedback from project beneficiaries can contribute to learning from implementation and allow midcourse correction, thereby improving outcomes.

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[2]	FY13 World Bank Group Country Opinion Survey for 41 countries.

Box 1.1. Evolution of the Concept of Citizen Engagement in WBG Operations: Openness, Participation, Accountability, Results

The Bank began building relationships with civil society organizations (CSOs) in the late 1970s as part of a new approach to multi-stakeholder engagement. In 1982, a formal World Bank-NGO Committee was established, through which senior Bank managers could have regular and intensifying dialogue with leading international CSOs.[a] Following on this dialogue, the Bank developed a reform agenda throughout the 1980s that included information disclosure, environmental protection, and social development.

The concept of participation at the Bank was introduced with the launch of the Participation Sourcebook in 1996, which established how participatory approaches—which include women, the poor, and marginalized groups—could be integrated into Bank-supported projects. Building on this, the concept of social accountability emerged throughout the 2000s. The *2004 World Development Report: Making Services Work for Poor People* highlighted the role of citizen voice in influencing the accountability relationships that make service delivery pro-poor.[b] The Bank's first Social Development Strategy, published in 2005, identified inclusion and cohesion as a pillar of socially sustainable development.[c] In 2007 the Bank's first Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) Strategy introduced multi-stakeholder engagement with demand-side actors as one of its core principles, while the first GAC benchmarking exercise in 2008 explicitly tracked "transparency, accountability, and participation" efforts in the Bank. In 2012, the Update to the GAC Strategy made governance a focus area of WBG operations, including initiatives that enable greater openness in governments and closer interaction among citizens, the private sector, and the state. Transparency received a further boost through the Bank's landmark Access to Information Policy, adopted in 2011. In 2012, the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) was launched to build capacity for CSOs to engage in social accountability initiatives.

The concept of citizen engagement began to emerge in the Bank in 2013, when the WBG hosted a conference on citizen engagement with CIVICUS and InterAction to highlight the value of engaging with citizens for effective development.[d] In 2013, the corporate change process adopted a recommendation to scale up engagement with citizens for improved results. In addition, the WBG Strategy adopted in October 2013 undertook to engage more systematically with citizens and beneficiaries and integrate citizen voice in development programs as a key accelerator to achieve results. At the Annual Meetings in October 2013, President Kim undertook to include beneficiary feedback in 100 percent of projects that have clearly identifiable beneficiaries.

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[a] The World Bank-NGO Committee created in 1982 was phased out in December 2000 and replaced by the World Bank-Civil Society Joint Facilitation Committee in 2003.
[b] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5986.
[c] https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5986.
[d] http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/stories/citizen-engagement-enhanced-development-impact.

6. **The public sector can learn from private sector feedback and measurement approaches.** Traditionally, the market mechanisms of supply/demand and market/consumer research provided information on results and enhanced business accountability. The concept of shared value recognizes that societal needs, not just conventional economic needs, define markets (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Shared value measurement assesses progress and results, generating actionable data and consumers'/suppliers' insights to refine shared value strategies (Porter and others, 2012). Feedback from those who are affected both directly and indirectly can be analyzed with other evidence of development results to enrich the understanding of how companies are performing. Technology is changing the ways in which companies engage and interact with people, especially those at the base of the pyramid. But it is the consumers, producers, or end beneficiaries, combined with these new technologies, that are defining a new norm of interaction—one in which they play a central and active role (Long and Brindley, 2013).

A. Objectives

7.　　**The overall objective of this strategic framework is to mainstream CE in WBG-supported policies, programs, projects, and advisory services and analytics where such engagement can improve development results and, within the scope of these operations, to contribute to sustainable processes for CE with governments and the private sector.** In this process, WBG-supported development interventions aim to build on and strengthen existing engagement processes and systems between governments, the private sector, and citizens at the national, regional, local, or sectoral level, as applicable.

8.　　**In operationalizing CE for improved results across its portfolio, the WBG aims to achieve the following sub-objectives:**
   (a) Scaling up context-specific CE across the WBG client engagement spectrum where such engagement can contribute to improved development outcomes;
   (b) Improving the quality and outcomes of mandatory engagement mechanisms (consultations and grievance redress mechanisms);
   (c) Achieving 100 percent CE in projects that have clearly identifiable beneficiaries (referred to as "beneficiary feedback"); and
   (d) Improving the monitoring and results reporting on CE, including beneficiary feedback, in WBG operations.

9.　　**This framework complements other related work.** Staff guidance, "Piloting Citizen Engagement in Projects," developed by the Middle East and North Africa region, facilitated piloting and scaling up citizen engagement in projects in FY14, and early feedback and findings have informed this framework. The report by the Africa region, "Listening to Citizens, Learning from Projects in Africa," identified relevant and useful lessons learned that were integrated in this work. The draft SDV Flagship Report "Opening the Black Box: Contextual Drivers of Social Accountability Effectiveness" studies contextual influences on social accountability interventions in detail; the high-level elements of this work have been integrated in Table 5.1 of this framework. A proposed Policy Research Report, "Transparency, Citizen Engagement and the Politics of Development," is planned to further study selected aspects related to the interface of information, CE, and political context.

B. Definitions

10.　　The literature review and stocktake, including interviews of task team leaders (TTLs), undertaken for the preparation of this framework confirmed the need for clear and consistent definitions of *citizen engagement* and *beneficiary feedback* in the context of WBG-supported operations.

11.　　*Citizens* **are understood as the ultimate client of government, development institutions', and private sector interventions in a country.** Citizens can act as individuals or organize themselves in associations and groups such as community-based groups, women's groups, or indigenous peoples' groups. Civil society organizations (CSOs) can represent citizens and can include organizations outside the public or for-profit sector, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, foundations, academia, associations, policy development and research institutes, trade unions, and social

movements. In this context, the term *citizen* is not used in a legal sense but is understood in the broad sense of referring to all people in a society or country in an inclusive and nondiscriminatory way.

12. ***Beneficiaries* are defined as a subset of citizens directly targeted by and expected to benefit from a development project.** For the World Bank, clearly identified project beneficiaries are understood to be a subset of citizens who directly benefit from a World Bank-supported project (e.g., children who benefit from an immunization program, or households that have a new piped water connection). As the large majority of such projects with direct beneficiaries are provided through investment project financing (IPF) operations, the target of achieving 100 percent beneficiary feedback in WBG projects that have clearly identifiable beneficiaries will be tracked on the basis of the use of CE mechanisms in IPF.

13. ***Citizen engagement* is defined as the two-way interaction between citizens and governments or the private sector within the scope of WBG interventions—policy dialogue, programs, projects, and advisory services and analytics—that gives citizens a stake in decision-making with the objective of improving the intermediate and final development outcomes of the intervention.** The spectrum of citizen engagement includes consultation; collaboration and participation; and empowerment (see Figure 1.1). Access to information is a necessary enabling condition, but it typically implies a one-way interaction only. Information-sharing and awareness-raising activities alone, therefore, do not meet the definition of citizen engagement. Closing the feedback loop (i.e., a two-way interaction providing a tangible response to citizen feedback) is required to meet citizens' expectations for change created by their engagement, use their input to facilitate improved development outcomes, and justify the cost of engaging with them.

Figure 1.1. Dimensions of Citizen Engagement

1. Inform – Providing citizens with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities, solutions
2. Consult – Obtaining citizen feedback on analyses, alternatives, decisions
3. Collaborate – Partnering with citizens in parts or all of decision-making
4. Empower – Final decision-making in the hands of citizens

Source: Adapted from "IAP2 Spectrum of Public Participation," International Association for Public Participation.

14.	*Beneficiary feedback***, a subset of citizen engagement that is applicable to World Bank IPF, refers to engagement (consultation, collaboration, and empowerment) with those citizens who are clearly identifiable (direct) project beneficiaries during IPF preparation, implementation, and evaluation.** The objective is to integrate consultations, collaboration, and empowerment activities into IPF project design and implementation to facilitate continuous learning, improved project monitoring, and improved project outcomes.

15.	**A number of mechanisms exist for engaging with citizens** (see Annex I). They broadly include (a) traditional consultation and feedback mechanisms, such as focus groups and satisfaction surveys; (b) participatory mechanisms, such as community scorecards, participatory planning, and budgeting; and (c) citizen-led mechanisms, such as community management or user management committees. In addition, third-party monitoring mechanisms include social audits, citizen report cards, public expenditure tracking surveys, and working with independent monitoring entities such as information commissions, ombudsmen, or supreme audit institutions.

II. Summary of Evidence and Lessons Learned

A. Summary of Evidence

16.   **This section reviews the current state of knowledge on the impact of CE initiatives on development outcomes and on contextual factors that help determine how such engagements shape development results.** See Annex II for more details on the literature review.

1. Citizen Engagement and High-Level Development Goals

17.   **Emerging evidence on CE suggests that there is largely untapped potential for CE initiatives to influence high-level development goals such as poverty reduction.** Wong's (2012) review of the impact evaluation results of World Bank-supported community-driven development (CDD) programs over the past 25 years found generally positive evidence for poverty reduction, poverty targeting, and increased access to services. Similarly, a program for inclusion and empowerment, Brazil's *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, has helped reduce inequality and extreme poverty and has improved education outcomes (Soares and others, 2010). CCT programs often use participatory mechanisms to improve beneficiary targeting and monitoring. For example, in Zambia, the targeting and approval systems are designed through Public Welfare Assistance Scheme structures, using elected Community Welfare Assistance Committees operating at the village level, which receive training and use a multi-stage participatory process to identify the neediest 10 percent of households (Schubert, 2005). At the same time, such examples of impact on high-level development goals are still limited because of the highly contextualized nature of CE, the need to establish stronger links between citizen-led interventions and desired development outcomes (Holland and Thirkel, 2009), and the limited extent to which CE interventions can induce changes in policy, practice, behavior, and power relations (Menocal and Sharma, 2008).

2. Citizen Engagement and Intermediate and Final Development Outcomes

18.   **There is stronger evidence that CE can lead to improved intermediate and final development outcomes in suitable contexts through better targeting and implementation of development interventions and improved monitoring of the performance of governments and service providers.** CE initiatives have had a positive impact on such outcomes in several areas, including improved service delivery, public financial management, governance, natural resource management, and social inclusion and empowerment, particularly for women and marginalized or vulnerable populations.

19.   **However, the literature in this area also points to caveats.** In a smaller number of documented cases, CE initiatives have either had no impact or have led to unintended adverse outcomes. In a review of more than 100 case studies that mapped CE outcomes, Gaventa and Barrett (2010) describe examples in which authorities either refused to respond to citizen demands, or made tokenistic concessions such as declaring policy changes but not implementing them.

3. Impact of Citizen Engagement on Development Outcome Areas

20. **While there is a significant body of evidence that links CE with improved intermediate and final results, the nature and rigor of such evidence varies by type of development outcome.** Based on case studies, randomized control trials, and participatory evaluations, the strongest evidence attests to the impact of CE on the accessibility, coverage, and quality of service delivery in health, education, infrastructure, and water and sanitation. There is also substantive evidence that CE in public financial management processes has led to citizen mobilization, more inclusive budget processes, and pro-poor fiscal policies. Most of such evidence is based on qualitative case studies and case study analysis and to a lesser extent on indices and rankings, though there are efforts to explore and substantiate links between increased budget transparency and improved governance (Islam, 2003); positive development outcomes (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2011); and higher credit ratings and lower spreads between borrowing and lending rates (Hameed, 2011).

21. **In the area of natural resource management, the literature upholds, with exceptions, the influence of CE on process-driven outcomes such as increasing participation of CSOs, promoting disclosure of contracts, and demanding increased revenue transparency.** However, it is less clear about how citizen-centered initiatives have led to institutionalized changes in policy outcomes or influenced corruption and poverty in resource-rich countries. There is also substantial scope to improve evidence in this area, since these conclusions are primarily based on studies of transparency and accountability initiatives and community-based natural resource management systems. In some cases, such community-based natural resource management systems have been found to contribute to more sustainable forest management or more equitable water distribution, for instance, but the overall evidence is mixed (Mansuri and Rao, 2013).

22. **A range of methods, including qualitative analysis, indices, randomized control trials, and participatory evaluations, have been used to measure the impact of CE on improved governance[3] and social inclusion and empowerment.** However, the evidence is still mixed and uneven for these areas. While it is difficult to draw an overarching conclusion for an area as broad and complex as governance, a number of relevant interventions attest to impact on intermediate outcomes such as changes in policy, regulation and reform, improved transparency, more active community-level participation, reduced corruption, and improved responsiveness to citizen demands. Similarly, even though there is consensus about the positive economic impact of CCT and CDD programs/projects, their influence on promoting inclusiveness, social cohesion, and empowerment is subject to caveats. In the same vein, a growing body of evidence suggests that increased female participation in self-help groups and other participatory development programs improves economic outcomes (Meier zu Selhausen, 2012; Kandpal and Baylis, 2013; Beath and others, 2010; Blattman and others, 2013; Oxfam, 2013). Still, mobilization of such groups can at times also exclude poor, less educated, or more marginalized women and does not always translate into greater empowerment or a shift in norms that can drive wider social and political changes (Hallward-Dreimeier and Hasan, 2013; Weldon and Htun, 2013; Hasan and Tanzer, 2013; and UN Women, 2011).

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[3] *Governance* is defined as "...the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them" (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2007).

4. Contextual Factors that Influence the Impact of Citizen Engagement Initiatives

23. **The literature points toward a growing recognition that context-specific factors are essential to understand why and how CE interventions can contribute to improved intermediate and final development outcomes (O'Meally, 2014; Buckenya and others, 2012).** One of these factors is the availability of timely, user-friendly, reliable, and comprehensive information, as a precondition for effective CE. Examples from countries with highly developed information campaigns and from government programs in India and South Africa show the role of greater transparency in mobilizing citizen-centered interventions. At the same time, Lieberman and others, (2014) and Banerjee and others (2010) describe campaigns on information sharing and dissemination interventions that had no perceptible impact on civic participation or service delivery, and Hubbard (2007), Fox (2007), and Darch and Underwood (2010) question whether access to information by itself can translate into broader social, economic, and political outcomes. Table 2.1 provides a broad overview of additional factors that may be of relevance to analyzing and designing context-specific CE initiatives.

Table 2.1. Contextual Factors that Affect Outcomes of CE Initiatives

	Demand-side factors
Willingness	- The degree to which the development issue addressed by citizen engagement initiatives is of interest to all citizens or an identifiable target group of citizens. - Willingness to engage with the state based on factors such as intrinsic motivation, perception of government willingness to engage, belief in the efficacy of participation, or cost(s) of inaction. - Nature of past state-citizen engagement and outcomes achieved. - History and risk of elite capture.
Capacity	- Access to timely, credible, comprehensive, relevant, and easy-to-understand information. - Sufficient awareness and understanding of the issue to engage with the government effectively. - Capabilities (economic, human, social, political, technical) to engage in the "upstream" (policy formulation) as well as "downstream" (implementation) stages of the engagement process. - Strong, broad-based, and recognized leadership to engage on the development issue. - Authority, credibility, and legitimacy of CSOs. - Capacity to network within and across state-society. - Capacity of individuals and groups/organizations for collective action, including excluded and marginalized sections of society.
	Supply-side factors
Willingness	- Willingness of state functionaries (elected officials/bureaucratic staff/service providers) to (a) engage with citizens, and (b) respond to citizens' feedback (as determined by interests, ideology, incentives, and reward(s)/cost(s) of action/inaction). - Strength of individual champions within the state. - Level of political competition and whether it creates incentives for reforms and accountability. - Perception of the capability of mobilizing citizens and other stakeholders. - Degree of sanctions triggered by engagement mechanisms (if any). - Effective horizontal accountability institutions (e.g., judiciary, legislative, and other oversight authorities) or well-known legal accountability mechanisms that promote the responsiveness of public officials to citizens' concerns and priorities. - Politics of patronage.
Capacity	- Generation of and access to timely, credible, comprehensive, and useful information on issues that are important to citizens. - Mandate, knowledge, plan/strategy to address the issues. - Capacity to gather, aggregate, and respond to citizen feedback (e.g., organizational, technical, and political competencies).
	Sociopolitical, economic, legal, and other factors
Context and processes	- History of civic participation, including existence and history of well-known, open, accessible, credible, and institutionalized citizen-state interface platform(s). - Existence of interlocutors/mobilizers with strong leadership, adequate capacity, and credibility (with citizens and state actors) to mobilize both citizens and state officials and facilitate citizen-state interaction. - Degree of decentralization.

	- Relationship (balance of power and terms of negotiation) between principals (clients, citizens, and policymakers), and professions, such as trade unions.
	- Nature of the rule of law (e.g., existing legislation on right to information and its implementation, procurement monitoring, etc., and credibility of sanctions).
	- Transitions or "windows of opportunity" (e.g., new legislation or policy commitments).
	- Existence of functional and free media institutions.
Economic, social, and cultural factors	- History of existing state-society relations.
	- Relationships and nature of interaction between the state (including executive and oversight institutions) and citizens.
	- Character of formal/informal state-society accountability and bridging mechanisms.
	- Power relations and nature of socioeconomic inequality and exclusion.
	- Cultural practices used to frame citizenship that may shape the worldview, interests and incentives of different groups based on ethnicity, income level, class, gender, religion and geography
	- Values, norms, or social institutions that legitimize or undermine state-citizen interaction (these may differ across factors such as ethnicity, income level, class, gender, religion, and geography).
	- Types of alliances/solidarity that may be relevant for collective action (e.g., ethnicity, income level, class, gender, religion, geography).
	- Macro social and economic variables (e.g., economic development, population dynamics).
	- Existence of supportive global actors and processes.
Other factors	- Geographic factors that may affect accessibility to information or ease of congregation, such as degree of urbanization.
	- Duration of specific citizen-state interaction that may affect institutionalization.
	- Sector characteristics (e.g., nature of public goods such as education vis-à-vis road infrastructure).
	- Organic evolution of citizen-state engagement vis-à-vis external, induced, or discrete interventions.
	- Broad-based cross-sector alliances across different levels and forms of government.
	- Political "windows of opportunity."

Source: Based on SDV Social Accountability Flagship; Background Literature Review for Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in WBG Operations (Annex II); Bukenya and others, 2012; O'Meally, 2014.

24.   **Additional context factors play a role in the effectiveness of CE initiatives in specific outcome areas.** For example, community characteristics such as inequality, likelihood of elite capture, and capacity to participate in development processes influence the effectiveness of CE in natural resource management and CDD. In the area of public service delivery, CE outcomes depend on factors such as social norms and values, service characteristics, the degree of choice of service provider, or circumstances influencing the performance of service providers. Legal frameworks and the timing of citizen input into budget processes, among other aspects, determine the impact of CE on public financial management. The organizational culture of public institutions, and the mandate and strength of oversight institutions such as the judiciary, supreme audit institutions, and anticorruption agencies, influence CE outcomes in the area of governance. Table 2.2 provides an overview of additional context factors by outcome area, identified through the literature review.

Table 2.2. Additional Contextual Factors Affecting CE Outcomes in Various Areas

Outcome area	Factors
Public service delivery	- Service characteristics, such as availability of information on and complexity of the service provided. - Influence of citizen feedback on the outcomes of service provision vis-à-vis such factors as capacity of service providers. - Accessibility/quality of services affiliated with ideologies and values (e.g., water, sanitation). Concerns about service provision in such areas can emerge into socially and politically salient issues. - Institutional capacity, mandate, and incentives to respond to citizen feedback. - Existence/effectiveness of oversight mechanisms to ensure responsiveness to citizen feedback. - Cultural and social factors that affect decision-making processes (e.g., gender, wealth, ethnicity, and education). - Risks of providing feedback or engaging with service providers (e.g., retribution by the service personnel on whom citizens depend) - Limited or no choice of service providers (e.g., in geographically remote areas).
Public financial management	- Existence of legal frameworks that require or facilitate opportunities for CE in budget processes. - Stage of budget process and timing of citizen input: early CE during budget preparation (vs. execution) increases opportunities for impact. - Government structure: governments with existing participatory processes are more likely to be open to a broader range of CE approaches. - Perceived legitimacy of citizen input: citizen input that is collective/representative may lead to greater government responsiveness in budget processes than individual input.
Governance	- Organizational culture of public institutions. (e.g., clarity and effectiveness of policies, procedures, and monitoring and control systems). - Form of corruption: extortive corruption practices are more likely than collusive corruption practices to motivate citizen action. - Cultural values such as gift-giving or nepotism. - Mandate and strength of oversight institutions, including legislature, judiciary, supreme audit institutions, and anticorruption agencies. - Independence and proactivity of media. - Degree of decentralization, effectiveness of local institutions, and extent of central government oversight.
Natural resource management	- Resource value: high resource value/economic dependence provides fewer incentives for devolution of authority to local communities. - Costs/benefits for relevant stakeholders; e.g., agreement on revenue sharing could help to motivate community engagement. - Community characteristics, such as high inequality, likelihood of elite capture, limited information flows, or low capacity. - Legal framework and reporting requirements on access to and ownership, allocation, and control of natural resources. - Central government support for local management of natural resources, and capacity to negotiate favorable concessions and legal agreements. - Existence/efficacy of the private sector's attempts to understand and address the needs of local communities.
Social inclusion and empowerment	- Community characteristics such as transparency of decision-making rules, identification of the poor, and degree of equality. - Community capacity to implement projects and utilize CE mechanisms effectively. - Existence of measures to prevent elite capture (such as contested election of local leaders). - Social norms and incentives for the inclusion of women and other vulnerable and marginalized groups. - Commitment of state actors to decentralization and empowerment of local governments and communities.

Source: Background Literature Review for Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in WBG Operations (Annex II)

25.   **While political context matters, entry points for CE exist in all types of polities.** A higher level of democratization creates more space for CE activities and may facilitate better outcomes. At the same time, the influence of democratic approaches and institutions on CE

outcomes, versus that of informal institutions and other types of political settlement, merits further study (Crook and Booth, 2011). CE can emerge in other political contexts, including less democratic or so-called "closed polities,"[4] where electoral accountability is typically missing and space for civil society is often controlled. In such cases, avenues for CE may exist in areas where governments are willing to share information and development objectives are aligned—for example, for service provision or environmental protection. Decentralized government structures and independent oversight institutions provide additional entry points for CE in such contexts.

26.   **CE in fragile contexts requires careful design.** Fragile and conflict-affected settings are typically characterized by the absence or weakness of government institutions, lack of a common understanding of the social contract, and, in some cases, limited state authority over territory. In such contexts, engaging with citizens is not without risk, as it can contribute to further fragility or conflict and can entail greater personal risk for those engaged. At the same time, opportunities for CE can be explored in settings where there is precedent for state-citizen interaction, local government structures exist, or there are local customary institutions and other intermediaries that have the government's trust and the capability to mobilize citizens. "Windows of opportunity" such as elections or other transitions provide additional openings for public engagement.

27.   **Gender dynamics can be consequential for citizen engagement outcomes.** Social norms that reinforce negative stereotypes about women's ability to contribute to participatory initiatives or that restrict them from participating in public spaces may not be favorable for female participation in decision-making processes. Setting minimum quotas for women's participation, working with separate women's groups, and working through alternate formal and informal channels can help to address such gender imbalances in participation (World Bank, 2012e). While in some cases a higher proportion of women in decision-making bodies, such as forest management groups in India, has been associated with improved outcomes (Agarwal, 2009), outcomes of female participation in CE initiatives have been found to also depend on such factors as financial autonomy and representation of the poorest and most vulnerable women.

B. Stocktaking Findings

28.   **This section presents a synopsis of the lessons learned from World Bank experiences in using CE approaches in projects,** drawing on reviews and studies, the stocktaking undertaken for this framework (see Annex III), and regional experiences (Annex IV).

29.   **Most CE activities in World Bank-supported projects have been motivated by application of safeguard policies.** The vast majority of projects reviewed have triggered one of the three safeguard operational policies (OP 4.01, *Environmental Assessment*; OP 4.10, *Involuntary Resettlement*; and OP 4.12, *Indigenous Peoples*) that require CE through consultations and grievance redress mechanisms (GRMs). This fact highlights significant potential for scaling up non-mandatory CE mechanisms in World Bank Group-supported projects and for moving from compliance to systematically integrating citizens' voices in operations for improved results. In this context, there are opportunities to use CE more systematically for course correction during project implementation (World Bank, 2014b).

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[4]   Draft SDV Flagship Study, forthcoming.

30.   **CE already occurs mostly during project preparation, and consultations are the primary mechanism for engagement**, largely reflecting safeguard requirements. This framework therefore pursues a systematic approach to scale up CE during implementation to realize opportunities for improving project outcomes through learning and mid-course correction.

31.   **CE is implemented in all sectors and WBG geographical regions** (see Annexes III and IV), so that there are numerous opportunities for systematically identifying entry points to scale up CE where it can contribute to improved results. Some regions, including East and South Asia, have a long history of using participatory development processes, while the Middle East and North Africa region has, as a result of recent political transitions, new opportunities to scale up CE. Similarly, CE mechanisms can be found in projects across all sectors, but in some regions, the degree of implementation has been found to vary significantly by sector.[5]

32.   **The majority of projects that currently include CE activities are service delivery projects.** As the World Bank has long experience with CE in service delivery projects, this can become a cornerstone of mainstreaming CE in Bank-supported operations. CE mechanisms are also used in natural resource management and social inclusion projects. Interestingly, governance and public financial management projects have included relatively fewer CE activities, pointing to important opportunities for learning from experience and scaling up CE where it can improve outcomes.

33.   **CE outcomes are not monitored systematically, and results reporting during project implementation is irregular.** A review of reporting through Implementation Status and Results reports (ISRs) in FY13 for investment lending operations approved in FY10 found that 32 percent of total approved projects reported on CE results indicators in ISRs. Interestingly, the share of results reporting is higher in fragile and conflict-affected states (45 percent). This fact highlights opportunities for the use of CE results indicators to set incentives for adequate monitoring and reporting. TTLs confirmed that the use of results indicators can help focus attention on CE during project implementation.

34.   **Most CE takes place at the project level; there are only a few examples of country-level approaches to CE for improved results.** Some of the larger WBG-supported CDD-type projects in, for example, India or Indonesia have arguably achieved regional or national scale. To harness the opportunities of CE at larger scale, country-level and cross-sectoral approaches can be scaled up where they can contribute to improved development outcomes. Examples of country-level approaches to CE in the World Bank portfolio include the Central Asia Citizen Engagement Framework and the Cambodia Social Accountability Framework (see Annex IV).

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[5]   The work by the Africa region found that CDD-type projects generally included the most sophisticated instruments for community involvement in decision-making and monitoring, while certain infrastructure projects did not always follow through on implementing the CE mechanisms included at project design, or on reporting.

C. Lessons Learned

35.   **Country context is a key determinant for the design and outcome of CE.** As the summary of evidence has shown, government and citizen willingness and capacity to engage, as well as the enabling environment, economic, cultural, and social factors, and the history of government-citizen interaction, are important factors in determining the appropriate entry point and mechanism for CE and in influencing its outcome. For example, a number of countries in Africa that recently adopted decentralization legislation saw an increase in CE instruments, albeit with differences in implementation depending on the characteristics of local jurisdictions (see Annex IV). At the same time, CE has also been found to work in World Bank-supported projects even in countries that do not have an enabling environment for large-scale CE (World Bank, 2014b). The success of CE is also influenced by the timing and degree of political transitions, which can create challenges or opportunities. For example, the political transition in parts of the Middle East and North Africa region has provided opportunities to position citizen participation as part of a sustainable approach to development interventions. Identifying the right entry points for CE for improved results therefore requires analysis and understanding of the relevant country, sector, and local contexts. While context-specific entry points for CE exist in all country types, engagement approaches differ—for example, approaches in fragile and conflict-affected states differ from those in middle-income countries.

36.   **Government ownership matters for sustainable engagement processes.** For some Bank-supported projects, government-citizen engagement processes created or strengthened as part of the project were successfully sustained beyond the life of the project;[6] for others, opportunities for engagement receded after projects closed. This highlights the importance of government ownership of these processes and the need to think through the sustainability of engagement processes from the beginning. Opportunities to build on and strengthen existing country institutions and sectorwide approaches need to be systematically explored with client governments during the design of operations. Incentives for governments to support CE include greater legitimacy and the potential to achieve improved results.

37.   **The objectives for CE need to be clear, and CE needs to be integrated into project design,** answering questions such as how CE activities can support the achievement of project development objectives, and which mechanisms at what stage in the project cycle are best suited in the specific country, sector, or local context. Currently, objectives for CE activities are not always clearly articulated either conceptually or vis-à-vis those engaged, so that it is hard to monitor their outcomes.

38.   **Early successes help to create trust and buy-in from all stakeholders.** The capacity of and commitment by governments, citizens, and other stakeholders have been found to increase significantly once the initial results of CE have been achieved, typically close to midterm. Thus such results can be a driver for scaling up CE activities. Similarly, additional financing or repeater projects are more effective in recording the early results of CE, as are projects that used multiple entry points for engagement instead of one-off tools. In addition, trust is a key factor: citizens need to trust that governments will take their feedback into account to the extent possible, and governments need to have confidence that citizen feedback reflects pressing needs and priorities.

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6   An example is the CDD PNPM project in Indonesia.

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39.   **Multipronged and iterative approaches to CE tend to achieve more sustainable results.** Lessons learned from literature and the stocktaking found that CE approaches that support both supply- and demand-side measures, use a combination of engagement methods, and support CE over the long term tend to achieve more sustainable results. Repeater projects strengthen both supply- and demand-side capacity, enjoy buy-in from earlier results achieved, and in some cases contribute to building institutions that can be used for cross-sectoral engagement approaches.

40.   **There is strong demand for systematic guidance and support to mainstream CE in WBG-supported operations.** Bank staff have noted the importance of ongoing designated technical support, and of improved and systematic access to Bank knowledge on CE. The changing composition of Bank teams has been mentioned as an obstacle to passing along institutional knowledge and maintaining focus on CE activities. To ensure adequate attention to CE throughout the project cycle, staff guidance for IPF has been updated to include a set of indicative results indicators for CE. Illustrative results chains are being developed for five outcome areas including public service delivery, public financial management, governance, natural resource management and social inclusion and empowerment to help task teams think through their project results chain as they consider integration of citizen engagement activities in their project.[7]

41.   **Technology is not widely used to support CE activities in WBG-supported operations.** The use of ICT depends on the nature of the project, the size of the project area, and the number of beneficiaries. It also depends on the approach and context, as in some cases direct interaction between project implementation units and beneficiaries and citizens is deemed vital by staff to build needed relationships, particularly during the initial stages of the project. In projects where ICT is used to engage with citizens, the use of websites or web portals is most prevalent, followed by mobile short message service (SMS). Technology is often cited as expensive to incorporate into a project; however, experience demonstrates that when used in the right context and processes, it has saved time, reduced costs, and increased outreach.

42.   **Time has been cited as a key constraining factor to building CE into project design.** TTLs unanimously noted that meaningful CE requires adequate time for design, implementation, and closing the feedback loop—that is, informing those engaged how the information they provided has been used. Some TTLs also point to the relatively small number of staff with CE skills as a factor to consider in scaling up CE across WBG-supported operations.

43.   **Governments are borrowing for CE activities in priority sectors.** Some staff in the Africa region noted inadequate funding as a barrier to implementing CE in World Bank-supported projects. At the same time, the main source of funding for CE activities has been project components. WBG experience demonstrates that a government's willingness to engage is highest when CE is incorporated into project components that are discussed and agreed upon during project design. Counterpart funding is also a significant source of funding for CE activities. Additionally, World Bank budget and trust funds have supported such work, the latter to a lesser extent and primarily to pilot CE activities.

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[7]   Given the considerable challenges around isolating and measuring CE impact, results chains will help governments and staff think through the objectives and targeted outcomes of CE in the context of a specific development operation. Results chains will not provide a rigorous impact analysis of CE in operations, which requires a longer time horizon.

D. Guiding Principles

44.   **This framework does not propose new mandatory policies but builds on entry points for CE from existing WBG policies and identifies additional context-specific entry points for scaling up CE** across all types of operations where such engagement can improve development outcomes. Drawing on the lessons learned from the literature review and the stocktaking, this framework is guided by five higher-level principles: it is results-focused, it involves engaging throughout the operational cycle, it seeks to strengthen country systems for engagement, it is context-specific, and it is gradual.

- *Results-focused.* CE is not without cost; it requires the allocation of resources, time, and effort to design and implement appropriate engagement mechanisms. For these reasons, investments in CE in WBG-supported operations need to be undertaken where they can contribute to improved development outcomes. Operationalizing this approach entails identifying strategic entry points where CE can make the strongest contribution to development outcomes, being clear about the objectives of engaging with citizens, and understanding the results chains for CE in the specific context of the operation. As the stocktaking has shown, the majority of WBG-supported operations with CE pursue development objectives in the outcome areas of improved service delivery, public financial management, governance, natural resource management, and social inclusion. For each of these outcome areas, sample results chains will be made available to help task teams examine their project results chain as they consider integration of citizen engagement activities in their project. An indicative list of outcome indicators that can be used in results frameworks for reporting progress on implementing CE has been included in the updated Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note for IPF.

- *Engagement throughout the operational cycle.* While consultations are frequently used during World Bank program and project preparation, engagement is less systematic during implementation, except in CDD projects. This framework therefore promotes an approach to increase CE during program and project preparation, implementation, and evaluation, to contribute to improved outcomes.

- *Strengthening country systems for CE within the scope of WBG operations.* To facilitate sustainable development outcomes, including those of engagement processes, WBG-supported operations aim to support and strengthen government systems for engaging with citizens. The scope of such support needs to be agreed with client governments, and it varies by type of operation. For example, a development policy lending (DPL) operation can facilitate the adoption of national legislation on participatory budgeting or procurement monitoring, while an IPF operation can contribute to building effective feedback and recourse mechanisms to improve service delivery in specific sectors or empower citizens at the local level to participate in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of development interventions.

- *Context-specific.* As has been discussed, evidence shows that successful CE requires a context-specific approach and adequate capacity and willingness of governments and citizens to engage. Governments need to make relevant information available to citizens in accessible and understandable formats, and to build the capacity and systems to provide adequate responses to citizen feedback. Citizens need to acquire minimum skills to engage, and they need to be interested in the issue.

- *Gradual, iterative, and scalable.* Because of the complex nature of CE, the time required to build adequate capacity for engagement where it does not yet exist, and the need for continuous learning, the framework proposes a gradual approach to mainstreaming CE in WBG-supported operations. This approach is informed by the evidence and lessons learned from internal and external impact studies, the stocktaking (see Chapter III and Annex II), and complementary regional initiatives (see Annex IV). In addition, the approach has been elaborated in parallel to and in close collaboration with the rollout of regional pilots in mainstreaming CE in WBG-supported operations, allowing for real-time learning from the pilots. The framework proposes to take stock of progress and lessons from the pilots every six months to make this an iterative and continuous learning process and allow for adjustments.

45. **This framework has been developed in partnership with internal and external partners.** Internally, a CE change subgroup, followed by a WBG-wide CE working group, has provided substantive inputs. Externally, the framework draws on the expertise from external stakeholders provided through a multipronged outreach strategy, including (a) a web-based consultation space; (b) several dialogues in capitals and country offices; and (c) guidance from an external Advisory Council comprising representatives from CSOs, academia, governments, the private sector, and development partners. The partnership approach will continue during the implementation period.

III. Entry Points for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in WBG Operations for Improved Results

46.   **The WBG Strategy promotes a more evidence-based and selective engagement model with countries.** At its core, the new engagement model seeks to maximize the use of evidence and analysis to help country governments focus on the challenges of meeting the goals of eradicating extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner, in the context of country ownership and national priorities, and in coordination with other development partners. The new engagement model includes a Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) and a Country Partnership Framework (CPF).[8] The CPF process includes a performance and learning review at midterm and a completion and learning review at completion. The SCD and CPF are WBG products that cover World Bank, IFC, and MIGA analyses and operations.

47.   **A strategic approach to CE in WBG-supported operations for improved results** includes three steps (a) the identification of the priority development results a country needs to achieve in the context of the goals and its development strategy; (b) the identification of areas in which CE can contribute most to the targeted development results at the country level; and (c) the inclusion of CE in WBG-supported operations that support the achievement of such results, anchored in the CPF.

48.   **Entry points for CE for improved results exist across the WBG product portfolio,** including diagnostic, strategic, and operational portfolio products (see Figure 3.1). There are CE entry points throughout the product cycle of all of these operations, from preparation/design to implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

Figure 3.1. World Bank Group Product Portfolio

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
[8] Starting on July 1, 2014, the Country Partnership Framework replaced the Country Partnership/Assistance Strategies.

49.   **Over time, this approach can lead to a programmatic, cross-sectoral approach for government engagement with citizens.** There are opportunities and entry points for CE not only at the country level, but also at the programmatic level—for example, systematic CE to improve service delivery across several infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, entry points for CE also exist in each World Bank operational product (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Entry Points for CE in WBG-supported Operations

WBG instrument	Entry points for CE
SCD	• Consultations with stakeholders (mandatory). • Collaboration with local CSOs, academia, think-tanks to develop SCD. • Analytic work on a country's enabling environment for CE. • Identification of areas in which CE can contribute to improved development results.
CPF	• Stakeholder consultations (mandatory under new CPF Directive). • Consultation with citizens (e.g., through surveys) prior to CPF elaboration to understand citizen demand for WBG interventions. • Inclusion of CE activities in operations where they can improve impact. • Use of CE results indicators in CPF results framework. • CE in performance and learning review. • CE in completion and learning review.
Policy/reform dialogue	• CE as part of a multi-stakeholder dialogue on policy design, reforms, and evaluation.
Advisory services and Analytics	• Citizen feedback on knowledge product through client feedback surveys. • Engagement by local citizens in design, elaboration, and evaluation of knowledge products. • Where relevant, analytic work on responsiveness of service delivery systems to citizens' concerns.
DPL	• Description of country arrangements for consultations and participation for the operation and outcomes (mandatory, OP 8.60). • Government engagement with citizens in the design of reform programs. • Prior actions/triggers related to CE and participatory approaches by government. • CE in evaluation of reform programs.
PforR	• Bank-led stakeholder consultations on environmental and social systems assessment (mandatory, OP/BP 9.00).
IPF projects	• Environmental Impact Assessment/Environmental Safeguards Management Plan consultations (if OP 4.01 is triggered). • Involuntary resettlement: consultations and GRMs (if OP 4.12 is triggered). • Indigenous people: consultations and GRMs where applicable (if OP 4.10 is triggered). • CDD projects. • Service delivery projects. • Public financial management projects. • Demand for good governance projects. • Natural resource management projects. • Citizen-led procurement monitoring. • Capacity building for citizen engagement. • Collect, record, and report on inputs from citizens in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of projects
Grant programs	• Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA). • Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF). • Japan Social Development Fund.

Source: World Bank Group staff.

50. **Operationalizing CE in each of these instruments requires the following:**

(a) *Context analysis.* Defining the entry points for engaging with citizens requires an analysis of the specific country, sector, and program/project context. This understanding can be gained by analyzing such factors as political, economic, cultural, environmental, and social contexts, including supply- and demand-side factors (see Table 2.1) that influence CE in the country and operation (see Table 3.2). Existing diagnostic processes and analyses, such as the SCD, can be leveraged for such an analysis.

(b) *Stakeholder mapping.* All forms of CE require a stakeholder mapping to facilitate targeting engagement mechanisms and understanding the objectives, interests, and incentives of key stakeholders. For consultations, representative stakeholders, including representatives of marginalized and vulnerable groups, need to be identified at the national, regional, and local levels as applicable. For participatory approaches, target groups and champions need to be identified. Due consideration needs to be given to principles of inclusivity and representation, as well as to the capacity and willingness of the identified target groups to engage. Aspects of political patronage and potential elite capture also require consideration. Existing stakeholder mapping processes—for example, for client surveys—can be leveraged for this purpose, although a detailed understanding of the relevant stakeholders in the context of the operation is required to achieve results.

(c) *Clear definition and communication of the objectives for CE.* The objectives of engaging with citizens need to be clearly defined and to be realistic in terms of what they can achieve. For this purpose, guidance will be made available to help task teams work through the results chain for the planned operation in collaboration with client governments, identifying entry points where engaging with citizens has the potential to improve program or project outcomes. Once defined, the objectives of CE need to be clearly communicated to those to be engaged, and documented in operational documents.

(d) *Tailored design of engagement level and mechanisms.* The objectives, context analysis, and stakeholder mapping can inform the appropriate level and mechanism of CE. Where possible, it is desirable to pursue opportunities for CE in operations that support sustainable national processes for CE with governments and the private sector. However, in countries and environments where the experience, capacity, or willingness to engage with citizens is limited, pragmatic entry points for engagement may be at the level of an individual investment project. Table 3.2 provides an overview of engagement mechanisms along various types of CE approaches and a high-level outline of relevant context factors that can inform the choice of mechanism.

(e) *Improved results frameworks, indicators, and reporting.* There is a need for more systematic monitoring of the outcomes of engagement across the product portfolio. The planned integration of CE results indicators into program and project results

frameworks and reporting on them more consistently during implementation and evaluation will help address this point (see Chapter VII).

The next section summarizes key entry points and opportunities for CE in the various World Bank products.

Table 3.2. Overview of CE Approaches and Mechanisms

CE activity	Mechanisms	Government participation required	Citizen participation required	Technical complexity and skills required	Time	Cost
Consultation	Public hearings	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Low
	Focus group discussions	Weak	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Advisory body/committee	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium	Low
Grievance Redress	Formal GRMs	Weak	Low	Medium	Low	Low
	Citizens' jury	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
Collecting, recording, and reporting on inputs from citizens	Public hearings	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Low
	Focus group discussions	Weak	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium
	Citizen satisfaction surveys	Medium	High	High	High	High
	Community scorecard	Medium	Medium	High	High	High
	Citizen report card	Strong	High	Medium	High	High
Collaboration in decision-making	Citizen/user membership in decision-making bodies	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low
	Integrity pacts	Strong	Low	Low	Low	Low
	Participatory planning	Medium	Medium	High	High	High
	Participatory budgeting	Strong	Medium	High	High	High
	Citizens' jury	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
Citizen-led monitoring and evaluation or oversight	Procurement monitoring	Strong	High	High	Medium	Medium
	Public expenditure tracking	Strong	High	Medium	High	High
	Community scorecard	Medium	Medium	High	High	High
	Social audit	Medium	High	High	High	High
	Citizen report card	Strong	High	Medium	High	High
	Citizen satisfaction surveys	Medium	High	High	High	High
Empowering citizens with resources and authority over their use	Participatory planning	Medium	Medium	High	High	High
	Community management	Strong	High	High	High	Medium
	Community contracting	Strong	High	High	High	Medium
	Participatory monitoring	Medium	High	High	Medium	Medium
Building citizen capacity for engagement	Budget literacy campaigns	Weak	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium
	Public reporting of revenues and expenditures	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low
Information dissemination/ demystification*	Information campaigns	Weak	Low	Low	Medium	Medium
	Citizens' charters	Strong	Low	Low	Low	Low
	Citizen service centers	Strong	Low	Low	Medium	Medium
	Budget transparency	Strong	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium
	Public reporting of revenues and expenditures	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low
	Budget literacy campaigns	Weak	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium
	Independent budget analysis	Weak	High	Low	High	Medium
	Citizens' budget	Strong	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium

Source: Adapted from "How-To Note: How, When and Why to Use Demand-Side Governance Approaches in Projects," SDV.
**Information dissemination/demystification is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for CE, but without additional engagement mechanisms it is not included in the corporate definition of CE (see Chapter II).

A. Systematic Country Diagnostic

51. **The objectives of CE in the SCD process are threefold:** first, stakeholder consultations including citizens can improve the analytic focus of the SCD by providing information about citizens' perceptions of the country's key development challenges. Second, collaboration with local think-tanks or universities can improve the quality of the SCD's analytic work. Third, the SCD provides an opportunity to identify country-specific areas of development in which CE can help to address constraints and improve development results.

52. **During the preparation of the SCD, stakeholder consultations including citizens can provide an informative grassroots perspective on the country's development challenges,** fill information and data gaps, validate hypotheses, and improve the understanding of context. The SCD is developed in close consultation with the government and is expected to be informed by inputs and feedback from country partners (such as private sector, governments, researchers, or institutions) and citizens. Consulting citizens, CSOs, media, the private sector, and other stakeholders through, for example, online platforms, surveys, townhall meetings, or focus group discussions can yield important insights on perceived and actual development challenges in a country, their relative rankings, and perceived priority solutions. Consultations also create ownership around the SCD process. Consultations should follow good practice principles, be announced well in advance to allow for adequate preparation of those consulted and for input, and respect the principles of stakeholder diversity and representativeness (see Box 3.1).

Box 3.1. Guiding Principles for Including CE in SCDs

The following principles can guide task teams in incorporating CE in SCDs:
- *Country context.* Understanding the local context and political economy factors are key when considering CE in SCDs.
- *Stakeholder mapping.* When mapping relevant stakeholders for engagement, it is useful to differentiate between (a) stakeholders who can provide analytical input to the SCD (such as local universities, think-tanks, media, the private sector), and (b) stakeholders who need to be consulted to understand citizen perceptions of development challenges (CSOs, community organizations, etc.). Principles of diversity and representativeness also need to be respected when engaging citizens as part of the SCD process.
- *Clarity of objective.* It is important to be clear on the scope of citizens' engagement to avoid unrealistic expectations.
- *Government support.* Wherever possible, existing national and local engagement processes should be used.
- *Process and timeline.* Citizens should have at least one month's notice of upcoming consultations and available avenues for engagement.
- *Closing the feedback loop.* Documenting consultations and reporting back how citizen feedback has been used to inform the SCD process needs to be an integral part of engaging citizens in the SCD process.

Source: World Bank Group staff.

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53. **Collaboration with local universities, think-tanks, or the private sector can improve the quality and relevance of the SCD.** Local universities may be able to provide an in-depth understanding of specific sector issues, as well as local data. The local private sector can provide a view on issues such as obstacles to competitiveness and the investment climate. Think-tanks can contribute potential work on overcoming core development challenges. Such collaboration can occur both at the design stage of the SCD to inform the concept and focus areas of the SCD, and during the elaboration of the SCD itself.

54.   **SCDs can provide an opportunity for analytic work related to areas in which CE can contribute to development results.** In the process of identifying a country's key development challenges, the SCD may identify areas in which CE can strongly contribute to improved governance and results—for example, through improving accountability in public service delivery and transparency in public policy and expenditure. In such cases, an analysis of the enabling legislation for citizen participation, such as laws related to access to information or participatory budgeting, and of existing country systems, can help inform the SCD. Where appropriate, diagnostic work can also assess non-legislated spaces and processes for stakeholders to collaborate with authorities in areas such as third-party monitoring of procurement, or collaboration in or feedback on service provision. Understanding a country's track record in citizen participation and collaboration between government and the private sector can also inform the design of future development solutions.

55.   **Ongoing learning from early SCD processes will further inform the approach to CE in SCDs.** A part of the WBG's new approach to inform country partnerships, consultations and participatory approaches in the preparation of early SCDs provide an opportunity to learn and further refine guidance to WBG staff. For example, one SCD being prepared in a post-conflict country has identified the lack of trust between the state and its people as an important obstacle for progress on poverty reduction, increasing shared prosperity, and regional integration.

B. Country Partnership Framework

56.   **CE in the CPF process has two objectives:** (a) to inform and improve decision-making about the targeting and expected outcomes of the CPF, and (b) to include CE in programs and projects where it can improve development outcomes.

57.   **Stakeholder engagement is an integral part of the CPF process.** The CPF process involves a dialogue with the country authorities, and with citizens and other stakeholders, about the country's development program. Stakeholder engagement in the CPF process should be anchored in national engagement processes around the government's own national development plan. Engagement processes focus on the views of governments, partners, and citizens on how the WBG can best support the objectives and actions set out in the SCD and the government's development strategy (see Box 3.2 on the experience with consultations on Country Assistance Strategies). Tools for engagement in the CPF process include consultations through townhall meetings, workshops, focus groups or interviews, surveys, websites, GRMs, third-party monitoring, social audits, citizen report cards, and community scorecards. Documenting consultations and closing the feedback loop (that is, informing those consulted how their feedback has been used) is an important guiding principle.

Box 3.2. Consultations on Country Assistance Strategies (CASs)

In FY10-12, civil society participated in 82 percent of the 129 CAS-related products approved by the Board of Executive Directors. For example, extensive structured consultations for the 2009-2011 CAS for Burkina Faso involved meetings with multiple stakeholders, including CSOs, rural communities, local municipalities, universities, media, parliament, and the private sector. Some key areas of consensus that emerged from these consultations included the proposition that the World Bank should maintain an appropriate balance between general budget support and project lending, including direct support to local communities, and that it should adopt a better communication strategy in the country.

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58.   **Depending on the country context, the CPF can include CE in programs and projects and support national engagement processes that have the potential to contribute to improved development outcomes.** The entry points and extent of CE activities to be included in the CPF depend on the dialogue between the WBG and the client government, based on country demand and on the areas that are most critical to achieving the two goals of ending poverty and promoting shared prosperity sustainably. For example, in countries where the quality of service delivery in sectors such as health, education, and infrastructure provision has been identified as a key constraint to eradicating poverty and increasing shared prosperity, including CE in service delivery projects can help governments to improve service provision for citizens. Similarly, in countries where governance has been identified as an obstacle to development, CPF support could include assistance for strengthening national engagement and accountability processes— for example, support to access to information legislation, or capacity building for transparency and accountability institutions, legislatures, and supreme audit institutions. The WBG operational portfolio in Mongolia, for example, has contributed to improving the overall anticorruption framework by bolstering the functional system of income-and-asset declaration and disclosure and the code of conduct framework for conflict-of-interest prevention and resolution.

59.   **When analyzing entry points for CE at the country level, country context factors need to be taken into account** (see Table 3.1). For example, in countries with a limited history of CE, pragmatic initial entry points for CE may be in service delivery initiatives, while more complex engagements, such as in participatory budgeting, would likely require additional time, capacity, and trust among all actors. The World Bank's approach in Central Asia (see Annex IV.C.) is a good example of a context-specific approach to mainstreaming CE in country programs. Initiated with the objective of contributing to improved transparency and governance, the Central Asia Citizen Engagement Framework has become a valuable tool to manage risk in operations by introducing third-party monitoring and incorporating CE in country- and project-level operations.

60.   **Citizen feedback can inform performance and learning reviews during CPF implementation.** Potential entry points for CE in performance and learning reviews include the following:

   (a) A client and citizen satisfaction survey addressing the implementation of the CPF to date;
   (b) Focus groups with representative stakeholders of the areas of CPF implementation on lessons learned to date;
   (c) An independent, third-party assessment (e.g., by CSOs, academia, independent experts) of results achieved to date (see Box 3.3.);
   (d) Collaboration with local academics, think-tanks, CSOs, foundations, and so on in collecting results data.

61.   **Similarly, citizen voices can contribute to the completion and learning reviews.** CAS completion reports are based on a self-assessment by the World Bank country team, which also solicits feedback from the government. Potential future entry points for CE in the CPF completion learning review can include the following:

(a) A client and citizen satisfaction survey addressing the results and implementation of the CPF;

(b) Direct feedback from CSOs and other stakeholders on the results and implementation of the CPF program to inform the World Bank's self-assessment;

(c) Governments can be encouraged to solicit feedback from citizens on the results achieved by the CPF program;

(d) An independent third-party evaluation on the results of the CPF program by CSOs, academia, independent experts, and others (see Box 3.3).

Box 3.3. Third-Party Monitoring of the World Bank's CAS for Bangladesh 2011-2014

Objectives. The 2011-2014 CAS for Bangladesh includes third-party monitoring of CAS implementation by foundations, CSOs, and independent experts to:
- Ensure a continuous focus on progress towards results;
- Promote greater demand for good governance and lower tolerance of corruption over the long term;
- Strengthen domestic accountability mechanisms; and
- Provide avenues for citizens to monitor the delivery and quality of services.

CE tools such as community score cards, focus group discussions, and social audits were used to implement third-party monitoring.

Results. Preliminary findings of a third-party monitoring report to verify progress on selected CAS indicators for public programs and projects indicate that World Bank funds have been used effectively for the following:
- Increased access to roads, bringing improved access to health, education services, and economic opportunities;
- Multifunctional shelters that saved thousands of lives in the recent cyclones;
- Wide coverage of communities with access to safe drinking water; and
- Promoting the satisfaction of women who have gained access to short-term employment.

At the same time, the report identifies additional opportunities for active beneficiary involvement and rigorous internal supervision of the implementation of public projects and programs on the ground.

Source: Manusher Jonno Foundation (2012); World Bank (2010a).

62. **Opportunities exist to enhance CE in CAS/CPF products and monitor their outcomes through results indicators.** Of the 34 CAS products submitted to the Board in FY12,[9] half included support to outcomes that enable or include CE in the CAS program,[10] and the majority included in their results frameworks results indicators related to CE. The majority of CAS-supported outcomes and indicators related to CE refer to information disclosure; only five CAS products included outcomes and indicators involving collaboration with citizens, only two included activities related to empowerment of citizens and local communities, and only one included an explicit outcome to strengthen country systems to implement gender and social inclusion policies and frameworks. Country-level results indicators related to CE were used mainly for information and consultation activities, while project-level results indicators were used in the area of collaboration with and empowerment of citizens. These findings point to scope for exploring additional entry points for CE across WBG-supported country programs where such engagement can contribute to improved results, and to the need for an improved understanding of how collaboration and empowerment of citizens might contribute to achieving country-level outcomes.

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[9] Products include Interim Strategy Notes, CAS/CPS, and CAS/CPS progress reports.

[10] Outcomes supported by CAS products enabling or involving CE include increased transparency in budget and procurement processes, improved accountability of institutions, natural resource management, public service monitoring, access to infrastructure, and social inclusion.

C. Policy Dialogue

63.   **Policy and reform dialogue provides opportunities for structured interaction with citizens.** The World Bank does not mandate citizen voice and participation in the general policy and reform dialogue it conducts in a country. At the same time, it regularly consults with the major development stakeholders and partners in a country where it leads an active reform dialogue, and it expects the governments to do the same. In addition, taking the voices of citizens and their representatives into account can inform and contribute to the sustainability of governments' policy decisions.

64.   **Opportunities exist to test entry points for increased CE in the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of World Bank-supported policy and reform dialogues** with a view to improving their quality and outcomes, including capturing the contribution of citizens to policy adoption and outcomes. Specifically, the World Bank can support the following:

(a) Assessments and analytic work on a country's structures and processes for citizen voice in policy dialogue, possibly as part of the SCD, where relevant.

(b) The creation of national/regional/local fora for exchange between government and citizens (CSOs) on policies and reforms, including in the context of multi-stakeholder fora (see Box 3.4).

(c) The definition of objectives and elaboration of results frameworks for policy dialogue, anchored in national development strategies. Defining the objectives of a policy and reform dialogue allows opportunities to identify how citizen voice and participation can contribute to reaching the expected results. For example, different outcomes would be targeted in a reform dialogue about natural resource management than in one about reforms affecting the enabling environment for citizen participation.

Box 3.4. CSOs as Equal Partners in the Dialogue around Natural Resource Management: The EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global coalition of governments, companies, and civil society working together to improve openness and accountable management of revenues from natural resources. Countries interested in joining the EITI apply for candidate status and need to be accepted before they can embark on implementing the EITI standard, including the publication of an annual EITI report. Among others, the EITI standard requires the creation of a group, including representatives from governments, companies, and civil society that oversees the EITI implementation in a country, the so-called Multi-Stakeholder Group. The Multi-Stakeholder Group agrees on its governance structure and working modalities; develops the country work plan for EITI implementation and the production of the EITI report; and ensures that the EITI contributes to public debate.

Through the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the World Bank is supporting EITI implementation in most of the 44 implementing countries, including capacity building for CSOs to engage with and participate in EITI in 31 countries, of which 9 are EITI candidates and 19 have achieved EITI validation (2 are delisted and 1 is a pre-candidate).

Source: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), www.eiti.org.

D. Development Policy Lending

65.   DPL is rapidly disbursing policy-based financing that aims to help a borrower achieve sustainable reductions in poverty through a program of policy and institutional actions that promote growth, enhance well-being, and increase the incomes of poor people. Consultation and participation are a policy principle of DPL. According to OP 8.60, *Development Policy Lending*, "In carrying out dialogue with borrowing countries, the Bank advises the clients to consult with and engage the participation of key stakeholders in the country in the process of formulating the country's development strategies." The responsibility to initiate a participatory process and design its scope rests with the government, but the World Bank can facilitate, support, and advise on the engagement.

66.   **Government-led CE in DPL can help achieve several objectives:** informing the design of the reform program, improving implementation effectiveness, and improving the monitoring and evaluation of reform programs. The World Bank's 2012 DPL Retrospective found that all DPL operations had reported, in varying degrees of detail, on the country's consultation and participatory processes related to the program supported by the operation. In consultations on the 2012 Retrospective, stakeholders encouraged the Bank to think how DPL can contribute to further progress in transparency, accountability, and participation.

67.   **DPL mainly supports reforms in public sector governance; explicit prior actions related to participation and civic engagement are less prevalent.** The 2012 DPL Retrospective found that 40 percent of prior actions of the 221 development policy loans reviewed are related to public sector governance, 18 percent to financial and private sector development, 12 percent to social protection and management, and only 1 percent to participation and civic engagement. At the same time, prior actions related to public sector governance, such as procurement reforms, may include measures that promote transparency and enable CE at the country level, such as third-party procurement monitoring as part of a new procurement law. Box 3.5 shows how consultations in a series of DPL operations focused on public financial management can contribute to results in this area. A review of 51 development policy loans approved in FY11 and FY12 also found that the vast majority of prior actions were related to information activities; very few of the loans had prior actions related to consultations, citizen feedback, or GRMs; and even fewer included prior actions related to participatory and collaborative processes with citizens.

Box 3.5. Consultations in the World Bank's Programmatic Fiscal and Institutional DPL Series in Guatemala

Objectives. In addition to other development objectives, the WBG Programmatic Fiscal and Institutional DPL Series for Guatemala has since 2009 provided support for the following:

- Improving governance and transparency of public financial management and expenditures by creating institutional structures to promote public accountability and reduce corruption.
- Strengthening the effectiveness of the *Mi Familia Progresa* CCT program through testing to identify eligible beneficiaries and improving procedures for verifying beneficiaries' co-responsibilities (i.e., confirming school and health check attendance).

CE mechanisms include consultations between Congress, the Executive branch, and civil society, with the following results:

- Adoption of the Access to Public Information Law, leading to the creation of specialized public information offices in 85 percent of central government agencies.
- Creation of the Vice-Ministry of Fiscal Transparency and Evaluation within the Ministry of Finance, opening avenues for improved accountability, public participation and social auditing, and fighting corruption.

- With improved targeting and transparency, the *Mi Familia Progresa* program was extended into more than 270 municipalities to reach over 900,000 families in a short timeframe. Improved execution resulted in 100 percent of beneficiaries sending their children to school and attending required health check-ups.

Source: '[Fundamentals for Broad-Based and Inclusive Growth in Guatemala](#)' and [GT Fiscal and Institutional DPL](#), Projects and Operations Portal, World Bank.

68. **Opportunities exist to leverage DPL to strengthen country processes for CE.** Such opportunities can be informed by the SCD and will need to be discussed with governments in countries that qualify for DPL and have supply- and demand-side conditions that are conducive to strengthening country systems for engagement. Box 3.6 provides examples of prior actions that have been used to support country systems for participation in recent DPL operations. In addition, DPL has been used to support ad hoc participatory mechanisms. For example, the 2010 development policy loan to Rwanda included a prior action related to completion of an assessment of local-level service delivery, using citizen report cards and community scorecards.

Box 3.6. Examples of DPL Prior Actions Supporting Country Systems for CE

- Instruction issued to set forth guidelines and procedures for procurement under community participation method (Vietnam, FY11).

- Instruction issued related to a manual on participatory planning by communes as well as minimum participation by women (Vietnam, FY11).

- Circular issued establishing a participatory process for systematic monitoring of the performance of the public service by civil society, citizens, and service providers (Tunisia, FY11).

- Borrower has created regional committees to pilot processes for citizen participation aimed at identifying regional priorities within the borrower's public policies (Brazil, FY13).

- Decrees issued to strengthen urban governance by broadening participatory mechanisms for budget execution (Brazil, FY13).

Source: Development Policy Actions Database, World Bank.

E. Beneficiary Feedback: Citizen Engagement in Investment Project Financing

69. CE in IPF can improve outcomes in service delivery, public financial management, governance, natural resource management, and social inclusion. The World Bank has long experience in CE in IPFs in service delivery projects, demand for good governance projects, CDD projects, and projects supporting reforms in public financial management. Engagement mechanisms include consultations; GRMs; collecting, recording, and reporting on inputs received from citizens; collaboration in decision-making; citizen-led monitoring, evaluation, or oversight; empowering citizens with resources and authority over their use; and citizen capacity building for engagement (Chapter VI provides examples of each of these approaches). Consultations and grievance redress are mandatory engagement mechanisms in projects that trigger World Bank safeguard policies. There are additional context-specific opportunities for CE in projects that support reforms in areas where CE has been found to contribute to improved results. When choosing the appropriate engagement mechanism, context factors need to be taken into account (see Table 3.2).

70.   **To maximize the impact on project outcomes, CE needs to be embedded in project design and continued throughout the project cycle,** including during implementation and evaluation (see Box 3.7). Mandatory consultations—for example, on environmental assessments—typically take place during project preparation. While consultation summaries are included in project documents, it is not always clear how the feedback received has informed the final project design. Typically, consultations are not continued during project implementation, although they could be useful to detect and address environmental and social implementation challenges early on. In contrast, CDD projects involve participatory planning, implementation, and oversight during the life of the project. For projects in sectors such as transport, ongoing user feedback and oversight can contribute to, for example, improved quality of road construction or an improved system to report and address road maintenance issues. Engaging with citizens over the life of the project can improve project risk management, promote continuous learning, and allow for corrections as needed, all facilitating better outcomes.

Box 3.7. Tracking Beneficiary Feedback: CE in World Bank-supported IPF Projects with Clearly Identifiable Beneficiaries

The World Bank's IPF operations aim to promote poverty reduction and sustainable development of member countries by providing financial and related operational support to specific projects that promote broad-based economic growth, contribute to social and environmental sustainability, enhance the effectiveness of the public or private sectors, or otherwise contribute to the overall development of the member states. Except for loans to financial intermediaries, all of these investments (which typically happen in sectors such as agriculture, health, education, and infrastructure) have direct beneficiaries. The World Bank President's commitment to include beneficiary feedback in 100 percent of projects with clearly identifiable beneficiaries is being implemented by including CE activities in IPF.

The World Bank aims to integrate CE mechanisms in IPFs with direct beneficiaries across all sectors, regions, and outcome areas, with a focus on engagement during project implementation to allow for continuous learning and adjustments as needed. The choice of CE mechanism will vary according to the country and sector context, development objective of the project, and capacity of governments and beneficiaries to engage. A focus on results ensures that engagement mechanisms planned at design are being implemented and that beneficiary feedback provided receives an adequate response. For this purpose, project teams are required to include at least one CE results indicator in IPF during project design and report on it during project implementation. Progress on including CE results indicators and reporting on them will be monitored at the corporate level through the Corporate Scorecard and the IDA17 Results Measurement System.

In FY13, the ISR results frameworks of 32 percent of IPFs reported on beneficiary feedback and engagement three years after project approval. The target is to achieve 100 percent.

Scaling up CE across IPFs can leverage several entry points. A number of sectors (such as health and social services, agriculture, education, and public administration) already incorporate a high share of CE results indicators in their project design. In these sectors, the focus is on improving the quality of reporting during project implementation. Other sectors, such as energy and transport, use a relatively low share of CE results indicators during project design. In these sectors, the focus is on including CE mechanisms in project design and ensuring reporting during project implementation. Certain World Bank regions have a long history of CE in IPF operations and are already working with a relatively high share of CE indicators and reporting on them to various degrees. Others may start from a lower base but have developed action plans for scaling up CE in IPF going forward, building on regional windows of opportunity.

Source: World Bank staff.

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71.   **CE mechanisms should, as much as possible, build on and strengthen existing national, regional, and sectoral processes for participation and feedback** instead of creating project-specific engagement mechanisms. For instance, feedback mechanisms in utility sectors

should support utility-based engagement mechanisms; participatory budgeting processes should be embedded in national legislation; and third-party monitoring mechanisms should be anchored in existing institutions. As an example, the Village Investment Project in the Kyrgyz Republic is a series of CDD projects that have contributed to building decentralized structures and capacity for village-level participation and engagement. Some of these quasi-governmental structures are now being used by other sectors to implement their development projects. Similarly, several CDD programs in countries such as Indonesia, Senegal, the Philippines, and Afghanistan include capacity building for governments, for example, in the area of decentralization reform or social reforms.

F. Program-for-Results

72.   **Program-for-Results (PforR) financing aims to promote sustainable development and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditures by financing the expenditures of specific client development programs.** PforR operations disburse on the basis of the achievement of key results under the development programs; and, where appropriate use and strengthen the program systems and strengthen the institutional capacity for such programs to achieve their intended results. OP 9.00 requires the World Bank to consult stakeholders on its environmental and social systems assessment, and all PforR operations have carried out such consultations. The focus is largely on system-level issues, per the design of the instrument.

73.   **Feedback from TTLs and regional pilots to mainstream CE have pointed to opportunities to scale up non-mandatory CE in PforR operations,** including in the area of supporting systemic approaches to CE in specific sectors.

G. Advisory Services and Analytics

74.   **World Bank advisory services and analytics aim to influence policy choices and programs, enable and empower clients to implement reforms, strengthen institutions, and improve development actions.** World Bank knowledge services include economic and sector work, technical assistance, external training, and impact evaluations.

75.   **Advisory services and analytics are frequently used to engage with citizens to build consensus, raise awareness, and influence public debate.** The World Bank's FY13 Client Feedback Survey on knowledge and advisory services included feedback from academic/research institutions, media, and nonprofit organizations, which together accounted for 28 percent of respondents. The majority of respondents stated that the knowledge used led to change. A 2013 review by the WBG Independent Evaluation Group on knowledge-based country programs found that the primary use of WBG knowledge activities is raising stakeholder awareness. The review recommended involving "local experts, partners and local think tanks extensively in knowledge services to help understand better the political economy of reform, bridge the gap between international good practices and local conditions, enhance the applicability of the recommendations, and build local capacity to achieve longer-term impact" (IEG, 2013).

76.   **CE in advisory services and analytics is a newer area for the World Bank.** In general, potential entry points for CE in knowledge products include consultations with citizens/CSOs, local academia/research institutions, think-tanks, or media during the design of knowledge products; collaboration with local academia/research institutions and think-tanks in the elaboration of knowledge products; and participation in the evaluation of knowledge products. For example, to assess the impact of knowledge and advisory work to support the review and design of social policies in Turkey between 2008 and 2010, the Bank used surveys to elicit not only the feedback of the government but also that of academia and CSOs (World Bank, 2011b).

77.   **Guiding lessons can be drawn from the experience of participation in Poverty and Social Impact Analyses** (PSIAs). Besides informing Bank operations, such as DPL, PSIA also informs government policy processes and the national policy debate. PSIAs determine the distributional impacts of reforms, as well as the processes by which appropriate stakeholders are engaged in policymaking and integrated into country processes. To enhance policymaking and transparency and strengthen country ownership of reform, it is good practice to involve key stakeholders in PSIA design and implementation. Key stakeholder groups typically include different government ministries, CSOs, parliamentarians, the media, and national think-tanks. For example, the PSIA process in Lesotho helped to mediate what had been a heated national debate about electricity reform. The inclusion of participatory processes in the PSIA contributed by not only better informing stakeholders about the objectives and envisaged measures of the reform but also by integrating their views into the reform proposal, which then reduced their opposition and made successful implementation more likely (World Bank, 2008c).

78.   **Going forward, the World Bank plans to scale up CE in its advisory services and analytics for improved results.** This will entail (a) identifying the development objectives of knowledge work for which CE can help improve outcomes; and (b) developing guidance for task teams for CE during the design and implementation of advisory services and analytics, and training staff to use stakeholder participation to, for example, define the problem to address; collaborate with citizens, CSOs, academia, and others in the analytic work; crowd-source knowledge; and conduct interactive dissemination of findings. Where relevant, analytic work can also be conducted on country or sector systems for CE, such as the degree of responsiveness of service delivery systems to citizen feedback.

H. Grant Programs

79.   **Capacity building provides an entry point for CE.** Capacity building for governments, CSOs, and citizens to collaborate in development interventions can be a component of various operational products, including investment lending or knowledge products. Chapter V.G provides examples for capacity building for CE as part of IPF.

80.   **In addition, the World Bank supports capacity building for the CE work of CSOs and other non-state actors through various grant programs:** the Development Grant Facility, the Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF), and the Japan Social Development Fund. Examples include the SPF-funded Program to Enhance Capacities for Social Accountability in Cambodia and the SPF-funded Program on Accountability in Nepal.

81.   **Launched in 2012, the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) provides strategic and long-term (3-5 years) support to CSOs to strengthen transparency and accountability.** Grants are made directly to CSOs for capacity building, research and knowledge dissemination, networking, and programmatic activities related to social accountability, including activities supporting the enabling environment for social accountability. GPSA support is available to legally registered CSOs in the 39 countries that have joined the GPSA. GPSA has an existing grant funding volume of US$26.5 million,[11] and to date has awarded grants to 22 CSOs in 17 countries through two calls for proposals.

I. IFC

82.   **IFC and its private sector clients engage with citizens who are directly or indirectly affected by their operations in a variety of ways.** This section describes the instruments the IFC uses to engage: the Sustainability Framework and the Independent Recourse Mechanism: the Compliance/Advisor Ombudsman.

83.   **The IFC Sustainability Framework, an integral part of IFC's approach to risk management, helps articulate IFC's and its clients' strategic commitment to sustainable development.** The framework helps clients to do business in a sustainable way, promoting sound environmental and social practices, encouraging transparency and accountability, and contributing to positive development impacts. The Sustainability Framework applies to all IFC projects (investment and advisory) and consists of (a) the Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability; (b) Performance Standards 1-8; and (c) the Access to Information Policy, which articulates IFC's commitment to transparency (IFC, 2012).

84.   **The Sustainability Framework, originally adopted in 2006, has recently been updated following an 18-month consultation process with stakeholders around the world.** The update reflects the evolution of good practice in sustainability and risk mitigation over the past five years.[12] It incorporates modifications on challenging issues that are increasingly important to sustainable businesses: supply-chain management, resource efficiency, and climate change, as well as business and human rights.

85.   **The IFC Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability and Performance Standards 1-8 include a commitment to effective stakeholder engagement.** They are IFC's efforts to carry out all investment and advisory activities to enhance the sustainability of private sector operations and the markets they work in, and to achieve positive development outcomes. Through them, IFC is committed to ensuring that the costs of economic development do not fall disproportionately on those who are poor or vulnerable, that the environment is not degraded in the process, and that renewable natural resources are managed sustainably. Performance Standard 1 establishes the importance of (a) an integrated assessment to identify the environmental and social impacts, risks, and opportunities of projects; (b) effective stakeholder engagement through disclosure of project-related information and consultation with local

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[11]   Global Partnership for Social Accountability: The GPSA in Review, June 2012-May 2014.
[12]   Stakeholder groups participated through consultations with more than 160 private companies; extensive meetings with government agencies around the globe; bilateral meetings with various stakeholder groups; 25 public consultations; and community consultations in nine countries. The reviews by the Board's CODE and numerous meetings and discussions with Executive Directors and their advisors also contributed significantly to the process. IFC received and systematically considered over 300 written submissions from different groups representing a broad range of interested parties.

communities on matters that directly affect them;[13] and (c) the client's management of environmental and social performance throughout the life of the project. Performance Standards 2 through 8 establish objectives and requirements to avoid or minimize impacts. When residual impacts remain, the Standards are used to compensate for/offset risks and impacts to workers, affected communities, and the environment.[14] Implementation of the environmental and social plans is reported annually to IFC by clients, and verified by IFC environmental and social specialists during site visits.

86. **A positive impact of the Performance Standards is the Equator Principles,** which have increased attention to and focus on social/community standards and responsibility, including labor standards and robust standards for consultation with locally affected communities and indigenous peoples (see Box 3.8). They have also promoted convergence around common environmental and social standards. Multilateral development banks, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and export credit agencies through the OECD Common Approaches, are increasingly drawing on the same standards as the Equator Principles. The Equator Principles have also helped spur the development of other responsible environmental and social management practices in the financial sector and banking industry: the Carbon Principles in the United States, and Climate Principles worldwide. They have provided a platform for engagement with a broad range of interested stakeholders, including NGOs, clients, and industry.

Box 3.8. The Equator Principles

More than 79 banks worldwide have adopted the Equator Principles, which are a set of good practice guidelines for environmental and social risk management in project finance based on the IFC Performance Standards. In financial markets worldwide, IFC Performance Standards have been catalyzing the rapid convergence of standards for cross-border project finance.

The Equator Principles are a risk management framework, adopted by financial institutions, for determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risk in projects. They are intended to provide a minimum standard for due diligence to support responsible decision-making. The Equator Principles apply globally to all industry sectors and to four financial products: project finance advisory services, project finance, project-related corporate loans, and bridge loans.

There are Equator Principles Financial Institutions in 35 countries that have officially adopted the Equator Principles, covering over 70 percent of international project finance debt in emerging markets. These institutions commit to implementing the Equator Principles in their internal environmental and social policies, procedures, and standards for financing projects, and they do not provide project finance or project-related corporate loans to projects if the client will not, or is unable to, comply with the Equator Principles.

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Source: http://www.equator-principles.com/

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87. **The Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO)[15] reviewed the IFC's adoption of the Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and its Disclosure Policy (Sustainability Framework) as a marked shift in the way in which IFC**

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[13] Stakeholder engagement is an ongoing process that may involve, in varying degrees, the following elements: stakeholder analysis and planning, disclosure and dissemination of information, consultation and participation, grievance mechanisms, and ongoing reporting to affected communities. The nature, frequency, and level of effort of stakeholder engagement may vary considerably and is commensurate with the project's risks, adverse impacts, and phase of development.

[14] When environmental or social risks and impacts are identified, the client is required to manage them through its Environmental and Social Management System, in accordance with Performance Standard 1.

[15] The CAO has three roles: dispute resolution, compliance, and advisor.

addresses environmental and social risks.[16] The review noted that the philosophy inherent in these new policies and standards signaled a move from satisfying a set of prescriptive requirements to an "outcomes-based" approach that requires client companies to engage with host communities early, to build constructive relationships, and to maintain them over time. It added that sound company-community engagement creates predictability for host communities around project-level impacts and mitigation measures, and can help to prevent conflict around private sector projects.[17] The review also noted that gaps in project-level engagement around impact mitigation activities and development impact reporting undermine efforts to build constructive relations and secure community support.[18]

88.   **IFC brings the private sector perspective to the WBG CE model, including the sector's view on actions by governments, the World Bank, and other development partners.** Two important trends have emerged in the field of international development. First, companies are increasingly engaging strategically in helping to address complex country development challenges in ways that harness their core business competencies, skills, and interests and that aim to create value for both shareholders and society. Second, for-profit companies, social enterprises, NGOs, foundations, public donors, and governments are moving beyond one-to-one, project-based collaboration to multi-stakeholder alliances through which to deliver solutions at a more systemic level in particular development sectors or locations (Bulloch and others, 2011). Thus the private sector can play an important role in increasing prosperity and opportunity, which requires that the market system operate within effectively regulated and broadly accepted governance frameworks, spearheaded by principled companies and leaders (Jackson and Nelson, 2004).

89.   **For the private sector, there are many good business reasons to ensure that business activities are ethical, responsible, and environmentally and socially sustainable (IFC, 2009).** Experience has shown that a demonstrated commitment to values and sustainability can help companies[19] achieve a variety of benefits, including the following:

- Gain and retain loyal customers while avoiding boycotts or other undesirable consumer actions;

- Be perceived as more desirable places to work and able to effectively recruit and retain talented staff members;

- Identify ways to increase efficiency and reduce costs in their operations, such as through more sustainable energy use and waste management, or reduced employee absenteeism;

- Forestall legislation or regulation by adopting voluntary programs, allowing them to develop discretionary standards according to their particular circumstances and challenges or to adopt industry agreed codes of practice; and

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[16]   Office of the CAO (2010).
[17]   Drawn from CAO caseload over the past 10 years, and illustrated by CAO's body of advisory work.
[18]   Aside from CAO work on the IFC Sustainability Framework, it provided advice on project-level engagement though its advisory work on grievance mechanisms and participatory water monitoring.
[19]   Ultimately, companies are developing more mature social business capabilities by focusing on key social business challenges. Businesses that have more developed social business capabilities do not view social business solely as an application or tool. They have integrated it into many functions, such as strategy and operations, and use it in daily decision-making. Although the discipline of measurement is still evolving, more mature companies do not let measurement challenges halt progress. Finally, social business changes the way work gets done, and processes need to be designed to assure its adoption and success (Kiron and others, 2013).

- Win the support of the communities where they operate and jointly solve problems that affect the company as well as the local population.

90.   **Over the past years, a few clients have sought IFC support for measuring the social/development impacts of their work.** This support included advice in defining nonfinancial key performance indicators and the use of feedback tools such as poverty scorecards, narratives, and consumer research. Clients saw value in results measurement and feedback tools, which enabled them to articulate the effects they have on consumers and suppliers—which is important for their "license to operate"—and also assisted them with impact reporting to investors and development institutions (see Box 3.9).

Box 3.9. Feedback from Consumers of a Water Company, an IFC Client in Ghana

The Ghana project provided evidence of the attitudes of over 6,000 water consumers. This evidence was used to underpin business decisions submitted to the company's investment committee, help benchmark communities, and anticipate consumer reaction in new communities. It was used as an additional tool in the company's toolkit of proxies—e.g., size of population, taxes paid, and economic activity.

Using a multi-tool approach including simple poverty scorecards and narratives, the project also provided IFC and other investors with evidence of developments that the client is achieving beyond a particular outcome—such as drinking potable water that is healthier than the alternatives available to these poor communities (e.g., wells, river, rainwater). For example, the community relations team provides the communities with extensive and effective education campaigns. The pilot provided evidence that these education efforts have been successful as people can now correctly identify the difference between "pure" / treated water, and other sources. This outcome demonstrates that people in the served communities are aware of the diseases that drinking untreated water might cause.

Source: IFC.

91.   **Working with interested clients, IFC will test potential tools and methodologies to provide evidence of the impact of stakeholder engagement, including social impact metrics related to several dimensions of supplier and consumer feedback.** These efforts build on two practice traditions—participatory development and consumer research—that have been widely used for over 60 years but have not yet been fully combined. They draw on a succession of participatory development techniques that emerged in the 1950s—rapid rural appraisal, participatory evaluation, appreciative enquiry, and others—and on the customer research industry. In these pilots, the following guidelines will apply:
- Focus on client companies;
- Emphasis on adding value to existing/potential IFC investment clients;
- Implementation in one or two regions, with each region managing its own projects but coordinating with the other; and
- Provision for clients to share some of the cost of these pilots.

92.   **In February 2013, IFC conducted a global survey of its investment and advisory staff to gauge perceptions regarding clients' demand for results measurement services.** The survey results showed that clients require support on results measurement and stakeholder feedback tools, and that they are willing to pay for these services.

93.   **An IFC-commissioned report that looked at the latest tools and approaches used by businesses to consult stakeholders concluded that these tools allow businesses to move from**

compliance to competitive advantage. By helping them to measure simultaneously what matters for business and for development, the use of such tools has led to the following benefits Dalberg, 2012):

- Monitoring compliance with regulation to avert legal or social consequences of noncompliance;
- Capturing marketing and public relations value from social or environmental compliance;
- Attracting capital from impact investors and socially minded investors; and
- Gaining strategic advantage in the marketplace, increasing profitability and efficiency.

94.   **These efforts are also aligned with the current focus of agribusiness companies on listening to consumers and suppliers.** The Committee on Sustainability Assessment, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling Alliance, Rainforest Alliance, the Ford Foundation, the Center for Development Innovation at Wageningen, and the Sustainable Food Lab believe that advancing a shared approach to measuring a core set of sustainability indicators within smallholder supply chains will enable better learning opportunities, increase the ability to compare data across diverse initiatives, and allow cost savings (Seas of Change, 2012). A growing number of companies are expanding their smallholder sourcing programs, including the use of third-party certification.[20]

95.   **The IFC Strategic Community Investment team focuses on developing community investment strategies, strengthening supply chains, addressing environmental and social risks, and conveying benefits through tax/royalty payments** (Box 3.10). Working with the IFC natural resources, agribusiness, forestry, and infrastructure sectors, it provides services such as the following:

- Facilitation of corporate-community engagement and communications;
- Design of participatory planning and monitoring processes related to land use, water use, and local benefits;
- Building company capacity to design initiatives that benefit both the company and the local community;
- Conducting economic evaluation and scenario analysis of community investments;
- Ensuring gender and minority mainstreaming;
- Building local government capacity to manage tax/royalty payments to improve community welfare; and
- Supporting CSOs to ensure that local governments are accountable for how they spend tax resources.

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[20]   The Seas of Change International Learning Workshop, held in The Hague in April 2012, brought together 100 leaders from business, government, NGOs, and research and farmer organizations to discuss scaling the benefits of agri-food markets that are inclusive of smallholder farmers. One of the key takeaways from this workshop was the need for better monitoring and assessing of social impact (Woodhill and others, 2012).

One-Stop Shop for Local Communities. The IFC-developed CommDev.org website aims to increase the access of companies, civil society, and local and regional governments to practical knowledge and tools for navigating complicated, community-focused, social, environmental, and economic development issues related to extractives, agribusiness, forestry, and infrastructure sectors. With over 2,000 visitors each day, it fosters the exchange of knowledge and practical experience on social, environmental, and economic development issues faced by the private sector as it engages with communities around the world.

Skills Development for Mining Suppliers. In South Africa, IFC worked with a mining client to create a program focused on skills development for local suppliers and contracting of local businesses as suppliers to the IFC client. More than 305 contracts have been awarded to 45 small and medium-size enterprises, totaling US$45.4 million and creating approximately 330 direct jobs.

Source: IFC Advisory Services in Sustainable Business, www.ifc.org/sustainablebusiness.

96.   **The commodities roundtables contribute to broad-scale market transformation in key commodities as multi-stakeholder forums where all stakeholders (farmers, traders, suppliers, processors) engage.** Such roundtables aim to reduce risk by developing commodity standards and environmental and social practices through the supply chain that all stakeholders can accept and adopt. IFC participation is consistent with the emphasis of its Performance Standards on the use of certification by clients and their primary supply chains, where credible standards are available. IFC is actively engaged in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, the Roundtable on Responsible Soy, and the Better Sugar Cane Initiative. IFC provides support and thought leadership in areas such as smallholder inclusion mechanisms, standards, positioning for new geographic frontiers (e.g., Africa, Asia), and making the business case for greater impact and its measurement.

J. MIGA

97.   **Throughout the life of a project supported by a MIGA guarantee, MIGA consults with communities and indigenous populations affected by the project in a manner consistent with the requirements defined in the Performance Standards.**[21] Stakeholder engagement is a guiding principle of MIGA's Performance Standards.[22]   While managing environmental and social risks and impacts in a manner consistent with the Performance Standards is the client's responsibility, MIGA seeks to ensure, through its due diligence and monitoring efforts, that the business activities/projects it supports are implemented in accordance with the requirements of the Performance Standards (see Box 3.11). Through the Performance Standards, MIGA requires project companies to engage with affected communities through disclosure of information, consultation, and informed participation, in a manner commensurate with the risks to and impacts on the affected communities. Consultations, community engagement, and GRMs are requirements under several Performance Standards.[23]

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[21] MIGA operations are subject to the same performance standards as IFC's operations.

[22] Performance Standard 1 stipulates stakeholder engagement in the assessment and management of environmental risks and impacts.

[23] Performance Standards 1, 2, 5, and 7 require one or more of the following: consultations, community engagement, and GRMs.

98.   **MIGA is committed to working with the private sector to put into practice processes of community engagement that ensure informed consultation of and participation by the affected communities as well as the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples.** Informed consultation and participation involves an in-depth exchange of views and information, and an organized and iterative consultation, leading to the client's incorporating into its decision-making process the views of the affected communities on matters that affect them directly—for example, proposed mitigation measures, sharing of development benefits and opportunities, and implementation issues. The consultation process should (a) capture both men's and women's views, if necessary through separate forums or engagements, and (b) reflect men's and women's different concerns and priorities about impacts, mitigation mechanisms, and benefits, where appropriate. The client is expected to document the process, in particular the measures taken to avoid or minimize risks to and adverse impacts on the affected communities, and to inform those affected about how their concerns have been considered. If indigenous peoples are affected, MIGA expects the client to enter into free, prior, and informed consent negotiations with the affected peoples, with the help of external experts, to identify and mitigate project risks.

Box 3.11. Successful Grievance Redress in the Context of a MIGA-supported Project

MIGA has developed a special environmental and social review process for complex projects in difficult contexts. One of these projects is a green field nickel development project with complex social and environmental impacts, including on 16 directly and indirectly affected villages with indigenous and vulnerable groups; primary tropical forest; cultural habitat; and endangered and vulnerable species and water resources. As a result, the project attracted strong NGO attention and opposition, while the investor was new to the country and had limited experience in effective grievance mechanisms in complex settings.

MIGA worked closely with the investor to put in place a GRM that could respond to the complex challenges of the project. The GRM includes multiple channels for communities, the availability of local field officers, and close coordination with traditional authorities, creating trust between villagers and local field officers. The GRM provides an integrated system for all types of complaints as well as systematic registration and follow-up.

By linking the GRM for the project to its community engagement, the investor was able to gain the trust of the villagers, develop a constructive relationship with local NGOs, and set a working precedent for other mining operations.

Source: MIGA staff

IV. Citizen Engagement Approaches

99.   **This chapter describes the main approaches to CE in World Bank operations.**

A. Consultations

100.   **Meaningful consultations can contribute to improved design, implementation, and sustainability of development interventions.** The objectives of citizen consultations include receiving input for improved decision-making about the design and implementation arrangements of a development program or project, to contribute to improved results and sustainability. In this context, consultations can potentially give voice to the needs of different population groups, including vulnerable and marginalized groups; improve risk management by identifying opportunities and risks from and to a project (World Bank, 2012b); and increase transparency, public understanding, and citizen involvement in development decision-making (World Bank 2004b).

101.   **Consultations with key stakeholders, including project-affected people and civil society, are mandatory in a number of World Bank instruments**, including in CASs/CPFs, PforR financing, and IPFs that trigger certain safeguards. For CPF and PforR, the World Bank is the interlocutor in the required consultations. For DPL and IPF, the government consults, and the World Bank can support and facilitate the consultation. (Box 4.1 provides an example of consultations during project preparation triggered by OP 4.01, *Environmental Assessment*.) Consultation methods include public hearings or meetings, focus group discussions, household surveys and interviews, electronic consultations, and advisory/expert groups. In addition, consultations can include informal structures at the local level, such as village councils and women's groups.

102.   **Safeguards-related consultations are the most frequent CE mechanism in World Bank-supported operations, and they take place mostly during project preparation.** As Chapter III pointed out, almost 90 percent of consultations for IPF are motivated by safeguard requirements. However, there are significant opportunities to consult with citizens during project implementation for joint learning, risk management, and course correction as needed.

103.   **Good practice approaches to consultation, including closing the feedback loop, need to be applied more systematically.** The WBG consultation guidelines lay out good practice principles such as clear subject and purpose, adequate stakeholder representation and methods of consultation, and disclosure of and timely access to understandable, relevant, and objective information and documentation (World Bank, 2013d). Meaningful consultations also require stakeholder identification and analysis, including due consideration of representativeness and inclusion of women and disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. In addition, safeguard policies require adequate documentation of consultations as part of the project documentation (see Box 4.1).[24] These principles are not always applied consistently. Consultations without apparent outcomes are a complaint from CSOs engaged with the Bank,[25] pointing to scope for

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[24]   For projects of environmental Category A, OP 4.01 stipulates that an annex to the PAD includes a summary of the borrower's consultations with affected groups and local NGOs, including the issues raised and how they have been taken into account.

[25]   CIVICUS IGO Scorecard, included in State of Civil Society Report 2014.

improvements in reporting back to those consulted and in monitoring and documenting the outcomes of consultations.

104.   **Going forward, more systematic use of results indicators will allow for tracking and documenting outcomes of consultations during the implementation of programs and projects.** Guidance and training will be made available to help teams identify objectives and track the outcomes of consultations during program or project implementation. The inclusion of outcome indicators in project results frameworks can improve the quality of consultations and subsequent results monitoring during project implementation. Indicators can track increased participation from women and marginalized or vulnerable groups, satisfaction with the consultation process, or changes to policies or projects affected as a result of consultations.

Box 4.1. Consultation Mechanisms in the WBG Niger Basin Water Resources Development and Sustainable Ecosystems Management Adaptable Program Loan

The objective of the Water Resources Development and Sustainable Ecosystems Management Adaptable Program Loan is to enhance regional cooperation, development, and sustainability of water resources management in the Niger River Basin. Major environmental impacts of the program include the loss of terrestrial natural habitat due to flooding; the loss of mostly rain-fed agricultural land; and induced environmental, human, and health risks associated with the construction and operation of a dam.

Extensive public consultations on the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment started in 2005 and continued throughout project preparation. Civil society, project-affected people, vulnerable groups, and various stakeholders were consulted on the preparation of all safeguards documents. Safeguards documents were disclosed locally and through the WBG Infoshop. An independent panel of environmental and social experts provided advice during the preparation of the safeguards documents and the public consultation process.

Key issues raised during the consultations included the need to (a) gain access to drinking water, (b) improve access to health and education infrastructure, (c) learn irrigation practices, (d) ensure access to jobs and activities for youth, (e) obtain access to land, (f) strengthen human resources for adult men and women (through functional literacy), (g) gain access to credit, agricultural equipment, and marketing infrastructure, and (h) fulfill women's requests for access to equipment for processing agricultural products and island village women's request for training for new opportunities in the resettlement sites.

These issues have been addressed in project design through detailed planning on the resettlement process, including with host communities; local development activities (establishment of new livelihoods, training, capacity building); establishment of services for the resettlement sites (electricity, water, sanitation, transport, health, education, etc.); and environmental management aimed at the sustainable use of resources (water, land, fisheries, agriculture, etc.).

Source: Niger Basin Water Resources Development and Sustainable Ecosystems Management Project.

B. Collaboration

105.   **Collaboration with citizens in decision-making processes and events can make decisions more responsive to citizens' needs and improve the sustainability of program and project outcomes through increased ownership by citizens** (see Box 4.2). Mechanisms for collaboration include citizen/user membership in decision-making bodies, integrity pacts, participatory planning and budgeting, and citizens' juries.

Context. As part of the decentralization process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the law mandated that budgetary funds would be transferred from the provincial to the local governments. As such laws had been widely ignored for years, the process of participatory budgeting was perceived as an effective means to make the budget transfer from provincial to local levels and to increase the legitimacy of the actions of local politicians from the perspective of citizens.

Action. In April 2010, with the assistance of the WBI open development technology alliance ICT4Gov Program in the province of South Kivu, a capacity-building workshop was carried out with the participation of 50 key actors from provincial and local government, civil society, academia, and local IT companies. The workshop introduced the concept of participatory budgeting and showed how ICT could support participatory processes. In August 2010 the provincial government invited all local governments to a meeting and informed of its decision of starting to transfer the funds to the local level. One condition, however, is that local governments start to consult their citizens informally and develop a strategy for the implementation of participatory budgeting. Through the process of participatory budgeting, local governments could now specifically allocate money to provide services to the poor, such as repairing classrooms and roads, and building health centers.

Result. As a result of the ICT-mediated participatory budgeting process in South Kivu in 2011, tax collection increased up to 16-fold in participating local communities as citizens saw that projects started to be implemented, and the provincial government increased transfers of funds to local governments up to fourfold as it saw a more legitimate process to elaborate the budget. In October 2012, the provincial government passed a law to institutionalize participatory budgeting. Other provinces are following suit and are starting to replicate the process.

Source: Social Accountability E-Guide: A Step-by-Step Approach to Integrating Social Accountability into Projects, https://saeguide.worldbank.org/sites/worldbank.org.saeguide/files/documents/Brochure.pdf

C. Collecting, Recording, and Reporting on Inputs from Citizens

106.   **Citizen feedback can be collected periodically on various dimensions of public services provided,** such as effectiveness, inclusiveness, quality, delivery time, transaction costs, and targeting, as well as on resource utilization or engagement processes. Tools include satisfaction surveys, focus group discussions, hotlines, community scorecards, citizen report cards, or SMS/online feedback. Box 4.3 provides an example of a utility-based hotline that was initially designed with grant funding and contributions from the utility and the government counterpart. Following the successful pilot, the government requested WBG assistance in mainstreaming utility-based feedback systems to improve the quality of energy distribution services.

Context. For decades, the Dominican Republic power sector has suffered from poor service, inadequate generation capacity, and frequent power cuts. Consumer frustration translated into pillage and vandalism, with nearly half of usage being illegal. At the same time, lack of transparency and accountability at the provider level opened the door to corruption and irregularities. Poor service adversely affects people, especially in underserved areas. Their feedback, if systematically collected, analyzed, published, and responded to, could help improve service provision.

Action. This was the rationale behind *Vozelectrica*, a pilot project that developed a citizen-feedback system for the Dominican electricity sector inspired by a World Bank-organized session where mayors, municipal staff, and civil society organizations showed how the so-called 311 citizen response platforms were being used in Boston (USA) and Serbia. Following the session, a multisectoral team (energy, social, transport, ICT) set out to test whether ICT-enabled feedback platforms could be scaled up in Latin America. The online platform *Vozelectrica* was launched in Santo Domingo in July 2013. Users were invited to send their feedback on issues ranging from warnings of power shortages to complaints about rude technicians or reports of neighbors stealing electricity. This could be done via e-

mail, social media, and a mobile app, but also through phone and in person to ensure the participation of older (and less internet-savvy) people. Each report would then pop up on a map on the *Vozelectrica* website in real time. In turn, the participating electricity distribution companies assessed the reports and had the option to post their responses in public.

To convince citizens their reports would be taken seriously, given the low level of trust in the electricity companies, the team agreed on a new approach—design the platform jointly with local civil society, and let civil society independently manage it. The companies and eight voluntary civil society groups went through training sessions together, negotiated a protocol to handle feedback and complaints, and held regular meetings up to the launch of the pilot.

Results. As a pilot, *Vozelectrica*, the first of its kind in the Dominican Republic, has proven valuable for all actors. It provided rich information to the utilities about how best to reach customers, what channels to use, the profile of participants, and the equity of service provision. The utilities have requested that the platform be mainstreamed beyond the pilot areas, with views to fully integrate it in their customer-response system. Civil society gained experience in the use of an ICT tool for social accountability and became more involved in the oversight of resources spent in the sector. More important yet, several organizations are considering adapting it to other areas: health, the environment, violence against women, and education. The experience is now being replicated by the Ministry of Transport and Public Works in Uruguay for transport and road users, by the new Quito Metro (with requests to expand to the municipal level), to the water sector in Honduras, and to the energy sector in Jamaica, and discussions have started with clients in other countries (Peru, Argentina) who are interested in using the same type of citizen interaction system.

When combined with other social compacts (agreements between users and the utility in specific electricity circuits) and more traditional technical improvements, these citizen-focused systems produced better citizen satisfaction (from 8% to 92% in pilot areas), better income to the utility (via loss reduction), and better hours of service as citizens no longer vandalized meters shortly after rehabilitation.

Source: Latin America and the Caribbean region, World Bank.

D. Grievance Redress Mechanisms

107. **World Bank IPF projects that trigger the indigenous peoples and involuntary resettlement policies (OP 4.10 and OP 4.12, respectively) require GRMs.** Any project involving involuntary resettlement needs to prepare a Resettlement Action Plan, which includes grievance procedures (i.e., affordable and accessible procedures for third-party settlement of disputes arising from resettlement). Such GRMs should take into account the availability of judicial recourse and community and traditional dispute settlement mechanisms, which are particularly relevant in investment projects affecting indigenous peoples.

Box 4.4. Key Findings from the 2014 Review "Grievance Redress Mechanisms – On Paper and in Practice"

In 2013, The World Bank's Dispute Resolution and Prevention team conducted a first "Global Review of Grievance Redress Mechanisms in World Bank Projects." A more detailed review was conducted in 2014 to assess the prevalence of GRMs on paper and in practice. The following summarizes the key findings of this review:

GRMs are on the rise in IPF projects. They are included in 66 percent of new projects (FY12), up from 50 percent in FY11 and 28 percent in FY08. Seventy percent of GRMs were outlined extensively in projects approved in FY12—that is, the project documents contained more than a perfunctory reference such as "the project will have a grievance redress mechanism." Roughly half of the GRMs designed for FY12 approvals contained commitments to collect the data that the mechanism generates, but only 22 percent of projects had committed funds for GRMs.

However, implementation remains a challenge. Of projects that commit to creating GRMs in design, 40 percent do not end up creating one in practice. This points to opportunities to use GRMs earlier in the project cycle to address grievances before they escalate. Furthermore, almost half of all GRMs reported to be working either receive no complaints or have no data on complaints. While service standards are included in a majority of working GRMs, their inclusion is far from complete. A variety of modes are being used as uptake channels, but technology/SMS lags

as a method of receiving complaints.

Regional and context-specific differences exist. The South Asia region has the highest percentage of projects reporting working GRMs during implementation when such a mechanism had been planned in design. In fragile states and conflict-affected situations, projects were far more likely to include a GRM in project design but less likely to report a working GRM than the rest of the portfolio.

Source: World Bank (2014a).

108.   **Generally, GRMs succeed when the client and the task team are both committed to using such a mechanism and follow good practice principles:** providing multiple channels for soliciting complaints; registering complaints in a log; publishing timely and service standards for acknowledgement, response, and resolution; and ensuring transparency about the grievance procedure as well as options for mediation and appeal. The capacity of local and national institutions to address grievances also needs to be assessed. Staff training on GRMs is being rolled out.

109.   **Recognizing the benefits of identifying and responding to complaints early, the World Bank is adopting a more proactive approach to focus systematically on GRMs in projects and encourages opportunities for alternative dispute resolution, where appropriate** (see Box 4.4). GRMs are increasingly recognized as a means to address complaints early on and manage risks in project preparation and implementation before they escalate (see Box 4.5). For example, the Upper Cisokan Pumped Hydroelectrical Power Project in Indonesia engages an independent monitoring agency to track implementation of project commitments. Grievance forms a central part of the monitoring process, with grievance tracking forms and indicators for a number of cases, meetings and field visits, and satisfactory disposition of cases (World Bank, 2013g).

Box 4.5. Feedback and GRMs in the Pakistan Flood Emergency Cash Transfer Project

Background. In July and August 2010, Pakistan experienced the worst floods in its history, affecting nearly 10 percent of its population across a vast geographical area. The Government of Pakistan set up a rapid response cash transfer program to support flood-affected families—the Citizen's Damage Compensation Program (CDCP). Phase I provided immediate relief to 1.8 million families, and the World Bank's Flood Emergency Cash Transfer Project provided technical assistance and helped finance emergency cash grants for Phase II. Among the improvements agreed upon for Phase II were stronger GRMs and a robust public information campaign.

Grievance redress mechanisms. Each of the program's facilitation centers includes a grievance redress counter staffed by the National Database Registration Authority to address complaints related to computerized national identification cards, eligibility/targeting, payments, maladministration, or lack of response. A public information campaign disseminates information about the grievance redress process through television, radio, and print, as well as word-of-mouth communication facilitated by NGOs and community networks. In addition to the facilitation centers, the grievance redress system receives and channels complaints through text messages and phone calls. Depending on the nature of the grievance and related appeals, different stakeholders are responsible for providing solutions: the National Database Registration Authority, local authorities, the District Administration, and Provincial Disaster Management Authority

Results. While setting up the GRM took time, as of December 2012 the results are as follows:
- 49% of eligibility appeals and 85% of complaints have been resolved.
- 1.087 million eligibility appeals have been logged.
- 536,846 eligibility appeals have been resolved.
- 139,841 of these resolved appeals were accepted for inclusion and issuance of cash transfer debit cards.
- 5,500 complaints (nonworking cards, requests for bribes, etc.) have been logged.

110. **The World Bank will continue to track the successful resolution of grievances received in projects.** According to data for projects approved in FY12, 75 percent of grievances received by projects have been resolved. However, this data point needs to be qualified by the fact that only about one-half of projects reporting a working GRM received any complaints. Data collection remains a challenge, but ongoing corporate monitoring is expected to enhance the adoption of the core sector indicator on grievance redress to make this easier in the future.

111. **Corporate recourse mechanisms supplement project-level GRMs.** The World Bank's Grievance Redress Service receives complaints and supports teams in addressing project-related grievances that affected communities or individuals may raise directly with Bank Management. In addition, the World Bank's Inspection Panel is an independent complaints mechanism for people who believe that they have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected by the World Bank's failure to comply with its policies in a World Bank-funded project and who wish to request an independent compliance audit**.**

E. Citizen-led Monitoring

112. **Involving citizens in monitoring service delivery, revenues, budget execution, procurement, contract awards, and reform policies can increase transparency, improve efficiency of service delivery or budget execution, and reduce opportunities for corruption.** Some mechanisms for citizen-led monitoring include public expenditure tracking surveys, social audits, or citizen report cards. In addition, beneficiaries and CSOs at times participate in the supervision of World Bank projects. A pilot effort in eight countries in the Africa region, the External Implementation Status and Results Report Plus (E-ISR+), aimed to obtain feedback from non-state players on project progress and results, and to systematically reflect external feedback in implementation reporting (Box 4.6 summarizes the main lessons learned from E-ISR+). Additional entry points for CE in monitoring World Bank operations include collaboration with local CSOs, communities, local academia, or think-tanks in gathering results data and conducting joint evaluations of project results after project completion (including in the preparation of project Implementation Completion Reports).

Box 4.6. Lessons learned from the E-ISR+

Background. In 2010, the main sections of a World Bank project's Implementation Status Report (ISR) became accessible to the public, reflecting the Bank's new access to information policy and an effort to open up more information about Bank operations to the external public. The Bank's Africa team spearheaded the E-ISR+ effort in eight countries: Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. The E-ISR+ pilot was intended primarily to disclose current project information to external stakeholders, to obtain feedback from non-state players on project progress and results, and to systematically reflect external feedback in implementation reporting.

Methodology. Assessment teams generally tended to use a combination of in-depth key interviews and focus groups with project beneficiaries and other stakeholders to gather information. The majority relied on qualitative rather than quantitative inputs in their assessments. With respect to contracting out the work to the assessment team itself, methodologies among Bank country management units varied. Some outsourced the task to market research firms, others to civil society groups that had experience working with the World Bank or to individual in-country consultants with civil society experience.

Lessons learned.
- In general, beneficiaries and stakeholders expressed awareness and understanding of project objectives, although in some cases awareness of project objectives was low. Levels of satisfaction among stakeholders on the quality of consultations before and during project implementation varied.
- Stakeholders identified obstacles to project implementation, such as delays in fund disbursement; lack of clear communication among project managers, government, and beneficiaries; and lack of understanding by community leaders of the potential negative impacts of projects.
- CSOs build capacity in finding and analyzing information as well as the technical aspects of monitoring and evaluation of projects. To scale up citizen-led monitoring approaches such as E-ISR+, the capacity of civil society, and the pool of civil society players that have the technical capacity to carry out monitoring and evaluation of projects, both need to be increased.

Source: World Bank (2014b).

F. Social Inclusion and Empowerment

113.   **CDD projects empower beneficiary communities with resources and control over planning decisions and investment allocation.** Over the past decade, CDD projects have become a key way for many national and international aid agencies to deliver services, as participation of affected communities can better meet the needs of communities and thereby increase the efficiency of resource use. The World Bank supports approximately 400 CDD projects in 94 countries, valued at almost US$30 billion. Over the past 10 years, CDD investments have represented between 5 and 10 percent of the overall World Bank lending portfolio (Wong, 2012). World Bank impact analyses found that such projects demonstrated mixed results on achieving targeted outcomes. In the study by Wong (2012), on a positive note, a small subset of projects was found to have achieved a measurable decline in relevant poverty indicators such as incidences of food insecurity, unemployment, or increase in per capita consumption. In addition, impact related to access to services was generally positive. However, impact related to governance and social capital was mixed to nonexistent. Mansuri and Rao (2013) found equally mixed evidence. Local officials have been found to target poor recipients better, though this is more prevalent in rural than in urban areas. Similarly, while community-based natural resource management has been found to improve sustainability, this impact is more evident for forests with limited livelihood improvement opportunities. Participation in local infrastructure development has been found to improve project maintenance, except in technically complex projects. While additional work is required to better understand the causal chains of impact at the local level, these findings highlight the potential challenges associated with CDD, such as limited capacity, elite capture, or the interplay of local politics and resource allocation.

Box 4.7 summarizes additional lessons learned from the long experience with CDD projects in East Asia.

Box 4.7. Lessons from Decades of Citizen Engagement through CDD: PNPM, Indonesia, and KALAHI, the Philippines

The experience of the PNPM CDD program in Indonesia and the KALAHI program in the Philippines is instructive in understanding better how communities get engaged but is critical to understanding how they stay engaged.

- *Transparency in decision-making and the use of funds to ensure accountability, promote community engagement, and empower beneficiaries as central stakeholders.* Information and transparency strategies include both written and oral methods of communication: (a) publicizing project and financial information including audits through village boards, websites, and the press; (b) transparency of fund transfer, amounts, holding, and control of funds, including proactively in village meetings; (c) a community communication platform, including active monitoring by NGO watchdogs and the media ICT mechanisms through social tools and ICT, and geomapping; and (d) literacy toolkits to help participants operationalize information for the benefit of their village.
- *Local controls to promote financial accountability.* PNPM relies on communities taking control of funds and holding the account managers accountable. Financial management is placed close to the beneficiaries. Communities are empowered through simplified systems of disbursement, contracting, program documentation, and grievance handling. Procurement procedures promote choice; communities are empowered to negotiate locally for the best price. Disbursements are linked to public accountability meetings. Villages also carry out cross-village social audits.
- *Planning and oversight by women in separate women's groups.* In PNPM, women's groups have proven particularly effective in monitoring the use of funds and materials. The separate planning stream for women is effective, with rules that women are required not only at planning and information-gathering meetings but also at decision-making meetings. In KALAHI, consistent efforts toward gender awareness are needed to break old patterns. Internal gender assessments found that, although women make up 40-60 percent of the Barangay assemblies, they have minimal participation in the KALAHI decision-making bodies. Moreover, women's contributions in implementation frequently go unrecognized and uncompensated. Gender awareness among project staff, and especially field staff, is crucial in mainstreaming gender equity.
- *Facilitators are a cornerstone of effective citizen engagement.* Facilitators are the agents of change. As a leader, trainer, and advocate for participatory, transparent, and accountable decision-making, the facilitator should address local power relations. The competencies of facilitators are crucial, and their professional development needs to be taken forward as a sustainable effort. Capacity to assist the community is vital, but so is the facilitators' ability to pass on the tools so more empowered communities can do it themselves.
- *Community leaders emerge from groups of ordinary citizens.* The experience of working as KALAHI community volunteers provided an effective training ground to transform community members into community leaders. Volunteers emerged as a new pool of leaders who are more service-oriented and committed—ordinary citizens trained and skilled in community mobilization and not drawn from elite groups in local communities.
- *Citizen engagement strategies need time and flexibility to shift engrained social norms.* The processes through which communities participate in decision-making and implementation tend to disrupt the equilibrium of the existing social systems that enable resources to be managed in a manner that serves the interests of entrenched elites. Breaking down these social systems is necessarily a slow and gradual process and must be done with care and full knowledge of both beneficial and adverse consequences.
- *The involvement of NGOs adds legitimacy to CDD activities, but capacity is a limiting factor.* The involvement of civil society can take several forms: (a) policy dialogue at the national level, mainly through the participation of NGO representatives; (b) independent monitoring of field implementation, (c) providing training for staff and community volunteers, (d) conducting learning exchanges among communities and facilitation in a few pilot municipalities, (e) discussions between staff and individual NGOs at local level to identify areas of collaboration, and (f) engagement in operations and maintenance. Greater involvement was hindered, at least in part, by difficulties in identifying competent NGOs and civil society groups.

Source: East Asia and Pacific region, World Bank.

114. **CDD projects typically have a longer implementation time and can contribute to sustainable country systems for participatory community development.** A number of CDD projects are being implemented under an adaptable program structure, allowing for follow-on projects with an overall longer duration. The average duration of CDD projects included in the World Bank's impact analysis was close to 12 years (Wong, 2012). Iterative cycles of engagement have several benefits: they build capacity in both the local community and government agencies, they build trust and ownership of the participatory approach through a realistic timeframe to achieve results, and they allow for learning and course corrections. They can also contribute to sustainable country systems. For example, the planning structure and delivery mechanisms put in place through the Indonesia PNPM project have become part of Indonesia's national poverty reduction program.

G. Capacity Building for Citizen Engagement

115. **Capacity building for citizens, CSOs, communities, government officials, and national accountability institutions to engage and participate in service delivery, natural resource management, public financial management, or CDD projects can also contribute to improved project outcomes** (see Box 4.8). Capacity-building components are therefore included in a number of World Bank-supported operations. Capacity building for all relevant stakeholders is particularly necessary and needs to be systematically integrated into WBG-supported operations where CE approaches are introduced for the first time at scale at the national, sectoral, program, or project level. A focus on building government capacity is also important to ensure the sustainability of engagement processes beyond the life of a project intervention.

Box 4.8. Building the Capacity of Community Procurement Committees in Fragile Areas to Enhance Transparency in Community Subproject Investments

Context. Two decades of armed conflict in Northern Uganda had led to economic stagnation and weakening of the community safety-net systems and the traditional social and economic fabric. In response to these factors, the Government of Uganda initiated the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) project to empower communities in 18 districts of Northern Uganda by enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and plan for their needs through subprojects; implement sustainable development initiatives to improve socioeconomic services and opportunities; and, by placing money in the hands of communities, contribute to improved livelihoods. The second NUSAF project further strengthened bottom-up accountability with a support program provided as part of a Transparency, Accountability, and Anti-Corruption Program.

Actions (2009-present)
- NUSAF 1 made an effort to build the capacity of community project management committees and community procurement committees in their core duties, including by conducting executive committee and general community meetings; selecting and undertaking viable procurement options; monitoring the progress of subproject implementation; and managing contractors. These efforts were all geared toward ensuring high subproject completion rates and promoting the use and sustainability of community investments or their spin-off benefits. To enhance the involvement of communities in monitoring their subprojects, the project held trainings with subcounty technical staff. In turn, the trained staff mentored local community members in basic monitoring.
- NUSAF 2 instituted community project management committees with the primary responsibility of handling grievances at the grass-roots level. These committees are also trained to use community scorecards — a qualitative tool used for local-level monitoring of how inputs and expenditures match with entitlements and budget allocations. It also provided support to government to investigate reported cases of corruption and abuse of office during project implementation, including violations of project rules and procedures. Preventive measures include routine monitoring, inspections, education, and raising awareness among citizens; enforcement measures include the investigation of complaints about NUSAF 2 projects and, when necessary, the prosecution

of criminal acts.

Results
- *Improved utilization of community funds.* The direct involvement of communities in monitoring enhanced subproject completion rates and promoted the utilization and sustainability of the investments.
- *Reduced leakage in funds.* The strengthened capacity of communities to perform oversight functions helped minimize some forms of malpractice at the community level, such as corruption, elite capture, and waste of community resources.
- *Increased responsiveness of local governments.* Despite variations in capacities across and within districts, local governments at the district and subcounty level have been responsive about appraising subprojects, providing technical support during implementation, and supporting the certification and commissioning of funded community investments.
- *Enhanced capacity for grievance redress.* A total of 3,695 community project management committees have already been instituted and trained in subproject implementation and grievance handling; 31 percent of the committee members were women. The SMS Corruption Reporting System (Report2IG), which will enable citizens to send SMS text messages to report cases of corruption, has been developed and tested.

Source: World Bank (2013b).

H. ICT

1. Impact of Technology on Citizen Engagement

116.   **Growing access to information and communication technologies in developing countries holds the potential to make participatory processes more transparent, inclusive, scalable, and cost-effective.** The impact of ICT-mediated CE initiatives can be reviewed from two angles (a) the effect of technology on participation, and (b) the effect of digital engagement initiatives on public policies and service delivery.

117.   **However, there are conflicting findings regarding the effects of technology on levels of participation and on biases in participatory processes.** A number of digital engagement initiatives show low levels of participation, while only a minority have shown significant success in terms of uptake. Regarding participation biases, assessing two Ugandan mobile-based accountability initiatives related to public service delivery and access to safe water, the Institute for Development Studies found that participants are often "the usual suspects": male, urban dwellers, and the most educated individuals (McGee and Carlitz, 2013). By contrast, a field experiment in the same country studying the use of mobile phones in enhancing engagement between constituents and their representatives found that the use of ICT leads to greater participation of marginalized groups when compared to traditional channels (Grossman and others, 2014).

118.   **Similarly, the majority of digital engagement initiatives to date have had limited impact on decision-making and service delivery** (see Box 4.9).[26] Nevertheless, a few ICT initiatives show positive results, with clear impact on policies and services, such as collaborative policymaking efforts and participatory budgeting initiatives supported by mobile and web-based applications (Peixoto, 2009; Alvarez and others, 2009). The evidence suggests that the shortcomings in digital engagement initiatives are more than a matter of technological choices; rather, they are the result of a poor understanding of the interplay among technology, institutions,

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[26]   Gyimah-Boadi (2004), Pratchett (2006), Smith (2009), Grofman and others (2014).

and contextual factors (Macintosh and White, 2006; Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007; Grönlund, 2010).

Box 4.9. Digital Engagement and Limited Responsiveness

While the 2011 launch of the Kenyan crowd-sourcing and monitoring platform, Huduma, was much celebrated by the development community, a recent assessment shows that of the 3,000 reports submitted via SMS, email, and Twitter, none had been resolved. Scholars have expressed concern about such tokenistic outcomes. Failures in creating meaningful digital engagement processes may undermine citizens' willingness to participate and evoke further public skepticism about participatory processes.

Source: Bott and Young (2012).

2. Role of Technology in CE

119.   **ICT can be used to support CE processes if it is designed to leverage the identified CE approach.** Technology can play a variety of roles, such as facilitating transparency, mobilization, feedback, or responsiveness/closing the feedback loop. To identify at which stage what type of technology can be applied in the specific context of a given CE initiative, the following factors should be considered:

- *Build on existing institutions, processes, and systems.* ICT is most likely to produce its expected benefits when articulated with existing institutions, processes, and systems (Chadwick, 2011; Grönlund, 2010). A major source of failure in digital engagement initiatives is a tendency to position ICT as a solution in itself, giving it priority over institutional design matters, often to the detriment of both. Building ICT into existing institutions, processes, and systems reduces the risk of duplication of efforts and associated implementation costs for governments and increases the likelihood of meaningful engagement by citizens at lowered participation costs. ICT mechanisms for CE range from data visualizations to the use of mobile phones. While the selection of technological solutions matters, their effectiveness is dependent on the design and quality of the participatory processes in which they are embedded. ICT has been used successfully for such processes as participatory budgeting, citizens' councils, petitions, or part of an existing intervention within a government or Bank-supported project, such as the digital collection of citizen feedback to inform performance-based management processes, or to feed into ISRs.
- *Adopting user-centric and hybrid approaches.* The selection of appropriate technological solutions should be context-sensitive (Van Reijswoud, 2009). Clearly understanding how a population routinely uses technology can lower barriers to participation. For instance, research suggests that the use of SMS solutions may affect the inclusion of rural populations (see Box 4.10), who have lower incomes and educational attainment. The use of alternatives such as voice-based technologies may increase the likelihood of including marginalized groups. Furthermore, different ICT tools (e.g., mobile, web) may mobilize different demographics (see Figure 4.1). The inclusiveness of digital engagement initiatives is increased by adopting a multi-channel approach, diversifying the paths for participation and collaboration, and combining digital with offline processes.
- *Iterative and incremental approach.* To ensure scalability and sustainability of digital engagement initiatives, the deployment of ICT tools should follow an iterative

and incremental approach—that is, identifying the best solutions as they are developed and used, allowing for a process of continuous learning that informs the design of subsequent features and solutions. To reduce costs, avoid vendor lock-in, and increase opportunities for collaboration across projects, digital engagement initiatives should, whenever appropriate, give priority to the use of open-source software over proprietary solutions.

Box 4.10. Mobile Phones, SMS, and Inclusiveness

A study looking at SMS use among the low-income mobile owners in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand found the following:

- Approximately 32 percent of the mobile owners have ever used SMS.

- While the distribution of MS) users is similar between urban and rural, a large proportion (73 percent) of the non-SMS users live in rural areas.

- The users' reported daily income was higher than that of the non-users.

- The non-users tend to have lower education; 83 percent had only primary schooling or no formal education.

Source: Kang and Maity (2012).

Figure 4.1. Access to ICTs and Media in Pakistan

Source: BBC Pakistan 2008 Survey of Adults (15+) n=4020; excluded: high-speed Internet and set-top boxes.

3. The World Bank Approach to Digital Engagement

120. **ICT can play an important role in CE as a means to support scalable, sustainable, inclusive, and cost-effective participatory processes.** This requires bringing together different types of expertise and capabilities relevant to activities found at the intersection of technology and CE. The following strategic points will guide the Bank's approach to digital engagement in support of mainstreaming CE in its operations.

121. **Bank operations can support governments in learning how to use ICT to support CE.** To avoid the pitfalls highlighted in the previous sections, areas of support to governments may include the following:

- Assistance for governments and task teams to select appropriate technologies reflective of national and subnational engagement contexts, following incremental and iterative approaches.
- Identification of suitable entry points for ICT in a specific results chain design for CE.
- Design and implementation of ICT solutions that can increase transparency, participation, and inclusiveness, and adapting them for specific contexts, including capacity building.
- Monitoring and evaluation of digital engagement initiatives.
- Bridging the government/digital civil society gap by bringing together government demand and civil society expertise.

122. **Knowledge generation and knowledge sharing:** the Bank will develop a digital engagement evaluation framework to assess the effect of ICT in participatory processes as well as the impact of these processes on public policy and service delivery compared to non-ICT-based processes. The Bank will also partner with actors in the field of digital engagement to promote knowledge sharing and collaborative research efforts. To meet TTLs' demand for guidance on the use of ICT for CE, the Bank will strengthen existing services and knowledge and learning programs in the area of digital engagement in coordination with the broader knowledge management for CE.

123. **ICT-enabled CE will be integrated in projects.** The development of ICT components to support CE projects where such engagement can improve results will follow an incremental and iterative approach, prioritizing the use of open-source software to promote the scalability and cost-effectiveness of digital engagement processes. The Bank will also partner with collaborative efforts that aim to reduce the costs of developing digital engagement solutions, ultimately reducing the barriers for the implementation of ICT-supported CE initiatives.[27]

V. Improved Monitoring and Results Reporting

124. **Better understanding and monitoring of the outcomes of CE in WBG-supported operations is an objective of this framework.** As Chapter III outlined, monitoring and reporting on the outcomes of CE in World Bank-supported operations is not systematic. As part of the results-focused approach, this framework will be followed by work on results chains[28] for CE across various outcome areas. Relevant staff guidance which suggests indicators to be used in IPF results frameworks to track progress on implementing CE activities has been issued[29].

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[27] See, for instance, Poplus: A Global Federation for Civic Tech, http://poplus.org/.

[28] In the context of WBG operations, results chains include inputs/activities, outputs, and intermediate and final outcomes that an operation can reasonably be expected to achieve. In CE and social accountability literature, the alternative terms *causal chains* or *theory of change* are being used to describe similar thinking.

[29] See Updated Investment Project Financing Project Preparation Guidance Note and the Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note.

Building adaptive capacity and evaluating the long-term impact of CE in WBG-supported operations is equally relevant.

A. Results Chains and Proposed Indicators

125. **Illustrative results chains will be made available for the five outcome areas of improved service delivery, public financial management, governance, natural resource management, and inclusion and empowerment, as well as enabling information activities** to help operational teams and clients identify how tailored CE activities can best contribute to improve specific outcomes in a given context. For the purpose of developing these results chains, CE approaches have been grouped into seven areas: consultations; complaint and grievance redress-handling mechanisms; collecting, recording; and reporting on inputs received from citizens; collaboration in decision-making; citizen-led monitoring and evaluation and oversight; citizen empowerment over resources and their use; and capacity building for CE. For each of these activity areas, a list of indicative CE indicators has been made available to teams that can be included in project results frameworks and reported on during project implementation.

126. **Measuring CE outcomes and impacts is challenging because of the difficulty of isolating the different contributing factors, the direction of causality, and the important role of context and enabling conditions.** Building on recent research, the results chains are based on certain assumptions that would need to be validated when preparing specific project-level results frameworks—assumptions related to citizens' ability to access timely and useful information, as well as their capacity, incentives, and means to participate; public officials' motivation and capacity to respond to citizens' concerns; and the legitimacy of collective citizen action. In addition, the results of these processes do not necessarily follow a linear process and can depend on a number of context-specific, interrelated, and iterative factors.[30]

127. An indicative list of outcome indicators to monitor and report on the results of CE activities has been provided in an updated Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note to help WB operational teams and clients develop results frameworks for IPFs. As a basis to select the indicators, the team reviewed the results frameworks of 374 WBG projects and 44 CASs that included CE-related indicators.[31] To systematically monitor CE outcomes in WBG-supported operations other than IPFs where their inclusion can contribute to improved results, CE indicators need to be developed, included in results frameworks, and reported on where relevant—for example, in CPFs and DPLs. In addition, sector-specific CE approaches can be piloted.

128. Internal and external indicators measuring aspects of CE were also analyzed.[32] In addition, useful feedback was obtained from regional pilot projects in mainstreaming CE.

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[30] For example, see World Bank, SDV Flagship (forthcoming, 2014)

[31] The review included 300 investment lending projects approved in FY11-12, 74 of the 199 DPL operations approved in FY10-12, and 44 of 66 CAS products.

[32] The following sources were reviewed to propose indicators: World Bank Core Sector Indicators; Afrobarometer; Bertelsmann Transformation Index; Countries at the Crossroads—Freedom House; CPIA indicators (World Bank); Global Witness Forest Transparency Scorecard; Global Corruption Barometer; Global Integrity Index; Global Right to Information Ranking; Human Resource Management Index; Indices of Social Development; OECD Better Life Index; Open Budget Index; Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Initiative; Service Delivery Indicators (World Bank-Africa); Social Inclusion Indicators (World Bank); Sustainable Governance Index; Transparency International Corruption Perception Index; USAID CSO Sustainability Index; World Values Survey; World Justice Project-Rule of Law; and Worldwide Governance Indicators.

B. Internal Reporting

129.   **Progress on CE in IPF ("beneficiary feedback") will be monitored by the Presidential Delivery Unit by tracking (a) the integration of results indicators into project-level results frameworks at design, and (b) reporting on the indicators during project implementation in ISRs[33].** Improvement in scaling up CE and implementation of grievance redress will be monitored through World Bank Corporate Scorecard indicators on (a) IPF operations with beneficiary feedback during implementation (percentage),[34] and (b) grievances registered related to delivery of project benefits that are actually addressed (percentage). At the institutional level, it is envisaged that such attention will strengthen incentives to improve implementation of CE and GRMs. The IDA Results Measurement System will also track progress on the percentage of projects using beneficiary feedback.

C. Long-Term Impact Analysis

130.   **An institution-wide approach to systematic impact evaluation of CE and beneficiary feedback would provide greater understanding of the links with development outcomes.** World Bank-financed projects typically have an active life of five years, while long-term impacts have a longer gestation period. In terms of approaches to impact evaluation of citizen engagement, the emerging consensus from leading scholars points to a combination of quantitative methods (such as randomized control trials) and qualitative methods, including participatory methods or field-based case study approaches (Joshi, 2013). Such long-term impact evaluations will need to be conducted outside the operational scope of a project to cover long-term lessons learned across a critical mass of experiences.

131.   **Opportunities to build adaptive learning mechanisms into project implementation are being piloted.** Such potential mechanisms can build on data generated jointly by project beneficiaries and government implementation agencies and can be supported by decision support systems that enable project staff and participants to make real-time adjustments on the basis of continuous feedback and learning. This approach is being piloted as part of World Bank-supported livelihood projects in India (World Bank, 2013f).

D. IFC

132.   IFC has recently developed and is testing a tool, the Performance Standard Achievement Rating (PSAR), which measures progress toward higher-level objectives and key elements in the Performance Standards over time. This tool is an index that allows monitoring of trends and behaviors in different regions, sectors, and countries, and supports decision-making and allocation of appropriate environmental and social resources. The PSAR describes the degree of implementation of applicable elements of a given Performance Standard on the basis of a structured approach and the professional judgment of environmental and social specialists. It

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[33]   Updated Results Framework and M&E Guidance Note for Investment Project Financing
[34]   Percentage of IPF operations that report credible action and/or results on one or more CE results indicators in ISRs three years after their approval.

includes a visual component that provides snapshots of regional and sectoral portfolio trends and behaviors.

133. **IFC has chosen Factor 4 (in Performance Standard 1) of the PSAR to measure progress in the context of this Framework.** Each Performance Standard includes two to five factors based on the key elements of the Performance Standard, and uses a six-point rating scale. Factor 4 in Performance Standard 1 focuses specifically on stakeholder engagement for the subset of IFC projects for which the concept of measuring stakeholder engagement is meaningful.[35] Table 5.1 displays the description of Factor 4 Stakeholder Engagement and what it means when it is fully achieved by a project, and Table 5.2 provides guidelines on how to rate Factor 4. Consistent application of PSAR allows the comparison of the PSAR index at appraisal and during the following project supervision cycles, and reflects the value-added of IFC engagement. Additionally, PSAR enables IFC to demonstrate to its stakeholders how it is delivering on its commitment to sustainable development in a way that is easy to understand and aggregate.[36]

Table 5.1. Factor 4 PSAR, Description and Full Achievement

Factor 4	Description	Full achievement
Stakeholder engagement	Information dissemination, disclosure, consultation and participation processes, including grievance mechanisms.	The project has implemented a plan to regularly engage with its stakeholders to be timely and adequately informed about project issues that could affect them and to take into consideration their views and concerns.

Table 5.2. Factor 4 PSAR, Ratings and Descriptions

Rating	Description
0%	None
20%	A few meetings and discussions, but not an ongoing process yet; grievance mechanism is being developed.
40%	Some public events, limited ongoing engagement process. Grievance mechanism is being implemented.
60%	Stakeholders have been identified and there were several events with effective dialogue; Grievance mechanism is fully implemented however there is not enough evidence of its effectiveness. Applicable consultation processes have been implemented.
80%	Multiple and ongoing public consultation and participation in a culturally appropriate manner. Stakeholders' feedback is actively considered; reporting to communities; effective grievance mechanism is evidenced by formal records.
100%	Stakeholders' engagement is part of the regular project activities. Affected communities' issues and concerns are proactively addressed. The project has built fluent and inclusive communication and consultation process with its stakeholders.

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[35] The methodology still needs to be adjusted to make it operational in the context of this framework; the PSAR in IFC is owned by the Environmental and Social Department.

[36] The PSAR design reflects these key criteria and characteristics: (a) it should have an appropriate balance between simplicity and thoroughness; (b) it must be based on key elements of each Performance Standard; and (c) given the diversity of investment products, it should have broad judgment criteria for grading the degree of Performance Standard implementation.

VI. Enabling Factors

A. Access to Information

134. **Access to timely, user-friendly, reliable, and comprehensive information is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for effective CE.** As Chapter III pointed out, evidence challenges the assumption that open access to transparent information automatically induces participation and impact, which also depend on such context factors as enabling legislation and grassroots activism (Pande, 2007; Keefer and Khemani, 2011; Lieberman and others, 2014). At the same time, access to information is required as a basis for effective citizen CE. Information formats and activities need to be part of the design of CE processes and be based on an understanding of the target audience (e.g., regarding their access to ICT, literacy, and so on). Good practice principles for information sharing as an enabler for CE require that the information provided be relevant (responsive to citizens' interests), timely (sufficient notice), and understandable (language, format, and local context).

135. **The World Bank champions a number of "openness initiatives," including capacity building for citizens, in the use of relevant information and data.** Through its Access to Information Policy,[37] the World Bank makes all operational documents publicly available via its Operations Portal, unless certain exceptions apply. In addition, the World Bank is a founding signatory of and regularly publishes data about its operations to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). The World Bank also collaborates with and supports an extensive portfolio of openness initiatives, including the following:

- The *Open Government Partnership*, which works with governments, CSOs, and others to develop an action plan, including measures to involve citizens in open government initiatives.

- The *Open Aid Partnership*, which works with governments and citizens to develop open and collaborative maps, and promotes the role of citizens/CSOs as infomediaries to make these maps more accessible and ultimately use them as a feedback tool.

- The *Open Contracting Partnership*, which aims to enhance disclosure and effective monitoring of government procurement and contracts, including through CE around the use of public resources (see Box 4.11).

136. **The IFC Access to Information Policy sets out the scope of information shared with interested stakeholders either routinely or upon request.**[38] It also encourages all IFC clients to be more transparent about their businesses to help broaden understanding of their specific projects and of private sector development in general,[39] and it requires them to continuously engage with communities affected by their projects through the disclosure of information.[40] In accordance with these principles, the information that IFC makes available enables its clients, partners, stakeholders, and other interested members of the public to better understand, and to

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[37] World Bank Access to Information webpage: http://go.worldbank.org/TRCDVYJ440
[38] Search IFC Access to Information at www.ifc.org.
[39] In addition, IFC believes that when clients are committed to transparency and accountability they help promote the long-term profitability of their investments.
[40] In a manner that is also consistent with IFC's Policy and Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability.

engage in informed discussion about, IFC business activities, their development outcomes, and other impacts of IFC's activities.[41]

Box 4.11: Open Contracting: At the Interface of Access to Information, Capacity Building, and CE

The former World Bank Institute (WBI), now the Leadership, Learning and Innovation (LLI) Vice Presidency of the WBG, has led the incubation of the Open Contracting Partnership (OCP), a collaborative initiative that strengthens transparency and monitoring of government contracts, from pre-award to award to implementation. WBI launched this OCP through multi-stakeholder dialogues comprising leaders from government, civil society, development partners, and the private sector, thereby building commitment to strengthen disclosure and participation in public contracting for better service delivery in different sectors, such as health care.

Open Contracting in Extractives. The OCP is helping to build commitments to open contracting in more than 20 countries, including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Sierra Leone, Guinea, DRC, Liberia, Ghana, Peru, Ecuador, East Timor, and the US. In *Ghana*, for example, all government payments to extractives industry actors are now disclosed on a quarterly basis to enable citizens to 'follow the money' from government to the extractives sector; government has also taken the step of disclosing many of Ghana's petroleum agreements, to further enable 'following the money' of royalty payments back to the public. WBI has helped to accelerate these transparency initiatives by launching the Ghana Extractives Industries Map, a free online, interactive mapping platform that gives users access to and visualizes information about the mining, oil, and gas sectors in the country, including links to contracts, company information and sustainability reports. WBI concurrently launched the Governance of Extractive Industries (GOXI) platform as a space for dialogue, peer-learning, and collaboration for those actively working on governance issues in the extractive industries. The Accra-based Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas—hosted by the Integrated Social Development Center—has been able to guide public sector progress toward a transparent system for managing oil revenues and the inauguration of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee which is tasked with monitoring compliance with the revenue law. Civil Society has started to pilot monitoring tools and applications, to help strengthen accountability among extractives industries in Ghana, and ensure communities are benefitting from extractives royalties, as mandated by law.

Transparent and accountable pharmaceutical procurement and supply chain management. Annual global pharmaceutical expenditure is US$750 billion, of which consumers lose approximately US$300 billion to human error and corruption. In Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, the OCP is aiming to support better health outcomes by improving efficiency, competition, transparency, and accountability in the procurement and supply of essential medicines. The OCP launched this support in 2010 by convening stakeholders from these countries' pharmaceutical procurement agencies, public procurement oversight authorities, ministries of health, civil society, academia, and the private sector. In all three countries, the initiative has facilitated the design and application of innovative tools, which are generating baseline data and providing an evidence base for joint (state and non-state actor) decision-making on reform priorities in the sector.

- *Uganda.* The multi-stakeholder Medicines Transparency Alliance has completed an extensive survey on medicine availability and health service delivery, covering 200 facilities and 10 districts. The findings (http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/files/Uganda_MeTA_Infographic.pdf) from the exercise are already guiding reforms articulated in both the national Health Sector Strategic Investment Plan and the Uganda Health Systems Strengthening Project, and they have informed the midsector review of the project. In direct response to the findings of the survey, the National Medical Stores has revisited its procedures and practices, with a view to expediting delivery of essential medicines to health facilities, especially at lower levels of care. At the request of the Ministry of Health, the coalition is also leveraging its experience in third-party monitoring to track progress in the implementation of interventions related to other areas of health service delivery, including maternal, newborn, and family planning services.

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[41] IFC systematically makes available institutional information and project-level information regarding investments and advisory services provided by IFC to its clients. In determining the availability of any particular information, IFC first considers whether such information falls within the scope of its responsibilities under the Access to Information Policy; and if it does, IFC then determines whether there is any compelling reason not to disclose all or any part of such information. In making this determination, IFC considers whether the disclosure of information is likely to cause harm to specific parties or interests that outweighs the benefit of disclosure.

- **Kenya.** The multi-stakeholder Forum for Transparency and Accountability in Pharmaceutical Procurement collaborated with the Kenya Medical Supplies Authority (KEMSA) to design and test-pilot a Mobile Drug Tracking System (MDTS), which provides citizens, community health workers, health facilities, and health management committees with real-time information on medicine availability in selected health facilities. Since the pilot in 2012, the coalition has received funding from Making All Voices Count (in 2014) to scale up MDTS and to develop a Medicines Price Reference Guide for essential medicines. Such a guide is necessary in the context of Kenya's new devolution processes to ensure that (a) consumers continue to receive low prices on medicines; (b) counties secure competitive prices for medicines; and (c) the opportunities for corruption are minimized.
- **Tanzania.** The coalition has completed an assessment of procurement practices (for pharmaceuticals) used in the Dodoma region. It is now exploring—with the Regional Commissioner and the Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority—quick, high-impact interventions to address some of the emerging issues.

To facilitate collaboration and knowledge exchange among these stakeholders, the WBG launched the Electronic Network for Procurement Practitioners (e-Nepp) platform; it has become a "safe space" to share challenges, innovative solutions, and resources to help move sensitive reforms forward. In October 2014, the OCP will launch a World Bank Study on *Accelerating Health Reforms through Collective Action*: *Experiences from East Africa*, which distills key lessons and insights from building and sustaining multi-stakeholder coalitions in the health sector.

B. Capacity Building

1. For Citizens/CSOs

137. **Building adequate citizen/CSO capacity to engage is important for CE to achieve results.** Capacity building for citizens/CSOs that is required for a successful program or project needs to be embedded in the operation. Capacity building for citizen/CSO engagement outside of and complementary to WBG-supported operations can be provided through complementary trust funds such as the GPSA, which provides capacity building to CSOs for third-party monitoring and other social accountability initiatives. In addition, the World Bank has launched preparations for a Massive Open Online Course to educate the public, including CSOs, about the benefits of engaging with governments and the private sector in development interventions. The course will be available in FY15. Additional regional training initiatives are planned (see Annex V).

2. For Governments

138. **Government willingness and capacity to engage with citizens and adequately respond to their feedback is at the heart of successful CE initiatives.** On the basis of an assessment of the government's capacity for sustainable CE, capacity building for governments to respond to citizens in the context of WBG-supported operations needs to be included in the design of the particular program or project. Capacity building provided through World Bank-supported projects and programs can include training officials in the benefits of engaging with citizens in various sectors and settings and the mechanisms for doing so, including knowledge exchange with other governments that have successfully implemented CE initiatives; investment in complaint management and other systems; and/or additional staff, as government officials typically require time in addition to their existing duties to respond to citizens' concerns.

139. **Capacity building for governments should include support for building effective national, local, or sectoral institutions for engagement,** such as supreme audit institutions, anticorruption agencies, or local government structures. This is particularly relevant in the context of operations supporting improved outcomes in public financial management, governance, or social inclusion. Capacity building for regulators is also relevant in the context of

infrastructure service delivery projects. For example, the Cambodia Demand for Good Governance Project built the capacity of government institutions by, among other things, providing technical assistance to (a) the Ministry of the National Assembly in law dissemination and complaints handling system under the Land Law; (b) the District Ombudsman Office on complaints handling and resolution; and (c) the Arbitration Council on establishing partnerships and stakeholder outreach and training. As a result, the Arbitration Council has handled nearly 1,000 cases with a 76 percent resolution rate, and the Government has established district ombudsman offices throughout the country.

3. For Staff

140.   **In the short term, a number of corporate and regional staff training initiatives are planned to facilitate the rollout of this strategic framework.** The LCR region has already conducted staff training related to ICT-enabled CE; the MNA region is preparing a series of staff training to support mainstreaming initiatives for CE; and the ECA region has launched staff training. A number of existing training materials, such as the Social Accountability E-Guide, are available for this purpose.[42]   CE content will also be included in core operational training programs.

141.   **During the rollout of this framework, it will be necessary to take a flexible approach to leveraging the limited staff resources available to support scaling up CE.** In this context, experienced staff across the institution can take the lead in internal training based on their day-to-day work experience in this area. In addition, the model of "engagement leaders" has proven useful: experienced staff coach and work with TTLs to integrate CE mechanisms and tools into their operations. In the medium term, the objective is to ensure that each Global Practice has access to in-house staff skills on CE related to its sector and area of engagement.

C. Knowledge Management

142.   **A systematic approach to internal knowledge management is required to maximize learning and facilitate mainstreaming CE in WBG-supported operations.** To meet staff demand for access to experiences, guidance, and resources, the MNA and LCR regions have created a web space for regional task teams. In addition, the social accountability and demand for good governance website provides an overview of materials, including case studies, training materials, handbooks, reports, guidance and how-to notes, toolkits, and presentations.[43]

143.   **Going forward, to take into account the new World Bank organizational structure and to facilitate a coherent approach to institutional mainstreaming of CE, it is recommended that the Bank pool all available and planned resources in one cross-cutting CE knowledge platform.** Responsibility for administering the platform will need to be aligned with the implementation arrangements for mainstreaming CE (see Chapter VII.). A single manager for the knowledge platform is recommended to, among other things, identify case

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[42]   Social Accountability E-Guide, https://saeguide.worldbank.org/: A stocktaking of other training resources across the WBG is planned.

[43]   Social Accountability and Demand for Good Governance Database. http://connect.worldbank.org/explore/SDV/DFGG/Lists/Demand%20for%20Good%20Governance%20DFGG%20Resources/allitems.aspx

studies and experiences whose results-focused approach and achieved outcomes make them useful to share across the WBG.

VII. Implementation Arrangements

144.   **In addition to the enabling factors outlined above, the successful mainstreaming of CE in WBG operations requires clear institutional responsibilities and ongoing work in partnerships.** This chapter lays out the planned approach to both.

A. Implementation Responsibilities

145.   **Regions and Global Practices need to be involved to mainstream CE in WBG-supported operations.** The guiding principles for this collaboration include the operational principles identified in this framework—that is, results-focused, context-specific, focused on strengthening country systems, and engaging throughout the operational cycle (see Chapter II.D.) The regions will continue to play an important role in identifying country-specific entry points and demand for CE, and in anchoring CE activities in country programs where such activities can contribute to improved results. In this context, existing regional strategies and approaches for scaling CE can be built on (see Annex IV). The Global Practices will need to prepare and implement the technical operations and monitor progress on the corporate beneficiary feedback target in IPFs. Mapping, consolidating, and scaling up staff skills as well as fostering knowledge exchange among staff, clients, and CSOs are important elements in scaling up CE for improved results in WBG-supported operations.

146.   **An implementation structure is being developed to mainstream CE in WBG-supported operations,** building on existing structures and institutional mandates, and including a light coordination mechanism across responsible units. The structure will leverage existing staff skills in the two GPs with substantial operational experience in CE—the Urban, Rural and Social Development GP and the Governance GP—and will involve practitioners from other GPs, regions, and relevant corporate units to facilitate institution-wide mainstreaming, knowledge-sharing, and learning. Efforts will continue to allow for information exchange and training of practitioners, including staff, governments, CSOs, and other partners, building on such efforts as the social accountability community of practice.

B. Working in Partnership with External Stakeholders

147.   **During implementation of the framework, there will be opportunities to continue to partner with and seek inputs from external parties.** Building on the participatory approach to the development of this strategic framework, the collaboration with the external Advisory Council that has informed the preparation of this framework will continue during implementation. The Advisory Council, which meets at least every six months, comprises experienced technical experts from civil society, government, private sector, foundations, academia, and development partners with proven experience in achieving improved development outcomes through CE (see Annex VI). In addition, regular dialogue with external partners, including CSOs, will be sought during implementation. Furthermore, implementation experience can also be informed by lessons learned from the GPSA. As relevant, country-level dialogues

with local stakeholders on opportunities and obstacles in implementing CE for improved results as part of the World Bank's country portfolio are also encouraged.

VIII. Conclusions and Next Steps

148.   **When designed carefully, CE has the potential to contribute to improved development results at the country, program, and project levels.** The literature review and stocktaking conducted for this framework have confirmed that CE can contribute to improved intermediate and final development outcomes in the areas of service delivery, public financial management, governance, natural resource management, and social inclusion/empowerment. In some cases, CE has also been found to contribute to higher-level development goals, such as poverty reduction. In all cases, the results of CE were highly contextual, with outcomes being affected by demand- and supply-side factors, such as the capacity and willingness of governments and citizens to engage, as well as by political, economic, social, cultural, or geographic factors. Additional research is required to further unpack the causal chains underlying these contextual impacts. While the evidence points to certain recurring themes, such as the importance of government ownership of engagement processes or citizen capacity to engage, overall it highlights the fact that there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach for scaling up CE in development interventions.

149.   **Successful mainstreaming of CE in WBG-supported operations requires several preconditions.** On the side of governments and citizens, they include the need for government ownership, adequate capacity and knowledge to engage, and access to necessary information. On the side of WBG staff, skills need to be scaled up to support CE across sectors and regions; a Bankwide knowledge platform and approaches to knowledge exchange need to be created; and adequate resources need to be provided to cover staff time for the preparation and supervision of CE activities in operations, while funding for their implementation needs to be included in the operation itself.

150.   **Going forward, the following steps are required to mainstream CE in WBG-supported operations in the short term:**

(a) **Systematically incorporating engagement mechanisms in IPF** to move toward the corporate target of including beneficiary feedback in 100 percent of projects with clearly identified beneficiaries. This includes (a) systematically including CE and associated results indicators in all new IPF operations, and (b) improving results reporting on CE indicators in existing operations, with a strategic focus on projects in the sectors that have the largest share of projects (transport, energy, water, agriculture, health, education) and projects that include consultations and GRMs related to safeguards. In addition, GP-specific targets for CE in IPF operations need to be finalized and monitored.

(b) **Piloting CE activities in the rest of the portfolio**—including in advisory services and analytics (e.g., SCDs), IFC investment operations and public-private dialogues— and capturing knowledge from these pilots.

(c) **Improving staff skills:** A mapping of staff skills in the urban, rural and social, governance, and other Global Practices needs to be completed. Subsequently, staff skills need to be upgraded to incorporate a basic understanding of the building blocks of a results-focused approach to CE (context analysis, stakeholder mapping, clarity of objective, and monitoring of results). Staff time required both for training and for supporting and training country and task teams in the rollout of CE activities in their portfolios needs to be adequately budgeted for. Creating a comprehensive knowledge platform for CE and facilitating structured knowledge exchange is required.

151. **Over the medium term, areas for potential further work include the following:**

(a) **Exploring how budget support operations can scale up support for the creation or strengthening of country systems for sustainable CE** with governments and the private sector.

(b) **Developing an approach to improved results monitoring of and reporting on CE activities across additional operational products and sectors.** To systematically monitor CE outcomes in WBG-supported operations other than IPFs where their inclusion can contribute to improved results, CE indicators need to be developed, included in results frameworks, and reported on where relevant—for example, in CPFs and DPLs. In addition, sector-specific CE approaches can be piloted.

(c) **Taking stock, consolidating lessons learned, and identifying additional strategic initiatives in support of mainstreaming CE in WBG-supported operations,** such as sector-specific or programmatic approaches, where such engagement may be useful to help accelerate development outcomes.

152. **The long-term agenda for mainstreaming CE in WBG-supported operations could include the following:**

(a) A long-term impact evaluation of WBG-supported operations with CE;

(b) Taking stock of adaptive learning pilots and lessons learned; and

(c) Ongoing longitudinal research on the impact of CE, the role of context factors, and so on.

153. **In mainstreaming CE, the WBG will continue to work with its partners.** At the global level, the External Advisory Council will continue to accompany the implementation of this framework for 24 months. Additional opportunities for exchanges with development partners and CSOs will be sought. At the country level, partnerships will be sought with governments, development partners, and CSOs to support sustainable engagement processes at the country, sector, and local levels.

Annex I: Overview of CE Mechanisms, Definitions, and Uses

Budget literacy campaigns are efforts—usually by civil society, academics, or research institutes—to build citizen and civil society capacity to understand budgets in order to hold government accountable for budget commitments and to influence budget priorities.

Citizen charter is a document that informs citizens about the service entitlements they have as users of a public service; the standards they can expect for a service (timeframe and quality); remedies available for non adherence to standards; and the procedures, costs, and charges of a service. The charters entitle users to an explanation (and in some cases compensation) if the standards are not met.

Citizen report card is an assessment of public services by the users (citizens) through client feedback surveys. It goes beyond data collection to being an instrument for exacting public accountability through extensive media coverage and civil society advocacy that accompanies the process.

Citizen satisfaction surveys provide a quantitative assessment of government performance and service delivery based on citizens' experience. Depending on the objective, the surveys can collect data on a variety of topics ranging from perceptions of performance of service delivery and elected officials to desires for new capital projects and services

Citizen/User membership in decision-making bodies is a way to ensure accountability by allowing people who can reflect users' interests to sit on committees that make decisions about project activities under implementation (project-level arrangement) or utility boards (sector-level arrangement).

Citizens' juries are a group of selected members of a community that make recommendations or action participatory instrument to supplement conventional democratic processes.

Community contracting is when community groups are contracted for the provision of services, or when community groups contract service providers or the construction of infrastructure.

Community management is when services are fully managed or owned by service users or communities. Consumers own the service directly (each customer owns a share) when they form cooperatives.

Community monitoring is a system of measuring, recording, collecting, and analyzing information; and communicating and acting on that information to improve performance. It holds government institutions accountable, provides ongoing feedback, shares control over M&E, engages in identifying and/or taking corrective actions, and seeks to facilitate dialogue between citizens and project authorities.

Community oversight is the monitoring of publicly funded construction projects by citizens, community-based and/or civil society organizations, participating directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. It applies across all stages of the project cycle although the focus is on the construction phase.

Community scorecard is a community-based monitoring tool that assesses services, projects, and government performance by analyzing qualitative data obtained through focus group discussions with the community. It usually includes interface meetings between service providers and users to formulate an action plan to address any identified problems and shortcomings.

Consultation, as distinct from dialogue, is a more structured exchange in which the convener commits to "active listening" and to carefully consider the comments, ideas, and recommendations received. Good practice consultations provide feedback on what was heard, and what was or was not incorporated and why to ensure that consultations contribute to improved policies and programs.

Focus group discussions are usually organized with specific goals, structures, time frames, and procedures. Focus groups are composed of a small number of stakeholders to discuss project impacts and concerns and consult in an informal setting. They are designed to gauge the response to the project's proposed actions and to gain a detailed understanding of stakeholders' perspectives, values, and concerns

Grievance redress mechanism (or complaints-handling mechanism) is a system by which queries or clarifications about the project are responded to, problems with implementation are resolved, and complaints and grievances are addressed efficiently and effectively.

Independent budget analysis is a process where civil society stakeholders research, explain, monitor, and disseminate information about public expenditures and investments to influence the allocation of public funds through the budget.

Input tracking refers to monitoring the flow of physical assets and service inputs from central to local levels. It is also called *input monitoring*.

Integrity pacts are a transparency tool that allows participants and public officials to agree on rules to be applied to a specific procurement. It includes an "honesty pledge" by which involved parties promise not to offer or demand bribes. Bidders agree not to collude in order to obtain the contract; and if they do obtain the contract, they must avoid abusive practices while executing it.

Participatory budgeting is a process through which citizens participate directly in budget formulation, decision-making, and monitoring of budget execution. It creates a channel for citizens to give voice to their budget priorities.

Participatory physical audit refers to community members taking part in the physical inspection of project sites, especially when there are not enough professional auditors to inspect all facilities. Citizens measure the quantity and quality of construction materials, infrastructure, and facilities.

Participatory planning convenes a broad base of key stakeholders, on an iterative basis, in order to generate a diagnosis of the existing situation and develop appropriate strategies to solve jointly identified problems. Project components, objectives, and strategies are designed in collaboration with stakeholders.

Procurement monitoring refers to independent, third-party monitoring of procurement activities by citizens, communities, or civil society organizations to ensure there are no leakages or violation of procurement rules.

Public displays of information refers to the posting of government information, usually about projects or services, in public areas such as on billboards or in government offices, schools, health centers, community centers, project sites, and other places where communities receive services or discuss government affairs.

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) involves citizen groups tracing the flow of public resources for the provision of public goods or services from origin to destination. It can help to detect bottlenecks, inefficiencies, or corruption.

Public hearings are formal community-level meetings where local officials and citizens have the opportunity to exchange information and opinions on community affairs. Public hearings are often one element in a social audit initiative.

Public reporting of expenditures refers to the public disclosure and dissemination of information about government expenditures to enable citizens to hold government accountable for their expenditures.

Social Audit (also called *social accounting*) is a monitoring process through which organizational or project information is collected, analyzed, and shared publicly in a participatory fashion. Community members conduct investigative work at the end of which findings are shared and discussed publicly.

User management committees refer to consumer groups taking on long-term management roles to initiate, implement, operate, and maintain services. User management committees are for increasing participation as much as they are for accountability and financial controls.

Annex II: Background Literature Review for Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in WBG Operations

1.   This annex is a review of the current state of knowledge on the outcomes and impact of citizen engagement initiatives, which draws on research and experiences of development practitioners both within and outside of the World Bank Group (WBG). Section I provides a brief introduction to the citizen engagement (CE) concept; Section II provides evidence of the impact of CE activities for five outcome areas, including service delivery, public financial management, governance, natural resource management, and social inclusion. Section III discusses contextual factors that contribute to impact. Section IV presents lessons learned, and Section V highlights existing gaps and proposed areas for future research.

I.   CONCEPTUALIZING CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

2.   While the growth of literature on CE attests to the interest in this area and its intrinsic value, it increasingly recognizes the need to harness its potential to improve development outcomes.

> The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is good for you… (Arnstein, 1969).

3.   **Open and inclusive policy-making is most often promoted as a means of improving democratic performance and efficient and effective administration (Shah, 2007).** By enhancing transparency and accountability, it helps to build legitimacy and trust in government. This helps to manage citizens' expectations, build ownership of development processes, and encourage compliance with policy decisions. It also contributes to improved utilization of public resources and quality of policy outcomes and, in doing so, promotes greater equity of access to public policy-making and services (OECD, 2009). Beierle and Cayford (2002) suggest that citizens are recognized as a resource for problem solving, and that based on their practical knowledge and day-to-day experiences, citizens can provide public managers with context-specific information that might not otherwise be available, or notify them of unforeseen factors and thus prevent costly errors. Moynihan (2003) asserts that citizens can provide ''innovative solutions to public problems that would have not emerged from traditional modes of decision making'', and that citizen input can help managers improve public efficiency—either allocative efficiency through better resource allocation choices or managerial efficiency through information that leads to improvement of the process of public service provision. Neshkova and Guo (2012) draw on data from state transportation agencies across the United States to show that on average greater CE is strongly and significantly related to better performance of public agencies, which can become more efficient and effective by seeking greater input from the public and incorporating it in their decision making.

4.   From the perspective of citizens, Robbins and others (2008) note that opportunities to engage directly in policy processes promote citizens' active public spirit and moral character and provide psychic rewards to citizens, including a sense of belonging to a community. It also helps to protect citizens' freedoms and provides them with a voice to challenge the existing power structure. Nabatchi (2010) confirms the instrumental benefits for citizens including educative and

empowerment effects through increased knowledge of the policy process and the development of citizenship skills and dispositions, and instrumental benefits for communities through capacity building within the community.

5. **Citizen engagement is an essential aspect of open and inclusive policy-making and is shaped by both processes and outcomes.** 'Processes' involve (a) the extent of interaction between citizens and duty bearers (i.e., service providers and state institutions) and (b) the level of citizen involvement in decision-making processes. 'Outcomes' require that such processes motivate or compel state actors to address the feedback that citizens and their representatives provide. Multiple iterations of sharing and incorporating such feedback would strengthen the 'feedback loop', and the responsiveness of state actors would help to improve policies and development results.

6. **In order to strengthen the link between CE and better results, Fox (2007) and Joshi (2013) have advocated the distinction between 'soft' accountability, which involves only answerability, and 'hard' accountability, which combines answerability with sanctions when citizens' inputs and actions remain unheeded.** Cognizant with this approach, Holland and Thirkell (2009) and Tembo (2012) have suggested that citizen-led interventions should be studied more closely, and linked more explicitly with desired development outcomes by using results chains. The WBG strategy builds upon this need to strengthen the link between CE and development outcomes, while taking into account the level of two-way citizen interaction and the extent of citizen involvement in decision-making processes.

Box A2.1. Evolution of CE in development thought

The intellectual underpinnings of CE have evolved over several decades. Arnstein (1969) used the term "participation" as the redistribution of power to "have-not" citizens excluded from political and economic processes. Nie and others (1974) used a narrower definition by referring to "those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take". Subsequent efforts to define participation differed in the increasingly direct nature of collective action involved, either to gain control over resources and regulatory bodies (Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994), or as a means of strengthening the relevance, quality, and sustainability of projects and programs (Narayan, 1995).

Parallel shifts in other related streams of development thought during the 1990s also influenced the approach to citizen participation. The emergence of the rights-based approach to development reframed participation as a fundamental human and citizenship right, and a prerequisite for making other rights claims (Ferguson 1999). Participatory development moved toward increasing poor and marginalized people's influence over the wider decision-making processes that affect their lives (Gaventa and Valderrama, 1999). And finally, the rise of the "good governance" agenda and its concerns with decentralized governance and increasing the responsiveness of governments to citizens' voices (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001) naturally lent itself to increased social accountability.

II. EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF CE

7. Emerging evidence shows that CE can lead to improved intermediate and final development results in suitable contexts, though its impact on broader development outcomes is mixed. Citizen engagement initiatives have increased transparency[1] and citizen trust in government (Cooper and others, 2006; Yang 2005), enhanced governmental legitimacy (Fung 2006), improved outcomes of macro-economic policies (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2003), and

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[1] Open Budget Survey 2012. International Budget Partnership. www.openbudgetindex.org

raised the frequency and quality of governmental responsiveness (Yang and Holzer 2006). From the perspective of development partners, Isham and others (2005) find a clear positive association between participation and project success by using evidence from rural water projects across 49 countries to assess participation and project outcomes. Sara and Katz (1998) find that greater participation is linked to more project sustainability, and Isham and Kähkönen (2000) find that CE leads to greater satisfaction with service design and also to superior health outcomes (Winters, 2003).

8.   **At the same time, CE literature is cognizant of instances where CE either had no impact on development outcomes or led to adverse outcomes which were unintended.** For instance, Bräutigam (2004) concluded, based on a comparative study of five countries, that participatory budgeting is neither necessary nor sufficient for making government spending more pro-poor. Similarly, Shatkin (2000) found in his study of participatory planning of urban housing in the Philippines that the influence of citizens on government decisions has not increased and therefore the degree of government responsiveness has not changed. Lastly, Francis and James (2003) found that decisions on resource allocation to villages in Uganda do not reflect villagers' needs in spite of having been planned with them.

9.   **This mixed state of evidence on broader development outcomes can in part be attributed to its highly contextualized nature and the validity and sustainability of intermediate changes that could induce improved policy, practice, behavior, and power relations (Menocal and Sharma, 2008).** However, it also demonstrates the need to strengthen the evidence base in this area to address the following issues:

- Since CE is used to refer to a diverse set of initiatives and activities, there is lack of consistency in what is being measured.
- This area is highly contextualized, so it is hard to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous factors and to isolate the interaction of specific inputs and enabling conditions.
- Even specific CE initiatives lack a theory of change, which makes it more difficult to define successes and examine impact. In some instances they may lead to one-off outcomes; in other cases where such outcomes become institutionalized, there is a dearth of longitudinal research to assess whether such initiatives continued to work and what type of outcomes they achieved.
- Rather than sectors (e.g., education) or outcomes (e.g., pro-poor budgeting), the frame of reference is usually based on a tool-based approach (e.g., community scorecards).

Box A2.2: Methods to Measure the Impact of CE

- ***Randomized controlled trials.*** Properly conducted experimental designs, especially randomized controlled trials, are considered a good research method to consult when looking for clear quantitative measures of causal effects and in overcoming attribution problems faced by other evaluation methods. However, they can be narrowly focused and often do not address seriously the question of causality.

- ***Qualitative case studies and case study analysis.*** There have been a number of qualitative case studies on transparency and accountability initiatives, using a range of ethnographic, historical, and observational techniques. However, case material can be more descriptive than analytical and requires the extraction of evidence on impact, rather than being impact-focused.

- ***Participatory approaches.*** These have been used to a limited extent. In service delivery, for example,

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community scorecard initiatives have lent themselves to participatory evaluations or assessments as a natural progression from participatory deliberation or dialogue between dissatisfied community users and service-provider representatives. While participatory evaluations are useful for highlighting impacts that are important for users, they are often criticized for bias in reporting successes.

- *Indices and rankings.* These exist in various sectors. For instance, the International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Survey assesses how far national governments offer public access and opportunities to participate in budget processes.

Source: Joshi (2013).

10.   **The following sections present an overview of evidence for the CE impact on five development outcome areas:** (a) public service delivery, (b) public financial management, (c) governance, (d) social inclusion and empowerment, and (e) natural resource management. These areas have been selected based on an illustrative review of the literature on CE and social accountability and stocktaking of nearly 420 World Bank projects for which improved beneficiary feedback or CE features as project development objectives or as components of various stages of the project cycle.

A. Service Delivery

11.   The framework proposed by the *2004 World Development Report: Making Services Work for Poor People* (World Bank 2003) defined a "long" and a "short" route to analyze accountability relationships among policy makers, providers, and citizens. Citizens can adopt the "long" route to influence policy makers who in turn influence service delivery through providers, or the "short route," through which they can—individually and collectively—directly influence, participate in, and supervise service delivery by providers. There are multiple instances that provide strong evidence for CE impact on service delivery in health, education, infrastructure, water, and housing/urban development. In cases where it has had no impact, context and operational modalities have been important to determine such outcomes. Citizen engagement in this area can be particularly useful in countries (and sectors) where the government and the private sector have been unable to provide essential services to citizens due to the misallocation of resources and corruption, weak incentives or a lack of articulated demand (Malena and others, 2004).

(a) *Health*
- Cornwall and Shankland (2008) trace how Brazil's universal health system has utilized innovative participatory practices to engage thousands of citizens to deliberate over health policy from the municipal level to the national level, and to track the implementation of these policies to improve both access and quality of healthcare.

- In Andhra Pradesh, India, Misra (2007) shows how community scorecards were used to highlight discrepancies in the self-evaluation of primary health-care service providers and their evaluation by the communities they served. Subsequent discussion of these different perceptions led to an action plan in which providers agreed to undergo training to improve their interactions with users, to change the health centers' timings to better meet community needs, to institutionalize a better grievance redress system, and to display medicine stocks publicly.

- In Gujarat, India, activation of social justice committees has mobilized the redistribution of government provided development services to meet the needs of *dalit* communities, including provision of water and electricity, land and housing, roads and infrastructures, and access to welfare services available for the poorest of the poor (Mohanty, 2010).

- In Maharashtra, Murty and others (2007) document how a health and policy awareness campaign implemented in conjunction with the use of community scorecards led to increased clinic utilization rates and a decline in malnutrition in several villages over a period of just six months. Not only did client satisfaction improve, but several villages demanded that the scorecard process be repeated after three or six months, attesting to the value the local communities saw in the intervention.

- In South Africa, new opportunities for participation in health facility boards led to changes in the overall health approach, "from being curative in nature to one that is primary and holistic, addressing the impacts of socioeconomic issues such as unemployment and poverty on the well-being of the community" (Williams, 2007).

- Bjorkman-Nyqvist and Svensson (2009) found that when local NGOs in Uganda encouraged communities to engage with local health services, they were more likely to monitor providers. As a result, both the quality and quantity of health service provision improved as communities began to more extensively monitor the health providers. One year later there were perceptible improvements in the utilization of health services, significant weight-for-age z-score gains of infants, and markedly lower deaths among children.

- In Zimbabwe, four wards with Health Centre Committees performed better than four without, including in level of health resources within clinics, service coverage, and community health indicators (Loewenson and Rusike, 2004). The association between Health Centre Committees and improved health outcomes was observed even in highly under-resourced communities and clinics (Molyneux and others, 2012).

In contrast
- In Benin, Keefer and Khemani (2011) trace how households exposed to radio programming on the benefits of using bed nets to avoid malaria ended up paying for these bed nets rather than holding local governments accountable for their distribution. These results show that in an environment with barriers to government responsiveness, greater access to mass media may not enable citizens to extract more benefits from government programs.

- In Nigeria, interviewee comments suggested that community participation was enhanced through the Bamako Initiative, with committees being involved in health activities, the provision of equipment, and identifying those deserving exemption from fees (Uzochukwu and others, 2004). However, committee members complained of exclusion from the co-management of user fees and revolving funds, and from priority setting or decision making (Molyneux and others, 2012).

- McNamara (2006) finds that the availability of publicly generated performance data through provider report cards in the USA health sector have not influenced citizens' decisions about which facilities to use even though better facilities may be available. In some cases, providers improved services in response to their performance on the indicators used in the report cards; in others, they improved their rankings by using strategies that improve scores but might undermine access and quality of healthcare. Key contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of such report cards include cultural characteristics (e.g., literacy rates, corruption indices, consumerism); health care market attributes (e.g., purchaser mix, provider supply); and information system capacity.

- Abelson and Gauvin (2004) find that community-level advisory boards in Nova Scotia, Quebec and Saskatchewan, which have a legal mandate to provide citizen input into regional health system decision making, did not involve meaningful engagement and served better as platforms for 'relationship-building' (Abelson and Gauvin, 2004).

(b) *Education*
- In Bangladesh, parents with girls attending school mobilized to encourage other families in the community to send their children, particularly girls, to school. In addition to providing school fees and supplies to facilitate girls' enrolment, parents also monitored teacher attendance to discourage absenteeism (Kabeer, 2005).

- Duflo and Rya (2012) found that in India enhancing incentives for teachers combined with strong accountability mechanisms improved teacher attendance rates in schools. During a randomized control trial experiment, cameras were given to schools to take digitally dated pictures of teachers at the beginning and end of each day. Teachers were guaranteed a base pay with additional increments linked to attendance rates. Absence rates in participating schools dropped to 21 percent—compared with a little over 40 percent at baseline and in comparison schools—and stayed constant even after 14 months of the program.

- In Kenya, a randomized experiment found that compared to hiring teachers through the civil service or parent-teacher association committees, hiring teachers on short contracts and working with communities to monitor their performance had a significant positive impact on student achievements (Duflo and others, 2008).

- Lassibille and others (2010) report on a random experiment in which different approaches were compared in schools in Madagascar. The findings showed that demand-led interventions led to significant improvements in teacher behavior and raised school attendance and test scores when compared with top-down interventions, which had minimal effects.

- A field and laboratory experiment of community-monitoring interventions in schools in Uganda found that when community monitoring involved a participation component to help collective definition of problems and indicators, it had a substantial impact on pupil test scores as well as absenteeism rates of both teachers and pupils (Barr and others, 2012).

- A review by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) on outcomes for children who attended community-managed schools in El Salvador showed that community-managed schools had fewer absences than comparable schools that were centrally managed. They find that enhanced community and parental involvement in EDUCO schools has improved students' language skills and diminished student absences, which may have long-term effects on achievement.

- In Mexico, the Quality Schools Program which included parent associations in designing, implementing and monitoring educational improvement plans led to a decline in drop-out rates, failure rates, and repetition rates. Qualitative data suggested this was due to increased parent participation in the school and supervision of homework (Shapiro and Skoufias, 2006).

In contrast
- Banerjee and others (2010) conducted a randomized evaluation of three different interventions designed to promote community monitoring of public education services in Uttar Pradesh: providing information on existing institutions, training community members in a testing tool for children, and training volunteers to hold remedial reading camps. These interventions had no impact on community involvement, teacher effort, or learning outcomes inside the school. However, in the third intervention, youth volunteered to teach camps, and children who attended these camps substantially improved their reading skills.

- In yet another example in Uttar Pradesh, village volunteers prepared report cards on the reading ability of children in 195 randomly selected villages, and a local NGO facilitated information-sharing sessions to share these findings with teachers, local government representatives, and residents in village-wide meetings. An evaluation found no difference in community participation, teacher effort, or learning outcomes in public schools between the villages where the meetings took place and 85 randomly selected "control" villages where no meetings were held. Reading scores did increase in 65 villages (among the 195), but this was only where a local NGO held additional classes to improve reading skills outside the public school system (Khemani, 2008).

(c) *Infrastructure*
- Using data from Northern Pakistan, Khwaja (2004) finds that project maintenance improved substantially for infrastructure projects provided by the community in collaboration with the Agha Khan Rural Support Program, in comparison with similar projects provided by government line departments. At the same time he also cautions that maintenance for more technical infrastructure projects may be beyond the scope of the community.

- Guided by the Uganda Debt Network (a civil society organization), community monitoring committees verified the quality of the building materials and the share of local taxes that were being utilized to identify and correct substandard construction of classrooms by contractors who were not abiding with construction requirements (De Renzio and others, 2006).

- The Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government, a civil society organization in the Philippines, has worked with local monitors in Abra province to verify that road and bridge construction projects are executed according to contract norms. Their activities have resulted in the reprimand of government officials charged with corruption, revised directives regarding the payment of road construction contractors, and a partnership with the National Commission on Audit to conduct participatory audits of road repair projects in Abra province (Ramkumar, 2008).

- Over the course of two years, the multi-stakeholder group involved in the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative's pilot in Ethiopia managed to persuade the government to change its legal requirements for disclosure of information in the construction sector (CoST, 2011).

In contrast
- Based on a randomized field experiment on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects, Olken (2010) shows how increasing government audits from 4 percent of projects to 100 percent had a greater impact on curbing leaked expenditures by 8 percentage points as compared to increasing grassroots participation in monitoring these projects. This case suggests that grassroots monitoring can be more effective in circumstances in which there is relatively little free-riding. For example, programs that provide private goods such as subsidized food, education, or medical care, where individual citizens have a personal stake in ensuring that the goods are delivered and that theft is minimized, may be appropriate candidates for grassroots monitoring. For public goods in which incentives to monitor are much weaker such as infrastructure projects studied here, the results suggest that using professional auditors may be much more effective.

- Since 2006, the Civil Society Working Group for the Interoceanic Highway in Peru has raised concerns regarding major environmental impacts, an inadequate mitigation process, and a lack of transparency in funding flows and decision-making. However, while they have succeeded in participating in the discourse on the construction of the highway, the impact of their involvement to date is unclear. Reasons for this include concerns regarding the group's legitimacy since it includes more NGOs as compared to other stakeholders (such as local communities, local universities, or even the business sector), and the fact that it does not have grassroots support (Pieck, 2013).

(d) *Water*
- In post-war Angola, the formation of associational water committees led to improved water services in urban Luanda, and extension of civic engagement into other aspects of urban development, such as sanitation (Roque and Shankland, 2007).

- In Hyderabad, Metro Water started a complaints hotline that enabled managers to hold front-line providers accountable by using this direct link with citizens. The findings of an evaluation of this intervention suggested that the performance of front-line workers improved, and corruption was considerably reduced (Caseley, 2003).

- Lamers and others (2010) describe how, between 2005 and 2008, the *Hoogheemraadschap De Stichtse Rijnlanden*—a water board in the Netherlands—successfully developed a water management plan for the Kromme Rijn region in cooperation with other water authorities, user interest groups, and the wider public despite major conflicting interests and doubts of these stakeholders at the outset.

- Narayan's (1995) review of 121 rural water systems projects in 49 countries found that increasing beneficiary participation led to better project outcomes, including a higher proportion of water systems in good condition, overall economic benefits, a wider target population, and environmental benefits. Katz and others (1997) and Isham and Kähköhen (2000) attest that the performance of water systems across a variety of countries are markedly better in communities where households were able to make informed choices about the type of system and the level of service they required, and where decision making was genuinely democratic and inclusive.

- Das Gupta and others (2004) compare the success of irrigation systems in South Korea and India. The Indian irrigation systems ended up being much less effective because the technocrats involved with operation and maintenance were not accountable to the farmers that they are supposed to serve; in South Korea, where participation resulted in a closer accountability relationship between the irrigation system administrators and the local farmers, service provision was superior (Winters, 2012).

In contrast
- The Molinos water project in Chile attempted to solicit feedback from community members about implementing a water treatment plant in the village but failed to integrate community inputs into decisions regarding the project and consult them regarding key project issues (Garande and Dagg, 2005).

- In their study of the influence of water user associations in Nepal, Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen (1998) found that the all-male organization for the Chhattis Mauja system in Nepal faced difficulties in enforcing its rules on women. Female heads of farms in the head end of the system always took more water than their entitlements while contributing less labor than they should. In other parts of the system, village irrigation leaders also mentioned water stealing by women as a problem that was difficult to solve because women were not included as members of the organization and could thus not be punished.

- During the development of Morocco's regional water master plan, the two river basin agencies involved the majority of stakeholders in the consultation process by establishing commissions, and publicized the master plan for discussion before submitting it for the approval of the National Council for Water and Climate. However, there was limited involvement of local associations, which represented all the groundwater users at the aquifer level, which decreased satisfaction with the consultation process (Wijnene and others, 2012).

(e) *Housing/Urban Development*

- In South Africa, social mobilization led to the courts overturning certain restrictive water service practices in Johannesburg as unconstitutional, thus making water more accessible to poor people (Mehta, 2005b).

- The citizens of Vietnam's Vinh City have been involved in improving designated housing areas and the city infrastructure from planning to construction and monitoring. In addition to supporting the approval of a detailed plan of wards and communes, communities have made investments to further the city's urban development process (DELGO'SEA, 2011).

In contrast

- Also in South Africa, mobilization through the courts on issues of housing led to a major victory known as *Grootboom* judgment, which upheld the right to housing, water, and sanitation for homeless people. While the combination of a social movement with action in the courts was an important development, implementation of the judgment has been inadequate in many ways (Williams, 2005).

- In Venezuela, the World Bank's Caracas Slum Upgrading Project outlined an enabling framework that would allow slum-dweller communities to effectively express their demands and participate in the relevant decision-making processes from the onset of the project. Nonetheless, over time the implementation of this framework suffered due to a resurgence of centralization in the country and the lack of independent social intermediaries who could work with communities (World Bank, 2004a).

12.   There are several contextual factors that are involved in shaping the outcomes of CE interventions on service delivery. Lynch and others (2013) find that access to resources including education and training and enhanced access to information are necessary for people to hold service providers and policymakers to account. Thomas and Amadei (2010) focus on the sustainability of citizen-led interventions and emphasize the role of cultural context, strong leadership in a defined community, and direct compensation/benefits to ensure motivation for continued use of processes and systems established during such interventions.

13.   Commins (2007) confirms that asymmetries of information across different sectors, and depending on the nature of the service, even within the same sector, can determine the level of difficulty of the monitoring of service outputs by citizens. For example, the nature of clinical health services like the treatment of complex illness is different from a basic health service such as encouraging the use of bed nets and hand washing; and community groups and local governments especially can play a strong role in making sure these practices are being more widely adopted. In contrast, clinical services are far more complex. Commins also refers to the differing characteristics of each service that lead to different conditioning factors and relationships between government and citizens such as technical-economic characteristics (e.g., monopoly, networked services), different levels of political salience, different balances of power between principals (clients, citizens and policymakers) and agents (e.g., professions, unions), and ideologies or values attached to specific areas of public life in particular cultures (water, sanitation, education and healthcare).

14.   Commins (2007) also highlights the relevance of overarching institutional factors (e.g., political system, legal frameworks), which while relevant to all sectors, may have varying effects due to the nature of the service systems. More specific local contextual issues (e.g., systems of land tenure and land ownership, ethnic and caste relations) that directly relate to the structuring and process by which community participation occurs are also relevant. Hossain (2009) recommends that it is worthwhile to learn from informal means that poorer citizens may be using to gain access to services.

15.   For the education sector, Westhrop and others (2012) outline contextual factors that have implications for how citizen-led interventions can affect education outcomes. In addition to adequate funding, an equitable national education policy, and bureaucratic culture, the role of civil society institutions and local power relations that accommodate adequate participation of diverse groups also has an impact on education outcomes. The nature of CE interventions (e.g., extent of capacity building, responsiveness to local priorities) and the nature and scale of participation by parents, students, marginalized groups and local leaders is also relevant.

16.   For the health sector, Shayo and others (2012) indicate a substantial influence of gender, wealth, ethnicity and education on health care decision-making processes and greater influence of men, wealthy individuals, members of strong ethnic groups, and highly educated individuals. Khan and van den Heuvel (2007) document how semi-authoritarian political structures have limited broad participation in health policy-making, and how changes in governments have disrupted health planning and implementation. An evaluation of participation in Malawi's health sector notes impediments to CE such as perceptions of ineffective responses by service providers or the expectations of community members that their complaints will be met with retribution by the health personnel on whom they depend (except in urban areas); insufficient distribution of information on the availability of formal accountability channels and how to use them; and lack of choice of health providers due to distance and the monetary and opportunity cost of travel. Institutional capacity and incentives of health management structures and oversight committees, which limit the internal mechanisms for monitoring of activities by citizens and implementation of sanctions against poor performance, are also pertinent factors (NORAD, 2013).

B. Public Financial Management

17.   The literature consulted here shows that CE in public financial management processes has produced strong intermediate and final results such as citizen mobilization, more inclusive budget processes, and pro-poor fiscal policies. The majority of evidence in this area is based on qualitative case studies and case study analysis, though there have been attempts to generate empirical evidence and substantiate links between increased budget transparency and improved governance (Islam, 2003); positive development outcomes (Fukuda-Parr and others, 2011); improved socio-economic and human development indicators (Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005); fiscal balances of national governments (Benito and Bastida, 2009); reduction in public debt and deficits (Alt and Lassen, 2006); risk premia for financial markets (Bernoth and Wolff, 2008); and higher credit ratings and lower spreads between borrowing and lending rates (Hameed 2011). Torgler and Schneider (2009) find that citizens are more willing to pay taxes when they perceive that their preferences are properly taken into account by public institutions. Frey and others (2004) and Torgler (2005) suggest causal linkages between citizen participation processes and

levels of tax compliance, particularly when it comes to direct citizen participation in budgetary decisions.

18.   There are several examples of how CE has led to improved budgetary outcomes at the formulation, approval, execution, and oversight stages of the budget cycle as well as procurement activities.

- *Formulation.* Among other examples, Wehner (2004) draws attention to how the South African Women's Budget Initiative was set up in 1995 by the parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance and two civil society organizations. This partnership arrangement enabled parliamentarians to draw on civil society's research skills to carry out gender analyses of 26 votes of the national budget, while the CSOs benefited from direct access to policymakers.

- *Approval.* By drawing on case study research on reproductive health in Mexico, child support grants in South Africa, and tribal development expenditure in India, Robinson (2006) describes how analysis carried out by independent budget groups has led to positive improvements in budget policies in the form of increased allocations for social welfare expenditure priorities.

- *Execution.* Reinikka and Svensson's (2005) examination of education expenditures in Uganda using Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) showed that on average only 13 percent of the expenditure meant for schools actually reached them. When this information was made public through an experimental information campaign, the transfer of funds to these schools increased by 90 percent.

- *Audit.* Cornejo and others (2013a) and the World Bank (2013a) highlight a number of examples where supreme audit institutions in Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, and South Korea have collaborated with citizens to plan and conduct audits successfully. Furthermore, in their case study to measure the impact of social audits in Andhra Pradesh on the implementation of the flagship National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, Singh and Vutukuru (2010) examined the effectiveness of social audits to enhance accountability. They concluded that there was a statistically significant improvement in the overall uptake of the social audit program in Andhra Pradesh, and that the detection of corrupt practices during the implementation of the program led to the recovery of a total amount of Rs 20 million of program funds.

- *Participatory budgeting.* Available evidence suggests that participatory budgeting leads to significant shifts in priorities and policies and toward expenditures that directly benefit poor sections of society (Avritzer, 1999, Navarro, 2001, Blore and others, 2004). In a similar vein, quantitative analysis by Melo and Baiocchi (2006) finds that participatory budgeting is strongly associated with a reduction in extreme poverty and increased access to basic services. More recently, a World Bank report demonstrated that participatory budgeting is positively and strongly related to improvements in poverty rates and water services (World Bank, 2008). These findings are supported by Gonçalves (2014) and Touchton and Wampler (2013) who associate participatory budgeting with increased expenditure on health services and significant reduction in infant mortality rates across municipalities and cities in Brazil; as well as Díaz-Cayeros, and others (2013) who

confirm similar findings for participatory budgeting in the municipalities of Oaxaca, Mexico which gained increased access to electricity, sewerage, and education.

- ***Procurement.*** Ramkumar (2008), the World Bank (2013a) and Transparency International have documented how citizen oversight of procurement activities has led to less corruption, better service delivery, and more savings in contexts as diverse as the Philippines, Pakistan, Germany, and Colombia.

In contrast
- A study of participatory budgeting in China concludes that even though participatory budgeting experiments have promoted a degree of transparency and fairness in the interaction between government and citizens, the fundamentals of budget processes have remained the same, and in most cases the budget is still considered to be a state budget rather than a public budget (He, 2011).

- Boampong (2012) notes how the efforts of civil society organizations to improve the overall governance of mining revenues in Ghana's Asutifi district failed due to the unwillingness of hierarchical authorities to be more accountable about their use of mining royalties and difficulties in supporting the creation of functional and multi-stakeholder consultative platforms among other issues.

- In Ireland, the National Economic and Social Council was composed of civil society partners and trade unions as well as government representatives and producers' associations. The fact that the Council's efforts to negotiate changes in tax policy and expenditures did not lead to pro poor outcomes illustrated how, in addition to the participatory nature of the process, it is also important to address who is involved and whether the institutional framework in question promotes pro-poor participation (Bräutigam, 2004).

- In their case study of two Kansas cities in the United States that used a variety of input mechanisms in the budget process, Ebdon and Franklin (2006) find that citizen input had limited impact on budget decisions, and that neither city institutionalized participation in the budget process. The authors attributed these outcomes to the timing of the input, unstated or unclear goals, implementation difficulties, and political and environmental constraints.

19.   In terms of context, Ebdon and Franklin (2006) deem **environment**, **process design**, and **mechanisms** as being critical to structuring citizen participation in the public budget process. The *environment* refers to the structure and form of government, political dynamics and culture, legal requirements, and population size and heterogeneity. For instance, cities with a council-manager form of government may be more likely to encourage citizen participation, and facilitate public participation in policy-making through methods that are not specifically related to the budget such as citizen surveys and strategic planning. *Process design* includes timing, type of budget allocation, participants, and gathering sincere preferences when designing the budget participation process. For example, timing is important because input that is received late in the process is less likely to have an effect on outcomes. Although participation is deemed to be more beneficial when it involves *mechanisms* that promote two-way communication, Ebdon alludes to results of surveys and multicity interviews that show relatively little use of two-way input

mechanisms in the budget process. LaFrance and Balogun (2012) refer to the number of opportunities citizens are given to voice their budget preferences; whether the nature of government efforts to solicit citizen input is passive or proactive; and the relationship between citizen attendance of prior budget hearings and the outcomes of those hearings.

20.   For participatory budgeting, Zhang and Liao (2011a; 2011b) note that relevant contextual factors to engage communities in such initiatives include municipal officials' attitudes and perceptions of general public involvement in the budget process, diversity of stakeholders, and healthy politics that is more likely to embrace a two-way dialogue. Franklin and Ebdon (2013) attest to the importance of legal guarantees, including citizen participation, municipal autonomy, and access to budget documents; active civil society organizations capable of mobilizing participation in budget processes; and a commitment to shared decision making. Shah (2007) confirms the relevance of these factors as well as the capacity for participation both inside and outside government and the existence of functional and free media institutions.

C. Governance

21.   Evidence that substantiates the positive impact of CE on corruption and improved governance is still limited and uneven, partly because this area is so broad. Yet there are a number of relevant interventions that attest to intermediate governance changes such as changes in policy, regulation and reform, improved transparency, more active community-level participation, and improved responsiveness to citizen demands.

- Using data from a specifically designed lab experiment, Serra (2008) suggests that "combined" accountability systems involving both bottom-up monitoring and top-down auditing are highly effective in curbing corruption in contrast to using purely top-down auditing.

- An in-depth empirical case study conducted by the World Bank and the IMF in Bolivia in 2002 sought to identify the relative importance of the various determinants of governance at the micro-level. *Voice*-related variables were found to be a significant determinant of governance, corruption, and quality of public services, accounting for a much larger share of the variation than more traditional public sector management type of variables (Kaufmann and others, 2002).

- A public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) exercise conducted in Sierra Leone in 2002 by the Ministry of Finance and repeated in 2005 by an independent civil society organization revealed that due to independent auditing of disbursements following the findings of the first study there was significant improvement in the delivery of fee subsidies and teaching materials at 28 randomly selected schools. (Transparency International, 2005).

- Banjeree and others (2009) assigned civil society organizations in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi, India, to conduct campaigns designed to reduce caste-based voting, persuade citizens to vote against corrupt politicians, and mobilize women to vote. In rural Uttar Pradesh, voter turnout increased. Further, survey data collected to track voting patterns showed that the likelihood that an individual would vote for the party that represented their caste decreased from 57 percent to 52 percent in villages which received this

campaign. There was also a reduction in the vote share of candidates facing heinous criminal charges. In Delhi, voting patterns made it clear that the poor have distinct preferences for representatives who focus on issues that are important for them.

- In Madagascar, a study regarding the role of media and monitoring in reducing capture of public expenditures by local officials finds that such types of elite capture could be constrained through a combination of media programs and intensive monitoring (Francken, 2009).

- In Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2008) find that publicized municipal audits reduced re-election among incumbent mayors found to be more corrupt than initially believed. Cities with local media were even less likely to vote for these corrupt mayors.

- In Indonesia, when decentralization led to the capture of public resources by regional elites through budget misappropriations, a group of lawyers formed a civil society organization in the province of Padang, mobilized and, with the help of the provincial prosecutor's office, secured the conviction and sentencing of a large number (43) of members of the Padang province legislature (Davidson, 2007).

- A World Bank (2013a) stocktaking of social accountability mechanisms describes how, beyond detection/prosecution of corruption cases, citizen-led initiatives had an impact on mobilizing public opinion against corruption, increasing transparency of procurement processes and development projects, and influencing laws and policies.

In contrast
- Peruzzotti (2006) documents how members of the executive branch in Argentina bribed senators to support a piece of labor legislation. This incident led to a media scandal after a senator leaked information to a major newspaper about the bribes. Civil society organizations became involved and sought to trigger several different mechanisms of horizontal accountability. Despite hearings in the courts, three agencies from the executive branch, and a number of legislative commissions and committees, the incident did not lead to a single conviction.

- In India, Rajasthan, an experiment to enhance police performance, improve public trust, and gather objective data on crime rates and performances involved researchers testing the impact of improving police training, freezing administrative transfers, introducing a weekly day off and duty rotation system, and community-based monitoring. Training and the freezing of transfers were found to be the most effective interventions in terms of higher job satisfaction and victims' perceptions of police investigations; community monitoring had little to no effect on the public perception of police performance since it was not implemented in a sustained manner (Banerjee and others, 2010).

- In another example from India, a civil society organization was selected by the government to monitor the attendance of assistant nurse midwives using time- and date-stamping machines and random unannounced visits. In addition, a district health officer altered the wage structure so that a large part of nurses' wages was based on attendance bonuses. Initially the increased monitoring and incentives decreased absenteeism.

However, this impact was mitigated over time as nurses got around the new regulations by getting absence approval from nurse managers and using more exempt days (Banerjee and others, 2008).

- In Liberia, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Tracking Network, a coalition of eight Liberian civil society organizations, monitored the implementation of the National Development Plan. The researchers and communities found that, despite the recent passage of the Freedom of Information Act, project beneficiaries could not access sufficient information about development initiatives that affect their communities or counties. In Lofa and Bong Counties, for example, participants responded that they cannot hold responsible bodies, including government and contractors, accountable because affected communities are often left out of the decision-making process (Schouten, 2011).

22.   There is a wide range of contextual factors that have an impact on citizen-led initiatives for anti-corruption reform. Francken (2009) describes that an active and well-targeted media can serve as a relevant factor to hold public officials accountable for corruption. However, examples of less rigorous and less widespread information dissemination in India (Banerjee and others 2009) and Indonesia (Olken, 2007) found unsuccessful in reducing the election of corrupt officials. Here Lindstedt and Naurin's (2005) findings that the effect of press freedom on corruption is dependent on the level of education prove that in addition to access to information, an ability to process the information is necessary. Furthermore, Brunetti and Weder (2003) find that the form of corruption determines citizens' incentives to act on corruption-related information. In cases where corruption is collusive private agents have no incentive to report corruption, but when it is extortive effective channels of information (e.g., independent and active media) can be useful to lower the costs of complaint for private agents.

23.   Grimes (2008) uses case study evidence to highlight the importance of effective institutions, political will, and international organizations that can influence national governments and viable political competition. She also notes that attributes of civil society organizations and networks such as preexistence of community and regional associations, precedence for collaboration, and the nature of such organizations (professional vis-à-vis grass-roots) have a bearing on the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Grießhaber and Geys (2012) find empirical evidence, which associates perceived corruption in a country, is shown to be significantly associated with a society's degree of civic engagement in formal social networks.

24.   Several scholars have identified the potential of decentralization to reduce corruption. For instance, Estache and Sinha (1995) report a positive association between expenditure decentralization and levels of infrastructure provided by local governments, but only when both revenue generation and expenditure responsibilities are decentralized. Fisman and Gatti (2002) find a negative association between expenditure decentralization and perceived corruption using cross-country data from 1980-95. Asthana (2008) points out that an increase in community participation combined with effective decentralization may have greater success in reducing corruption and improving public services as there is greater transparency and the community can hold local elites more accountable.

25.   At the same time, the literature also underscores the risks of decentralization—overall, the evidence indicates that corruption tends to be higher in communities that have low education

levels, low exposure to media, and are more remote from the center. Asthana (2008) cautions that anti-corruption efforts are unlikely to be successful when decentralization is introduced abruptly into communities that do not have the capacity to direct the allocation of funds, maintain regulations, and lead projects. Porter and Onyach-Olaa (2001), Crook and Sverrisson (2002) and Devas and Grant (2003) draw attention to factors that are consequential for decentralization to result in reduced corruption, which include local history, politics, tradition and skills/capacity, central monitoring of performance, and the length of time that reforms have been in place.

D. Natural Resource Management

26.   Based mainly on studies of transparency and accountability initiatives and community-based natural resource management systems, the literature in this area upholds (with exceptions) the influence of CE on process-driven outcomes such as increasing participation of civil society organizations, promoting disclosure of contracts, and/or demanding increased revenue transparency. Although community-based natural resource management has been recognized as an effective governance approach for sustainably managing commons or common-pool resources (Gruber, 2011), the literature is less clear regarding how citizen-centered initiatives have led to institutionalized changes in policy outcomes or influenced corruption and poverty in resource-rich countries.

27.   The fact that natural resource management is a cross-cutting theme—from non-renewable resources, including oil, gas, minerals and metals, to renewable resources such as forests, fisheries, and land—and that there are important variations in the challenges presented by these sectors also makes it more difficult to assess impact.

- Mainhardt-Gibbs (2010) found that in a CSO survey, the EITI process was felt to have resulted in enhanced CSO engagement in the extractives industries sector. This especially relates to increased availability of information and government recognition of civil society as part of the policy-making process.

- Rainbow Insight (2009) finds that the EITI is making a number of direct and indirect contributions to good governance with respect to natural resource revenues. This is through establishing an emerging standard to report natural resource revenues; providing a model of multi-stakeholder dialogue on a critical public policy issues; and forging an international network composed of civil servants, corporate executives, and representatives of global civil society who share a commitment to revenue transparency.

- Aaronson (2011) concludes that EITI has had important spillover effects in terms of encouraging firms to listen to and respond to stakeholder concerns, and in building civil society capacity to engage in governance. Governments in some cases have used the EITI process to develop dialogue between policymakers and citizens on resources utilization. Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sao Tome, for example, have organized public forums and seminars to encourage citizens to participate in discussions and debates about extractive issues and governance. Civil society activists have also relied on the EITI process to push for government to sign on to EITI, as occurred successfully in Sierra Leone.

- Edmonds (2002) uses data from Nepal to determine the impact on the level of extraction of wood for fuel of a government-initiated program that transferred management of forests to local user groups. The evidence suggests that there was a significant reduction in wood extraction in areas with forest user groups. In their study to assess the impact of local forest councils (*van panchayats*) on forest degradation in the Indian state of Uttaranchal, Somanathan and others (2005) found that community management was far more cost effective than state management.

- In east Cameroon, four villages formed a community forest association to oversee the Ngola-Achip Forest and to involve village inhabitants in the sustainable management of their forest to help poverty alleviation. Within the first five years, the forest association had made a profit that was used by the community development fund to build new houses; provide school fees and emergency medical care; and invest in a generator, satellite dish, and two television sets for the village (Kenneth, 2006).

- In Bangladesh, the efforts of Samata (a national CSO) to support landless poor to work for rights to land culminated in its substantial contributions to the Land Rights Program. Among other provisions, these included the recovery and redistribution of approximately 93,000 acres of land and water resources among 1.9 million landless families, the election of 458 landless men and women group members to local government, and the amendment of government legislation related to land—Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act, and Specific Relief Act (Hinds, 2013).

- In India, research shows that in the early stages of the watershed management programs that were launched in the 1970s, financial leakages were of the order of 30-45 percent of approved amounts, with overestimation of costs by at least 15-25 percent. The government managed to reduce financial leakages to 20-35 percent of approved amounts by measures aimed at involving citizens in project implementation, devolving funds to a village body, and issuing new financial guidelines. This was largely achieved because beneficiaries became more aware of how much money was received and for what purpose (Chêne, 2009).

- In Kompong Thom, Cambodia, the community and the provincial Department of Fisheries have made fishing maps available to citizens showing lot boundaries and public access areas. The community undertakes patrols to enforce the regulations and has also argued for the right to arrest and fine wrongdoers, citing delays in the responses of authorities (Fisheries Action Coalition Team).

In contrast:
- In an assessment of the impact of EITI, Ölcer (2009) finds that governments' public endorsement of the EITI principles does not, on average, improve the corruption perception levels of the country; control of corruption in EITI countries is worse than in non-EITI resource-rich countries; and in both EITI and non-EITI countries World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators scores have on average deteriorated between 2002 and 2007 (Ölcer, 2009).

- Suich (2013) refers to the evaluations of two community-based natural resource management interventions in Tchuma Tchato Project in Mozambique, and the Kwandu Conservancy in Namibia that found little or no impact in terms of reducing poverty. She notes that the lack of incentives or inability to deliver appropriate benefits that have a sufficient impact at the household level makes it difficult to maintain participation in such initiatives.

- Smith and others (2012) document how the lack of participatory mechanisms in Madagascar's EITI processes has resulted in little participation of civil society and local populations in deliberation and decision-making and led to few projects with mutual benefits. This poorly managed and exclusive process also has local communities that protest directly against mining companies rather than sharing their concerns through formal forums.

- The *Oficina General de Gestion Social* (General Social Management Bureau) created by the Government of Peru sought to address increasing public discontent with extractive activities by revising regulations to promote public participation in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors and by making it mandatory for developers to ensure public involvement in the Environmental Impact Assessment approval process. However, this resulted in a one-way information channel in which communities were duly informed of planned activities, but which provided no provisions for dialogue and consensus building (Barrera-Hernández, 2009).

- In Sierra Leone, Chiefdom Development Committees were created to ensure that project decision-making regarding the Diamond Area Community Development Fund was carried out in a more equitable and accountable manner. Even though each Chiefdom Development Committee was supposed to be composed of a wide, cross-section of elected Chiefdom residents so that a broad range of community interests could be represented, they have instead reportedly been composed entirely of rural elites such as section chiefs. This has undermined the concept of local ownership of the fund and further alienated many stakeholders such as women and youth. In addition, no reporting or oversight mechanisms have been established (Maconachie, 2011).

- Songorwa (1999) describes the ineffectual efforts of the Selous Conservation Program in Tanzania attempted to recruit communities to conserve wildlife on their lands. Since community interest in this program was incumbent on expectations of socioeconomic benefits, it waned quickly when such benefits did not materialize.

- In both Brazil and Indonesia, government efforts to implement decentralized coastal management has empowered local and regional authorities but has not resulted in the active participation and empowerment of communities. This is due in part to an inadequate framework to include them in institutional design and implementation (Wever, and others, 2012).

28.	In terms of relevant contextual factors, Claridge (2004) emphasizes the importance of social capital in the forestry and water sectors that can improve the outcomes for natural resource management through CE by decreasing costs of collective action; and increasing cooperation and knowledge and information flows, more investment in common lands and water systems, and

improved monitoring and enforcement. Pretty and Ward (2001) also support the notion that where social capital is well-developed, local groups with locally developed rules and sanctions are able to make more of existing resources than individuals working alone or in competition. However, Koontz (2005) cautions that local contextual factors, rather than internal group characteristics may be more relevant for policy changes in this area. Among such factors, Mansuri and Rao (2013) identify the level of inequality within communities, prospects for community members to benefit from natural resources, clear mechanisms for downward accountability, and adequate local management capacity.

29.   Nelson and Agrawal (2008) find that stronger public institutions, notably lower levels of corruption, and lower resource value that state actors could capture emerged as conducive factors for central managers to devolve authority over wildlife to local communities. In the mining sector, studies show that reforms succeed when interventions understand the needs of mining communities and ways of involving them in research and policy development (Hilson 2006). In the oil sector, Klassen and Feldpausch-Parker (2011) highlight the role of competent and experienced interlocuters who can secure opportunities for community members to be heard, enabling an otherwise neglected public to help set the local agenda while engaging with powerful external stakeholders. Isham and Kähkjönen (2002) attribute poor project quality and maintenance of infrastructure in the water sector to limited community capacity in understanding the technical aspects of such projects, and Leino (2007) maintains that water projects are better maintained when water management committees have access to funds for regular maintenance.

Schwarte (2008) on the other hand focuses more on supply-side challenges such as the culture of secrecy within government bodies and the politics of patronage. This approach is also adopted by Ribot and others (2010) who provide a comparison of the role of forest oversight committees in Tanzania and Senegal and note the former case was successful because there was clear support from higher levels of governments and mechanisms to sanction the grasp of local leaders. Baird (2006) emphasizes the impact of donor and government reporting requirements and incentives on the quality of local management, and cautions how they may have misguided effects despite good intentions. It appears however that more often than not, increased public revenues for local investment, which can be attributed to more effective management of common-pool resources, serve as the biggest incentive (Ribot and others, 2010).

E. Social Inclusion and Empowerment

30.   Evidence regarding the impact of CE in this area is mixed. The literature acknowledges the positive economic impact of conditional cash transfer (CCT) and community-driven development (CDD) programs/projects subject to caveats, though their influence on promoting inclusiveness and social cohesion is disputed. For instance, Menocal and Sharma (2008) find that when voice and accountability interventions are targeted directly to women and marginalized groups, there is some impact on empowerment. On the other hand, Mansuri and Rao (2013) maintain that CDD efforts have had a limited impact on income poverty, cohesion, and inclusiveness; and that the transfer of funds to communities without state oversight can result in capture of decision-making by elites. For ease of analysis, this category has been divided into (a) economic empowerment and (b) social empowerment.

(a) *Economic empowerment*

- Rawlings and Rubio (2005) reviewed results of CCT programs launched in Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey. They found "clear evidence of success from the first generation of programs in Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua in increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive health care, and raising household consumption". Ferreira and Robalino (2010), Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) and Souza (2006) also provide evidence that CCT programs have improved enrolment rates and timeliness of school enrollment. However, these studies present more mixed evidence for CCT impact on repetition rates of school enrollment.

- Based on analysis of the impact evaluation results of World Bank CDD programs over 25 years, Wong (2012) found generally positive evidence for poverty welfare reduction, poverty targeting, and increased access to service. Evidence is limited and mixed on governance, social capital, and conflict resolution.

- Through a randomized evaluation of a CDD program that delivered village-level technical assistance and block grants in Sierra Leone, Casey and others (2011) found positive impacts on the establishment of local development committees, local public goods provision, interactions between communities and local government officials, household economic welfare, and village-level market activity. However, the program had no impact on community social norms, the role of women and youths in local affairs, more egalitarian decision-making, or the capacity for collective action beyond the immediate sphere of the project.

- In Bangladesh, Mahmud (2007) investigated two models of community management committees in the health sector: (i) Community Groups, set-up by elected local government body of the Union Parishad; and (ii) Health Watch Committees established with the assistance of advocacy CSOs. It was found that although both models were weak on exacting accountability, Health Watch Committees performed relatively better. In the villages with Health Watch Committees, awareness of health issues, available services, and the number of people accessing the services increased; and doctor punctuality and attendance improved in some clinics.

- Blattman and others (2011, 2013) indicate that at the end of the second year of the Youth Opportunities Program in Uganda there was a gap of 157 percent between the intervention group and the control group in terms of income. Given their actual increase in income, the intervention group reported a 14 percent increase in perceived economic well being compared to peers. However, these perceived economic gains were significant only for men.

- The fact that financial insecurity led a high percentage of orphaned children to drop out from school made the use of child savings accounts highly relevant to the SEED project intervention. SEED (Save for Education, Entrepreneurship and Down payment) encouraged families and caregivers to save for the young person's education or business start-up costs, and they in turn received matching funds up to the equivalent of $20 a month. Findings from the SEED project suggest that a simple economic empowerment

scheme eased the immediate financial burden on families and caregivers, kept young people in school and could potentially lift them out of poverty (Ismayilova and others, 2012).

In contrast
- While Voss (2008) finds that the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia had a positive influence on household welfare and access to services, the redistributive effects of this intervention are mixed to negative. Traditionally disadvantaged groups, including female-head households and households with heads lacking primary education, did not see the same benefits for measures of economic welfare.

- Hargreaves and others (2010) used a randomized, customized trial to assess the impact of the Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE) program in South Africa. Their findings suggest that while the program had a strong capacity-building component, its impact in terms of economic capacity was unconvincing. The drop-out rate from the IMAGE cohort, although low at the beginning, was high: during the first 18 months of the trial, records of the pertinent microfinance organization showed that the drop-out rate was 11.1 percent, lower than its overall average (16.2 percent), although later the rate approached this average. Cumulatively, 134 out of 428 clients (31.3 percent) surveyed at 2-year follow-up were no longer members of the microfinance organization.

- Based on their review of more than 60 impact evaluations of CCT programs, the Independent Evaluation Group (2011) found that these evaluations mainly measured short-term achievements and found that while immediate goals (e.g., improving school enrollment or attendance) were achieved, there was no monitoring of long-term impacts such as learning outcomes.

- Bouillon and Tejerina's (2007) review of evaluations of CCT programs in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Nicaragua reveals mixed evidence on the impact of these interventions. For nutrition, the evidence is positive in Mexico and Nicaragua, mixed in Brazil and Colombia, and ineffectual in Honduras. The impact on health indicators is more diverse across countries and clear, positive impacts on health indicators have been found only in Mexico.

(b) *Social empowerment*

- Blattman and Martinez (2011) examined the impact of the Youth Opportunities Program cash transfers on young underemployed people in Uganda. The diversity of skills and abilities in the group served as a strength to support the empowerment of the young people as a group, with stronger and more able members serving as role models and supporting weaker members. The intervention was shown to be effective in building social capital for youth.

- Friis-Hansen and Duveskog's (2012) evaluation of the Farmer Field School (FFS) intervention in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda confirmed that FFS group-based learning could lead to empowerment and act as a pathway toward increased well-being. The fact

that the data from the three countries all pointed toward the same trend, despite contextual differences in the countries studied, strengthened this finding.

- In the study by Ismayilova and others (2012) on the SEED project, AIDS orphans were enabled by the child savings accounts to continue with education or training, and as such were given the opportunity to access the benefits of remaining within a supportive and caring community environment. Reports from teachers and community leaders suggested that this had a positive effect on their sense of self and their involvement in school and community life, and contributed to a reduction in risk-taking behaviors.

- In Nigeria, the use of forum theatre provided a unique opportunity for villagers to express in the public sphere their grievances about divisions arising from traditional community hierarchies and wealth inequality (Abah and Okwori 2005).

- In South Africa, participation in the Treatment Action Campaign became a way to challenge the stigma of HIV/AIDS and for members to gain a new sense of their own dignity and self-worth (Friedman 2010). Robins (2005) describes the importance of "experiential dimensions of belonging" for group members, many of whom are "often exposed to stigma and rejection from their families and communities".

- Kroecker's (1995) case study of a state-sponsored agricultural cooperative community in Nicaragua and Aslop and others's (2001) cross-sectional comparative study of the impact of collective community management of three natural resources projects in India reported that participants felt more empowered to report their views and concerns. Participants in these studies also reported that they felt that their opinions and views were important in shaping the direction and outputs of the individual programs.

- Changing attitudes to domestic violence and making it much less acceptable behavior, the IMAGE program in South Africa resulted in enhanced capacity of the community to protect women. At the individual level, the skills and knowledge gained by individual women made them more confident and capable of protecting themselves against the threat of domestic violence (Hargreaves and others 2010).

In contrast
- Both Kroecker (1995) and Aslop and others (2001) also highlight that internal hierarchies, frequently shaped by socio-cultural norms, often meant that the most vulnerable members of the respective groups (most notably women and those from the poorest socio-economic backgrounds) were the least likely to assert their opinions and views.

- Gugerty and Kremer (2008) conducted a randomized control experiment in a program supporting women's community associations in Kenya to evaluate its impact on civic participation among the disadvantaged. There were no significant differences between treatment and control groups in terms of outcomes such as organizational strength, participation, assistance to neighbors, or contribution to public goods. However, there was substantial evidence that funding changed group membership and leadership. It led younger, more educated, and better-off women to enter the groups and for older, more socially marginalized to depart.

- Humphreys and others (2006) used a unique nationwide experiment in democratic deliberation in São Tomé and Príncipe in which the discussion leaders were randomly assigned across meetings. They found that "leader effects" (the possibility of manipulation by political elites) was extremely large, which led them to question whether participatory decision-making processes in other countries are as vulnerable to elite capture.

- In the Philippines, Labonne and Chase (2011) find that CDD projects increased participation in village assemblies and interaction between residents and village leaders but did not initiate broader social change and, in fact, may have crowded out other avenues for collective action

- Casey and others (2011) find that women who participated in the GoBifo initiative in Sierra Leone were no more likely to voice an opinion during observed community meetings after the project ended or to play a leading decision-making role. No evidence was found of any increase in the role of women in the capacity to raise funds or to "act collectively outside the project", or any change in how decisions were made.

31.   Overall, Conning and Kevane (2002) conclude that communities are only more effective than outside agencies in targeting programs to the poor when they are relatively egalitarian, have open and transparent systems of decision-making or have clear rules for determining who is poor. Other evidence also suggests that inequality can worsen access to private transfers. Galasso and Ravallion (2005), for example, find that greater land inequality and geographic inaccessibility significantly worsened targeting in their study on Bangladesh. Communities that have a low capacity to mobilize information and monitor disbursements are more vulnerable to corruption and elite capture as are more heterogeneous communities, where multiple and conflicting identities can create competing incentives (Araujo and others, 2008).

32.   Wong and Guggenheim (2005) refer to project design and management structures, conducive local social environments, and transparent direct fiscal transfers to communities as determining factors for the effectiveness of CDD programs. Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) note the need for rules, transparency, and accountability to prevent corruption or elite capture of community resources; effective capacity building; field-testing of pilot projects in different conditions; systems for sharing and spreading knowledge to clarify roles and help create common values; relevant incentives aligned with the new roles of stakeholders; and ease of replication. Strong political commitment to decentralization and local governments to facilitate coordination across communities and allocate resources to encourage more inclusive and pro-poor CDD initiatives is necessary (Grootaert, 2003).

33.   While CDD initiatives are vulnerable to elite capture, parameters that may be useful to ensure that such initiatives are pro poor and inclusive include electoral incentives and capacity of higher levels of government to enforce accountability on lower-level bureaucrats, adequate managerial capacity and clear mechanisms for downward accountability among key considerations and project investments in capacity building; and democratic and actively contested selection of local leaders across a sub-district's community blocks (Fritzen, 2007).

34.   Among other groups, the risk of excluding females is a concern for community-driven development for several reasons. Mansuri and Rao (2013) indicate that social norms exclude women from participating in public spaces or relegating them to work on women-specific tasks. Women also face negative stereotypes about their ability to contribute effectively to proceedings that have public implications, and community groups may have exclusionary rules that are not favorable for female participation such as allowing only one person per household to belong to a forestry group, which effectively exclude women. However, incentivizing communities to include women and young men in community governance structures and setting minimum quotas for participation of groups (e.g., women) may improve the likelihood of female participation in community-driven development interventions (Lynch and others, 2013).

III. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

35.   Citizen engagement literature points toward a growing recognition that context-specific factors are fundamental to achieving both intermediate and final development outcomes. The majority of CE literature that has focused on the outcomes of specific types of interventions (e.g., CDD programs) or the use of specific mechanisms (e.g., the use of community score cards) has been useful to identify contextual factors. However, it is only more recently that the issue of context has being examined more closely by the World Bank (2014a) SDV Flagship, O' Meally (2014), Bukenya and others (2012), and Joshi (2013) to determine why certain interventions work in some contexts but not others and how CE initiatives can be tailored to contextual variations.

36.   **One of these factors is the availability of timely, user-friendly, reliable, and comprehensive information, a pre-condition for effective CE.** Effective access to local public information and institutionalization of participation mechanisms create a virtuous circle based on relationships of trust that, in addition to giving legitimacy to the actions of local authorities, reduces the gap between the local state and society thereby strengthening relations not only among civil society actors but also with the local government and the private sector and among the various citizens' groups. This creates conditions conducive to local development and improvement of development outcomes. For instance, Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) draw on a field experiment on access to ration cards among New Delhi's slum dwellers to demonstrate that India's Freedom of Information Law is almost as effective as bribery in helping the poor to secure access to a basic public service. Pande (2007) documents how a Delhi citizens group used the Freedom of Information Law successfully to address corruption and accountability issues, and posits that this was due to the combination of a sensitive bureaucracy, enabling legislation and grassroots activism. Similarly, field experiments on local accountability in primary health care in Uganda suggest that efforts to improve beneficiary control of health care delivery and performance would have no measurable impact on the quality of care without addressing users' lack of robust information on the performance of the healthcare clinics (Björkman-Nyqvist and others, 2014).

37.   **On the other hand, Lieberman and others (2014) and Banerjee and others (2010) describe information sharing and dissemination interventions that had no perceptible impact on civic participation or service delivery.** For instance, initially Reinikka and Svensson's (2005) examination of education expenditures in Uganda using Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) presented information explaining how on average only 13 percent of the expenditure meant for schools actually reached them; this information was widely publicized

through an experimental informal campaign after which the transfer of funds to these schools increased by 90 percent that resulted in improved school enrolment and student performance. However, a later re-analysis of the case questioned whether the observed changes were also significantly affected by other concurrent changes, including abolition of school fees, and increased requirements for fiscal accountability to donors (Hubbard 2007). This example attests that outcomes of citizen participation are influenced by myriad factors besides information provision.

38.   Baland and Platteau (1999) suggest that entrenched social inequalities and limited space for civic engagement may deter poor and marginalized citizens from questioning the lack of effectiveness and equity in the provision of public goods. Keefer and Khemani (2003) highlight weak incentives for service providers to improve their performance based on the support of political agents. Fox (2007) argues that transparency does not always translate into accountability, and that the outcomes of citizen-centered interventions are contingent on whether transparency is 'clear' or 'fuzzy' and whether accountability espouses sanctions in addition to answerability. Hubbard (2007) cautions that while evaluating the outcomes of citizen-centered initiatives other contextual factors besides information disclosure need to be taken into account. Darch and Underwood (2010) draw on case studies from Angola, Guatemala, Philippines, South Africa, and Zimbabwe to postulate that access to information has the potential to improve democratic process only if (a) the bureaucracy is capable of collecting and managing politically salient information but sufficiently professional to implement a law that cuts against its own institutional interests and (b) the political elite is politically and financially dependent in a nontrivial sense on those subject to its rule.

39.   **Another theme relevant for CE interventions is emphasis on the inclusion and empowerment of females (in addition to other disadvantaged or marginalized groups).** For example, Agrawal (2009) uses data for forest management groups in India and Nepal to provide evidence that groups with a high proportion of women in their executive committees (decision-making bodies) show significantly greater improvements in forest condition in both regions. Oxfam's Raising Her Voice (RHV) program in Honduras confirms the value that female participants contributed to the audit committee on public budgetary transparency and expenditure by gradually gaining the trust of the men (Evans and Nambiar, 2013). In Mali women members of agricultural producer self-help groups benefit from increased mobility and greater autonomy over the use of agricultural incomes, and they were consulted more on community and organizational decision-making.

40.   **At the same time, some studies show that efforts to empower women have not always led to positive development effects.** While studying the effect of political reservation for women running for local office on the provision of government services and local public goods to households in West Bengal, Bardhan and others (2008), for example, find that women in reserved positions are no more effective than officials in unreserved positions at getting benefits to their villages. In fact, they appear to be worse at targeting benefits to landless households and housing benefits to disadvantaged castes, and performed worse in generating revenues. A field experiment in Kenya that aimed to increase women's participation in the maintenance of water sources by encouraging them to attend community meetings had no impact on the quality of infrastructure maintenance as compared to control communities (Leino, 2007).

41.   Outcomes of female engagement in CE initiatives also depend on context. For instance, Ban and Rao (2009) find that women presidents in reserved *gram panchayats* are unambiguously more effective when they are more experienced and that they perform worse when most of the land in the village is owned by upper castes. This suggests that caste structures may be correlated with structures of patriarchy making the job of women particularly difficult when they are confronted with entrenched hierarchies. They also find that women presidents in reserved gram panchayats perform best in states where reservations have been in place the longest, indicating the salience of the maturity of the reservations system (Ban and Rao, 2009). Results of Oxfam's Raising her Voice Portfolio indicate that women's care responsibilities and lack of financial autonomy have a substantive impact on their efforts to participate sustainably in project activities, and their ability to assume positions of community or political leadership. The costs involved, for community groups and national coalitions alike, in convening meetings, running activities, and supporting women's participation and attendance also impact heavily on the likelihood of these spaces continuing to function once donor funding comes to an end (Beardon and Otero, 2013). The 2012 World Development Report on Gender Equality and Development (2011a) finds that female participation in civic or political initiatives can be strengthened through both formal or informal channels, though which channels will be most effective depends on the issue and the extent to which it challenges norms, beliefs, and social institutions.

42.   The remainder of this section provides a broad overview of other relevant contextual factors (demand side, supply side, and other) for CE.

A. Demand Side

- **There is limited scope for demand-side initiatives without the willingness of citizens to participate in such interventions.** Irvin and Stansbury (2004) refer to instances where citizens are too complacent to participate, or when they have had to contend with instances of limited representation and strong pursuit of self-interest by other interest groups. Citizens may have difficulty in establishing a causal relationship between providers' actions and final outcomes such as test scores or health status (Banerjee and others, 2010), or they may simply be too consumed with more pressing priorities such as securing food and meeting other basic needs to provide feedback on service delivery (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2008). Women in particular may participate to a lesser degree due to their multiple responsibilities (Bräutigam, 2004). Alatas and others (2011) note the cost of time and a sustained attention span by alluding to a collaborative village meeting that ran longer than one and one-half hours.

- **The issue addressed by CE initiatives needs to be of significant interest to citizens.** For instance, Shankar's 2010 study of social audits in the three Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh finds that villagers were more likely to monitor the performance of public officials on the wage component of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme—— implying that social audits are more effective in reducing thefts when citizens have a private stake in the outcome but less so when the supply of public goods is involved (Shankar, 2010).

- **There is evidence that participation competence is positively associated with the outcomes of CE interventions.** Yang and Pandey (2011) confirm that while competence is necessary, this does not imply that incompetent citizens should not be involved.

Competence can be improved through the participation process since citizens' knowledge and skills for collective action are cumulative and can be enhanced with engagement (IDS, 2011). Furthermore, there is evidence that argues for expanding participant representativeness in policy-making (Yang and Pandey, 2011).

- **The authority and credibility of the lead actor(s) and interlocuters is crucial to shape the outcomes of CE interventions.** Lead actors need to demonstrate that they can extract and present reliable data and can disseminate it regularly. For instance, in Robinson's (2006) independent budget analysis work, the legitimacy of the budget groups came from the fact that the agencies were authoritative sources of information on budget issues and that "in several cases were the only source of information and expertise outside government". Tembo (2012) also notes that since citizens' actions per se may not lead to required outcomes in specific contexts; it is therefore necessary to identify interlocutors (individuals, organizations, or groups of organizations) within civil society, the private sector, or inside the state "that work with or alongside ordinary citizens in engaging with state actors at various citizen–state interfaces".

- **The nature of civil society, in particular the depth, extensiveness, and character of the relationships among CSOs, plays a critical role in determining the success of CE interventions.** This was the case for South Africa's Treatment Action Campaign that worked with scientists, academics, and health professionals to generate scientific evidence in order to convince the government to change its HIV/AIDS policies. It also sent activists and health workers to villages to provide the medicine and care that HIV-positive people needed; used the media and public events to chastise inaction by the government and international pharmaceutical companies and to fight stigma; and mobilized citizens through awareness-raising campaigns.

- **There is an inherent risk that participatory initiatives may not end up benefiting the poorest and the marginalized sections of society.** In this context Haque (2008) confirms that such interventions are subject to elite capture and benefit elites and men more than the poorest. Isolated and poorer localities benefit less from programs due to capacity barriers and limits on access to information and media. In South Asia, this is also reflected in the caste structure in that higher castes make up the local elites who have political representation and government posts while lower caste participation is low due to social hierarchy and economic status. One case in point is how a program supporting women's community associations in Kenya precipitated the departure of older women, the most socially marginalized demographic group, which in turn led younger, more educated, and better-off women to join the community associations (Gugerty and Kremer, 2008).

- **Most available evidence of impact is based on collective rather than individual action because they are more likely to result in improved *public good* benefits as opposed to the *private* benefits** that can be the outcomes of individual action (Joshi, 2010). In this context, Olken (2007) shows how state audits were more effective in monitoring leakages for village road projects rather than grassroots monitoring. The community had fewer incentives to monitor public goods in contrast to private goods where individual citizens have a personal stake.

- **Mobilization and advocacy may be necessary to induce when there is little willingness on the part of citizens or when there is a need to scale up citizen-led interventions.** Goodwin and Maru (2014) indicate that programs involving use of advocacy strategies are most likely to influence participants' willingness to take action. Sirker and Cosic (2007) draw attention to risk factors for poor mobilization and ineffective participatory interventions, including poor partnerships across different CSOs or between CSOs and government; difficulties building alliances with socio-political movements; and weak links with grassroots groups and communities resulting in limited to no engagement with poor marginalized groups.

- **CE accountability or transparency mechanisms that have the potential to trigger strong sanctions are more likely to be used and improve responsiveness by providers**. Without the threat of effective sanctions and resulting impacts, citizen mobilization is difficult to sustain in the long run. One example of this is the struggle of Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), a CSO in Kenya, which has gained access to constituency development fund (CDF) records and organized social audits to track whether these funds have been used for community development projects. Since there is no freedom of information law in Kenya, public officials have shared CDF records or have refused to do so at will without any repercussions, which has made it more difficult for MUHURI to sustain its activities (IBP, 2008).

B. Supply Side

- **The willingness of state functionaries to either support or respond to citizens' demands and close the feedback loop will determine the outcomes of such efforts.** For instance, Irvin and Stansbury (2004) question the assumption of open policy-making on the part of governments by citing cases where political suasion and avoiding litigation costs was the motivation to involve citizens in policy-making processes. Gaventa and Barrett (2010) describe examples where authorities either refused to respond to citizen demands, or made tokenistic concessions such as declaring policy changes but not implementing them. Some of these outcomes can in part be traced to underlying perceptions regarding the relevance or importance of CE.

  Matthews (1999) observes that fear of public involvement, which can be traced to potential difficulties, can result from the involvement process: for example, increased conflict in the political system, increased problems of government policy-making, and decreased equality in society (see also Kweit and Kweit, 1981). Instrumental difficulties such as overload and lack of resources are also sources of fear (Checkoway and Van Til, 1978; Rosenbaum 1978). The relevance of public engagement in policy processes could also be in doubt if there is a sense that citizens are not competent in public decision-making (Rosenbaum 1978), that they have no definite preferences (Dahl 1966), and that they are too apathetic and uncommitted to participate (Rosenbaum 1978).[2]

- **Values and incentives of specific state actors regarding public participation in policy-making will influence their willingness to engage.** For instance, Yang and

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[2] See Yang, K. (2005).

Callahan (2007) find that bureaucratic values are more important than external political forces in determining government decisions and outcomes (Krause, 1999; Meier and O'Toole, 2006). Their values and priorities influence the participation process and can enable or constrain meaningful involvement (Yang and Callahan, 2007). They also confirm that communities in which elected officials are ranked high with respect to pressuring for citizen participation are likely to have greater citizen involvement efforts by government. Therefore, elected officials significantly affect how administrative decisions are made with regard to official procedures and processes, including space for public participation.

- **Characteristics of 'target' state institutions can determine the space for CE.** Yang and Pandey (2011) show that red tape and hierarchical authority are negatively associated with good participation outcomes, confirming the argument that bureaucratic structures are a major hurdle for effective participation (e.g., King and others, 1998). They also find that organization size is not a harbinger of limited opportunities for engaging with citizens since "small organizations can face burdensome circumstances that are not conducive to citizen participation, and even large organizations can be flexible, 'flat,' and ready for change resulting from citizen participation" (Yang and Pandey, 2011).

- **The majority of initiatives that have led to improved intermediate and development results have involved working across different sectors spanning the private-public divide.** For example, Transparency International's Integrity Pacts in Germany and Pakistan have been successful in bringing together governments, private sector companies, and citizens to monitor procurement processes and outcomes (World Bank, 2013a).

- **State actors and providers cannot respond to citizen feedback without a corresponding increase in their capacity to respond to their demands.** Limited capacity in terms of time and financial and personal resources can lead to inaction and frustration on the part of government officials and providers. For example, while integrity pacts turned out to be beneficial to curb procurement corruption in Colombia, during their implementation it became apparent that the time required of public officials to respond to contract-related queries and to ensure transparency of the procurement process had not been taken into account at the onset (World Bank, 2013a). Yang and Callahan (2007) also support this conclusion: managers feeling overloaded are less likely to involve citizens in decisions that relate directly to administrative power and require more administrative attention. At the same time they also find that administrative resources are not a major concern when government feels the need to involve citizens in dealing with urgent strategic problems that require broad participation and that in fact the results show that resource shortages had a positive impact on the use of involvement mechanisms such as public hearings, which do not normally require significant financial investments.

- **A higher level of democratization may help to facilitate better outcomes of CE activities, yet its influence on the emergence and effectiveness of such interventions remains unclear.** Crook and Booth (2011) suggest that in addition to formal democratic institutions and frameworks, there are informal institutions and the underlying political settlement that explain what happens and why. Furthermore, different forms of social

contract or developmental accountability can emerge within weakly democratic or semi-authoritarian regimes (Stasavage, 2005).

- **The presence of certain legal accountability mechanisms and the extent to which they are legitimate and enforceable in a given context will shape the form and prospects of different types of CE initiatives.** Barrera-Hernández (2009) documents how Peru's revised regulations, *Oficina General de Gestion Social,* made mandatory the public involvement in the Environmental Impact Assessment approval process, but in the end officials paid lip service to these regulations by merely sharing information with citizens and providing no avenues for dialogue and consensus building.

- **Competitive party politics can act as an enabling factor to encourage CE and associated policy outcomes.** In an evaluation of a Revenue Watch Institute pilot program for parliamentary strengthening to improve extractive industries governance in Ghana and Tanzania, Acosta (2010) argues that members of Parliament acting in the more competitive (multi-) party system in Ghana have greater incentives to use their increased knowledge to advocate and hold governments to account because their own electoral prospects may benefit from delivering greater transparency outcomes to voters. At the same time, Fritz and others (2014) maintain that preoccupation with winning and maintaining electoral support makes it difficult for politicians to commit collectively to a consistent and sustainable policy approach.

- **The CE results are more likely to translate into positive development outcomes when governments can make credible inter-temporal commitments.** Barma and others (2012) maintain that a stable policy environment is conducive to develop rapport and a mutually agreeable course of action and for deviations from those agreements to be sanctioned.

C. Others

- **A high degree of media competition can ensure good quality of available information necessary for public engagement.** Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argue that the existence of effective channels of information such as a free and active media can lower complaint costs for private agents about issues of corruption and that it can play a significant role in shaping public policy debates (Callaghan and Schnell, 2001). On the other hand, the use of media may in fact discourage citizen participation; for instance, Yang (2005) finds that government criticism in the media leads to lower levels of willingness to implement citizen involvement and Gibson (2004) demonstrates that local reporters cover urban development debates from a perspective that advances the position of those in power. Finally, Goodwin and Maru (2014) discovered relatively limited use of media in legal empowerment interventions, and Wang (2001) found no relationship between a cynical media and government's use of participation mechanisms.

- **The private sector may be instrumental in garnering support for increased CE, but even its motivation to push for citizen involvement may be ambiguous.** Since businesses will likely promote their interests, they may prefer exclusive participation forums. Nevertheless, businesses help create participation channels and opportunities that

may work for other citizens and therefore contribute to an increase in overall involvement. Evidence also shows that business organizations play a role in community services since more than 50 percent of American business leaders meet regularly with charitable and other nonprofit leaders; give employees paid time off for community service; and serve on boards, commissions, and committees that address community problems (Yang and Callahan, 2007).

- **Citizen engagement interventions need to take into account the 'cultural match' between existing and new institutions and processes.** Brett (2003) proposes that people must develop their own sense of the benefit of participation for a participatory approach to be sustained and effective. Facilitating CE approaches within hierarchical and deferential cultural contexts—where social differences based on social class, customs and tradition, and gender are pervasive—may fail if this approach is radically different from existing norms and value systems. Swindler (2009) advocates that analysis of the structure of patron/client ties; practices that adapt culturally meaningful, local institutional forms to new purposes (i.e., building on and extending local patterns of organization); and the identification of local brokers/international actors with long-term local knowledge and contacts are all key to learning how to make existing structures more responsive and how to embed interventions within a particular community or locality.

- **Efforts to strengthen citizen-state interaction need to be based on the conceptualization of citizenship, which may vary across contexts.** Cornwall and others (2011) recommend that such interventions need to analyze the history of colonial and post-colonial institutional reforms and how these have been shaped by or have impacted changing notions of citizenship. Rather than a strong sense of citizenship as individuals vis-à-vis the state, citizens in developing countries have multiple identities linked to class, gender, ethnicity, and religion, which shape the ways in which they engage in collective or individual action which usually involve multiple strategies for accountability and security. Joshi (2008) also advocates that any conjecture regarding the effectiveness of CE reforms should be based on the trajectory of reforms that have shaped collective action and outcomes to date.

- **Interactions among various CE interventions and multiple iterations of such initiatives may lend themselves to facilitate positive outcomes.** For instance, Robinson (2006) notes how independent budget analysis had to be accompanied by targeted advocacy of key decisionmakers to improve budget processes and outcomes. Furthermore, a World Bank global stock-taking of budget transparency initiatives describes examples from South Africa where earlier citizen-led interventions that did not meet their objectives set the precedent for later initiatives to promote pro-poor budget outcomes more successfully (World Bank, 2013a).

- **The duration of CE interventions is relevant since they need to be sustained for results to emerge.** This is necessary to ensure that reform commitments are implemented (Robinson, 2006), citizens gain trust in the initiative, and changes are institutionalized to the point that clear and positive results begin to emerge (Paul, 2011). While Blair (2000) agrees that many participation mechanisms may take a long time to begin to function effectively because of contextual constraints like entrenched local networks of power, he

also presents the caveat that effectiveness is not always linked to the length of time reforms have been in operation. He does so by alluding to Bolivia's more recent democratic local governance program that had a larger number of mechanisms for governance and civic engagement that were functional as compared to the system with the longest experience (Karnataka), which had performed less well.

- **If the timing is not right, CE interventions may not translate into desired outcomes.** Political transitions, including upcoming or ongoing elections, measures to curtail fiscal crises, new legislation, policy commitments at the international and domestic levels, and high-profile corruption scandals can provide "windows" of opportunity to advance CE initiatives. The prospect of upcoming elections, for example, enabled MUHURI in Kenya to obtain previously unavailable constituency development fund records from one parliamentarian who had a political incentive to be transparent (World Bank, 2013a). However, whether citizens and other stakeholders utilize these windows depends on a number of contextual factors since they may already be contending with "feedback fatigue" or may be engaged in additional interactions with the state which they believe might be more relevant for them or which may have greater potential for successful outcomes (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012).

- **While ad hoc or one-off CE initiatives can make a difference, experience shows that impact is greatest and most sustainable when the outcomes of such initiatives are institutionalized**. Where possible, the legal institutionalization of participatory mechanisms—from the level of individual programs and agencies through the overall system level—should be considered as a means to enhance long-term effectiveness and sustainability. An illustration of this is FUNDAR's campaign to convince the Mexican Government to increase budget allocations for the *Arranque Parejo en la Vida* program that sought to reduce maternal and child mortality. FUNDAR, the Center for Research and Analysis, and its partners were able to successfully lobby the federal government for a tenfold increase in the budgetary allocation for the program in the 2003 budget. However, by 2004, the Government had included these funds in a highly aggregated budget for a blanket health-protection scheme, making it impossible to determine whether or not the resources for the program's implementation had been impacted by that year's budget cuts (World Bank, 2013a).

- **Sectoral characteristics, and the nature of the public goods involved can shed some light on the outcomes of citizens' efforts to improve access and quality of public services.** Mcloughlin and Batley (2012) highlight (a) whether the characteristics of a particular service can influence incentives for politicians, providers, and users to commit resources to produce it and for politicians to be accountable to citizens for service performance and to determine the balance of power between policymakers and other actors; and (b) whether they set the broad parameters for when and how citizens can collectively mobilize around services and make demands on delivery organizations. Goetz and Gaventa (2001) describe other factors such as (a) the level of service complexity (lower technology services may be easier for citizens to engage with and influence or co-deliver); (b) the cost of services or service disruption to the client (which may trigger greater client interest in influencing how fees are spent or collective action for improved quality); (c) the presence of a strong private market for the service (creating a greater chance of 'exit' pressures for responsiveness); (d) whether the service provides

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an individual or a collective good (the latter being more likely to provoke collective action); and (e) whether the service is delivered face to face (thereby creating greater opportunity for engagement on both sides).

As an example, Khemani (2008) indicates that the varying outcomes of community monitoring in India and Uganda can be explained by the differences in the health and education services that were being monitored. Users can more directly observe poor health services than poor teaching, which can remain invisible to parents. As a result, the users of health clinics could be more easily motivated to demand better services they did not know they were entitled to.

- **The effect of decentralization on CE and inclusion is determined by other context-specific factors.** DFID's (2013) review of the link between decentralization and development outcomes alludes to both positive and negative instances in this regard. There are encouraging qualitative studies such as Dauda's (2004) study in Uganda in which the adoption of school fees in a specific locality provided strong incentives for parents to assume school management responsibility, and Jones and others' (2007) work on Andhra Pradesh found that health and education user committees enabled participation of a broad cross-section of villagers. On the other hand, Poteete and Ribot (2011) attest to the uneven effects of decentralization in Botswana and Senegal, which empowered certain local actors and weakened others. Gershberg and others' (2009) comparison of two community-based education reforms in Guatemala revealed that schools allowing a greater level of parental involvement struggled more with human resource management issues.

- **Global actors and processes can support or undermine CE efforts to promote accountability and improve development outcomes.** First, donor accountability and donor-state relations, especially in highly aid-dependent countries are relevant because aid conditions may create or limit space for national deliberation and accountability over appropriate policies and measures, or aid flows may provide (dis)incentives for political elites to be more responsive to local citizens and for tax bargaining. Second, the accountability of other international power-holders beyond the state such as multinational corporations or international nongovernmental organizations have been found to shape domestic accountability in more or less positive ways, especially when the state is unwilling or unable to regulate these actors' activities. Finally, a range of international economic and political processes can help to shape domestic accountability such as the implementation of international human rights norms, which can exert pressure on certain states and open spaces for greater accountability and so on (Ringold and others, 2011).

- **Structural factors such as a country's geography, resource endowments, or demographic dynamics can influence stakeholder incentives**. These factors may also include elements that may be subject to change but that are outside the control of stakeholders such as shifts and swings in commodity prices that can have significant effects on stakeholder incentives and opportunities, for example, by increasing rents or, conversely, by contributing to growing fiscal pressures (Fritz and others, 2014).

- **CE interventions can be undertaken in fragile contexts.** More limited space for civic engagement in fragile states may not lead to required development outcomes.

Goldfrank's (2002) analysis of the decentralization/participation program implemented by the *Frente Amplio* in the municipal government of Montevideo revealed that even though the program contributed to improvements in city services by providing the government with better information about citizens' needs and preferences, it failed to boost civic engagement among city residents because the channels of participation offered did not convince average citizens that their input in public forums would have a significant impact on governmental decisions. Coelho and Von Lieres (2010) suggest that unlike in stronger democracies, associations are very important for citizenship building and processes of political learning in more fragile contexts, while social movements are less common and often focus on a single issue such as elections. Diani (2008) argues that collective action in such regimes is mainly based on the community and embedded in non-political forms of organization (Earle, 2011). The Citizenship DRC has identified six factors that, depending on the context, may be useful to design CE interventions. These include the institutional and political environment, prior citizen capabilities, the strength of internal champions, history and style of engagement, the nature of the issue and how it is framed, and the location of power and decision-making (IDS, 2011). Batley and Mcloughlin (2010) while acknowledging the urgency and prevalence of service delivery by non-state actors (including communities and CSOs) in several fragile and conflict situations, also caution against undermining the role of the state in this area and risks such as limits to scalable and sustainable local capacity as well as the accountability of service providers.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

43.   The substantial level of expertise and knowledge that development practitioners and academics have amassed in this area over the past few decades will continue to help in implementing and learning from CE initiatives. This section draws on strategic and operational lessons from external stakeholders.

- **Build or sharpen 'political intelligence' in developing CE policies and undertaking such interventions on the ground.** As a first step, this requires the recognition that development cooperation is political and not simply technical in nature. It also calls for greater awareness that paths of change are not linear, and there may be embedded tensions in some of the assumptions that donors make about what brings about (positive) transformations (Menocal and Sharma, 2008).

- **Establish a set of clear rules in order to avoid frustration among participants.** These should specify both the procedural aspects (e.g., time available for debate, length of oral or written submissions) and the respective rights and duties of the participants (Caddy and others, 2005). Maintaining public interest and involvement in CE initiatives will also require initiators to tighten the "feedback loop" and demonstrate how people's contributions have been used. The challenge is two-fold: demonstrating efficacy and immediate results and building support and momentum over time (Caddy and others, 2005).

- **Think about the time and scale of CE interventions.** Where possible, development providers should invest in longer-term and more flexible support. Strengthening CE

requires longer-term commitments than those usually made in project planning. Building relationships with key strategic actors (both state and non-state) over the long term seems essential to ensure positive outcomes (UNDP, 2010). Mansuri and Rao (2013) also refer to this implementation challenge and caution that participatory projects should not be expected to follow the assumed trajectory and three- to five-year cycles as infrastructure projects.

- **Develop M&E systems to measure the impact of CE**. The variability of local context and the unpredictable nature of change trajectories in participatory interventions underscore the need for effective systems of monitoring and assessing impact. Such projects require constant adjustment, learning in the field, and experimentation in order to be effective—none of which can be done without tailoring project design to the local context, carefully monitoring implementation, and designing robust evaluation systems (Mansuri and Rao, 2013).

- **Focus capacity building not only on technical but also on political skills.** Caddy and others (2005) recommend capacity building for civil society user's committees or advocacy groups in techniques to assess service quality or introduce technology to monitor service quality as well as policy cycles, data systems, and modes of presentation that officials find accessible. They also advocate for support to independent media efforts to expose poor-quality service delivery or poor accountability of institutions. At the same time, there should also be efforts to address the lack of substantial political capacity of both state and non-state actors such as the capacity to forge alliances, develop evidence and build a case, and contribute to the decision-making and policy-making processes (Menocal and Sharma, 2008).

- **Work with a wider range of partners.** CSO partners should be carefully selected with due regard to issues of integrity, quality, and capacity; it is also advisable to select experienced partners that have ties to the grassroots and can reach otherwise marginalized and isolated groups (especially in the rural areas). This is important to ensure that participatory processes are more inclusive and representative (UNDP, 2010).

- **Build both sustainability features and exit strategies into the design of CE interventions.** There should be more attention to empower partners for taking over donor roles and working to build the sustainability of projects. In this context there is also a need for much greater donor coordination of CE initiatives—beyond the basics of information sharing and basket funding—with the aim of moving toward joint objectives, with activity streams focused on areas of donor comparative advantage. Improved coordination is highly desirable in order to maximize funding, reduce transaction costs, avoid duplication, allocate management roles, and develop M&E systems (Menocal and Sharma, 2008).

V. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

44.   The preceding review of CE relevance for development outcomes makes it clear that there is room to strengthen this evidence base, not only to measure its impact but also to gain a better understanding of how, when, and where CE can help to serve clients better and improve development results. This section proposes areas for further research that would be useful in this regard.

- **There is a need to generate a much more extensive evidence base regarding how context shapes the impact of CE interventions.** This focus on context needs to inform all stages of data gathering around such interventions, from the construction of baselines through M&E systems to impact assessments.

- **The effects of sector characteristics on relationships of accountability and control should be tested systematically through further inquiry**. Such examinations could focus on the following:

    (a) Links between the visibility, measurability, and attributability of different services and functions and the political dynamics that emerge around them;

    (b) Implications of task-related characteristics for political control and bureaucratic policy coherence; and

    (c) Influence of demand characteristics of territoriality and frequency and predictability on the scope for direct user accountability.

- **More explicit investigation of the impact of CE interventions on the outcomes of services rather than simply outputs would be useful.** These would involve efforts to focus on appropriate solutions such as the types of interventions that are likely to improve quality of education and learning outcomes, rather than simply dealing with teacher absenteeism.

- **Further insight into the trajectory of citizen–state relationships as well as the influence of other citizen-led activities is important for macro-level, socio-political analyses.** By tracing the extent to which collective actors engage in social accountability actions over time, one can trace the evolution of citizen–state interactions around accountability, including whether previous actions elicited positive or negative responses from the state. We can also understand the conditions under which state actors are likely to respond (for example, if they have the required resources and capacity, if they are well linked to social actors, or if they are the subject of trust). Another option in this regard could be to expand the number of robust studies and build the evidence base for conditions under which different mechanisms work; although this path is resource intensive and the payoff seems attainable only in the distant future.

- **Even though the key expectation of CE initiatives is that they will lead to official responses, current literature provides limited understanding of why officials might take certain actions rather than others.** Unpacking the assumptions in expecting official responses to citizen action would be important to understand the micro-contextual

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factors at play (Joshi, 2013). Along the same lines, the influence of local government institutions on the impact of CE activities on outcomes such as service delivery has not been studied adequately in theoretical or empirical literature.

- **Research and evidence on the link between horizontal accountability mechanisms and their ability to strengthen vertical accountability relationships** could include focus on the role of the judiciary, legislature and government agencies such as anti-corruption commissions to strengthen citizen's voice and accountability relationships.

- **Further research should also provide a deeper understanding of how CE initiatives fare when they target a diverse set of non-state actors.** This is because increasingly the state is only one of an array of legitimate actors who exercise public authority and provide services.

- **It would be beneficial to identify different characteristics of the communities that tend to support social accountability measures compared to groups where these mechanisms do not evolve or work (World Bank, 2009).** In the same context, evidence is lagging on how civil society could solve accountability problems in politics and thereby strengthen incentives of higher-tier governments to pursue appropriate interventions for improved compact and client power. For example, there is little rigorous impact evaluation of the role of mass media and cutting-edge communication technologies (Devarajan and others, 2011). In this context, is it necessary to isolate the impact of ICT on CE both on citizen mobilization/participation and, if possible, on final development outcomes.

- **Future research should generate case study evidence that includes a review of CE initiatives that have not managed to meet their objectives of contributing to development results.** This will provide further insight about the problems and complexities involved and inform ongoing learning in this regard (Newig and Fritsch, 2009).

- **CE interventions should be assessed comparatively for their durability, scalability, and contexts that are more amenable to specific mechanisms.**

- **Analysis of the costs of existing and upcoming CE initiatives should be undertaken.** The current lack of information on the true costs of such initiatives prevents any serious debate on their merits or drawbacks and does not serves the interests of either proponents or detractors of these new governance models.

- **There is need to better understand the risks of mainstreaming CE for all of the stakeholders involved, as well as potential unintended consequences.**

Annex III: Summary of Stock-Take

1.   This annex presents a synopsis of the lessons learned to date from existing World Bank experiences in using citizen engagement (CE) approaches in projects. It includes an overview of the stocktake of projects utilizing CE approaches in ongoing World Bank projects and some lessons learned gathered from existing impact analyses of World Bank-supported community-driven development projects and interviews with task team leaders (TTLs).

2.   **The stocktake aimed to gain an understanding about the differences between CE in project design with the actual implementation and to understand key challenges in implementation from a TTL perspective.** Methodology for the stocktake involved (a) a desk review of project appraisal documents for 517 Investment Project Financed (IPF) operations (IDA/IBRD) and 124 Development Policy Lending (DPL) operations (IDA/IBRD) approved in FY11 and FY12; (b) results framework indicator analysis of 299 IPF operations (IDA/IBRD) approved in FY10 and reporting in their Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) in FY13; (c) 142 surveys of TTLs for projects that implement CE mechanisms; and (d) 68 in-depth interviews of TTLs for projects that implement CE, identified by suggestions, TTL references, and best-case examples.

A. Stocktake

3.   For the purpose of the stocktake, CE activities in Bank operations have been categorized into seven types of activities: (a) consultations; (b) collaboration in decision-making; (c) collecting, recording, and reporting on inputs received from citizens; (d) grievance and complaint redress mechanisms; (e) citizen led monitoring, evaluation, and/or oversight; (f) empowering citizens with resources and authority over their use; and (g) building citizen capacity for engagement.

4.   **The large majority of CE mechanisms in projects to date are motivated by safeguard requirements, highlighting considerable potential for scaling up non-mandatory approaches.** Currently, 87 percent of IPF projects approved in FY10, FY11, and FY12 have triggered any one of the three key mandatory safeguards (OP4.01, OP4.10, or OP4.12) that require CE through consultations and grievance redress mechanisms, without clear reporting on them in project appraisal documents (PAD) and ISR results frameworks. Figure A3.1 provides the distribution of safeguards triggered for all IDA/IBRD IPF operations approved in FY10, FY11, and FY12. As shown, an Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01) was triggered in 84 percent of all projects approved, as compared to 53 percent for Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12), and 23 percent for Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10). With almost 90 percent of IPF projects triggering mandatory CE mechanisms, safeguards-related CE provides one operational entry point for mainstreaming results-focused CE. This entails (a) improved reporting on mandatory CE mechanisms[1] and (b) significant potential for scaling up non-mandatory CE mechanisms in Bank operations.

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[1] The draft Environmental and Social Framework proposes that the Borrower will develop and implement a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) which will describe the timing and methods of engagement with project-affected communities and other stakeholders (See ESS10, para 14). This is a mandatory requirement. Additional details will be clarified in forthcoming procedures.

5. **Regional figures find CE across IPF in all regions, allowing for a cross-regional approach to mainstreaming**. Figure A.3.2 shows the regional distribution of IDA/IBRD IPF projects approved in FY11 and FY12, which currently require CE through safeguards. The highest share of CE activities in IPF (referred to as "beneficiary feedback") currently derive from Africa (33 percent), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (17 percent), East Asia and the Pacific (17 percent), South Asia (15 percent), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (13 percent), and the Middle East and North Africa (5 percent). While figures for regions such as the Middle East and North Africa may appear low at 5 percent, this reflects the distribution of approved operations per region and/or sector. Even in regions with a small number of operations, projects with CE are currently operating in nearly every sector.

Figure A3.2. Regional Distribution of CE in IPF (%)

6. **Similarly, CE mechanisms in IPF are being utilized in all sectors of Bank operations, highlighting opportunities for mainstreaming CE across sectors.** The stocktake shows that across all regions, CE activities in IPFs are most prevalent in the transportation sector (17 percent); health and social services sector (14 percent); agriculture sector (13 percent); water sanitation and flood protection sector (13 percent); and public administration, law and justice sector (13 percent). This distribution can likely be attributed to the aforementioned safeguards requirements or community-driven development projects, particularly in the case of the agriculture sector. CE is also prevalent in the energy and mining sector (12 percent). Sectors where CE activities are least common include education (7 percent), industry and trade (5 percent), finance (3 percent), and information and communication (3 percent) (see Figure A3.3).

Figure A3.3. Sectoral Distribution of Bank Operations with Beneficiary Feedback (%)

FY11 & FY12

| Sector	%	
Agriculture	13%	
Education	7%	
Energy & Mining	12%	
Finance	3%	
Health & Social Services	14%	
Industry & Trade	5%	
Information & Communication	3%	
Public Administration, Law & Justice	13%	
Transportation	17%	
Water, Sanitation & Flood Protection	13%	

7. **The objectives of CE in IPF vary by region.** Based on project development objectives, the stocktake grouped IPF with CE into five common outcome areas: (a) service delivery; (b) natural resource management; (c) public financial management; (d) social inclusion and empowerment; and (e) governance. Regional differences exist. For example, Africa currently has CE activities across all five development outcome areas, while CE is not being used in projects across all outcome areas in other regions (see Figure A3.4).

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Number of Projects	AFR	EAP	ECA	LCR	MNA	SAR	Total
Social Inclusion & Empowerment	18	10	4	13	4	15	64
Public Financial Management	4	2	1	2	0	2	11
Governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Natural Resource Management	44	17	13	17	3	16	110
Improved Service Delivery	86	47	42	40	10	30	255
Total	152	76	60	72	17	63	440

Figure A3.4. Regional Distribution of Bank Operations by Development Outcome Areas

8.   **A review of project development objectives highlights that the majority of projects with CE mechanisms are intending to improve service delivery**. Among the five identified development outcome areas, IPFs with the intended objective to improve service delivery (e.g., in infrastructure, health, or education) have the highest prevalence of CE activities across all regions (56 percent). The regional distribution of projects that intend to improve service delivery and have CE are proportionally similar to the regional distribution of projects that trigger safeguards for CE—Africa has the largest share, followed by East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa respectively. Figure A3.5 provides an overview of regional and sectoral distribution.

Figure A3.5. Regional & Sectoral Distribution of Bank Operations with CE Intending to Improve Service Delivery

9. **A comparison of IPF with DPLs that use CE reveals that these instruments support different development outcome areas.** Investment lending operations use CE approaches mainly to improve service delivery and natural resource management and less in projects for improved public financial management and governance (Figure A3.6, left). On the other hand, a far higher proportion of DPL operations use CE in support of public financial management and governance outcomes (Figure A3.6, right). These findings show that CE is being used in different Bank lending instruments to achieve different outcomes. A comprehensive approach to CE for results therefore needs to build on all available World Bank instruments for engagement and not be limited to IPF only.

Figure A3.6. Distribution of Investment Lending Operations by Outcome Area

10. **Outcomes of CE are not monitored systematically, and results reporting during project implementation is irregular**. A review of ISR reporting in FY13 for investment lending operations approved in FY10 revealed that 32 percent of total approved IPF projects report on CE results indicators in ISRs. This highlights opportunities for the use of CE results indicators to set incentives for adequate monitoring and reporting by Global Practices/regions and sectors.

11. **Results reporting patterns differ by sectors.** Several sectors (including health and social services, agriculture, public administration and law and education) already include a CE results indicator in the PAD-level results frameworks while other sectors (transport, energy and mining, industry and trade) do this only in the minority of their projects. Similarly, some sectors such as health and social services or public administration and law report on CE results indicators during project implementation while reporting in others is weak to non-existent (Figure A3.7). Similar findings apply when data is presented by Global Practice. While this can

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in part be explained by the different nature of projects in the various sectors, not all of which systematically involve citizens, it points nevertheless to an agenda of (a) systematically integrating results indicators for CE activities in projects and (b) improving implementation reporting on results indicators agreed at the project appraisal stage.

Figure A3.7. Use of and Reporting on CE Indicators

Sector

■ % of CE indicators included in PAD results frameworks   ■ % of CE indicators reported on in ISR

Legend: ■ % of CE indicators included in PAD results frameworks ■ % of CE indicators reported on in ISR

B. Lessons Learned

12.   This section summarizes key lessons learned from 142 surveys and 68 interviews with TTLs and existing impact reviews of World Bank operations.

Context Factors

13.   **The quality of mandatory CE can be improved**. Eighty-five percent of TTLs interviewed attest that consultations are the primary method of CE, but the breadth of these consultations has been found to be highly variable. Consultations during design and implementation of project operations vary from being highly engaging with multiple iterations of consultation meetings to simple information dissemination. According to TTLs, a project's CE credibility is established through the quality of consultations during project design. For instance, consultations that best articulate a common understanding among the citizens such as by providing visual aids and information material in local, easily understood language fosters clarity among the citizens and encourages higher citizen participation along with increasing willingness to provide feedback.

14.   **The majority of CE activities are undertaken during the stages of project design and implementation and are relatively less prevalent at the completion stage.** The predominant mechanisms for beneficiary feedback are consultations, followed by public displays of information, participatory planning, and citizen satisfaction surveys. Third party monitoring is conducted most frequently through procurement monitoring and social audits, which are among

the most frequently used mechanisms at the project completion stage. However, the effectiveness of third party monitoring has proven to be contextually based and necessitates a minimum level of trust, otherwise it can even be counter productive by constraining the level of transparency at project level. Community management, though more frequent for community-driven development (CDD) projects, is less prevalent overall. Often, community management has involved co-financing by the community of the project, which has demonstrated success in sustaining activities post-project completion due to creating accountability within the community.

15. **Early results help build buy-in and ownership for CE activities in projects**. According to TTLs, stakeholder buy-in increases significantly once initial CE results have been achieved, typically close to mid-term, and can be a driver for scaling up CE activities. Trust is necessary to foster an enabling CE environment and strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of CE activities. Task team leaders emphasize the need for citizens' trust that governments will take their feedback into account, to the extent possible, as well as confidence on part of governments that citizen feedback reflects pressing needs and priorities. A collaborative relationship among citizen monitoring groups, the government, and the project management units increases the possibility of monitoring results to be incorporated into project implementation. The World Bank's experience in this area confirms the need at the onset of the project to encourage and empower disadvantaged citizens who may feel too marginalized to provide honest feedback and to ensure that a functional feedback loop is in place to avoid raising expectations and leading to disillusionment (World Bank 2012b).

16. **The timing and degree of political transition influences CE success**. Political transition, depending on type, can create obstacles or opportunities for CE. In general, however, TTL interviews highlight that a higher degree of political stability leads to higher degrees of CE and within a shortened period of time.

17. **Local knowledge and capacity can contribute to the success of CE activities.** Several TTL interviews emphasized the importance of local knowledge, technical how-how and convening power of the communities, CSOs, and schools/training institutes that proved to be valuable during project design and implementation. Project team leaders cite that selecting staff who are CE knowledgeable within the local context was often challenging and was done on an ad hoc basis. Project implementation can benefit from a country-based CE specialist with knowledge of the country context, contributing to building the trust and confidence of sometimes skeptical government officials. Moreover, CSOs can be useful intermediaries between citizens and governments. Team leaders emphasize the benefit of CSO capacity to engage and reach those in the remote and rural areas. Citizen engagement has been found to be most successful when the government counterpart has sufficient implementation capacity and operates in a transparent manner. The most effective projects to institutionalize CE as part of country systems achieved this in an environment where a willing government structure had strong capacity to implement CE activities as well as the capacity to act on the feedback. If country capacity is not readily available, "the Bank may be able to augment [current country] systems by bringing technical expertise on how to generate meaningful and reliable responses." (World Bank, 2014b).

19. *'Feedback fatigue'* **can have an adverse impact on planned CE activities.** According to some TTLs, parallel ongoing CE activities (particularly due to limited harmonization among

development cooperation providers), time constraints, and limited or slow results ensuing from their feedback have affected the willingness of citizens to participate in such activities. Some project teams recognized this aspect and made accommodations for project beneficiaries (e.g., changing the timing of community meetings to encourage higher attendance by women who were otherwise occupied with household chores at other times). There is a clear need to work better with other development partners by leveraging one another's resources to reduce project cost, including for CE activities.

Operational Aspects

20.   **There is strong demand from TTLs for guidance and support to CE mainstreaming in WBG operations.** Discussions with TTLs have confirmed the importance of designated technical support on a sustained basis as well as improved accessibility of systematic Bank knowledge on CE activities. The TTLs' awareness of existing guidance (or how-to) notes and resources for engaging with citizens is limited. Additionally, frequent TTL transitions have been noted as obstacles in passing on institutional knowledge. Beyond project documents, TTLs have named insufficient communication or knowledge transfer as key transition challenges. More WBG-wide systematic knowledge management on CE activities has also been cited as a need.

21.   **All TTLs stated that CE needs to be incorporated into the project design.** This is particularly important to determine whether CE activities can support project development objectives; how to collaborate with partner governments in CE mainstreaming; which CE activities or mechanisms would be better suited for respective Bank-lending instruments and projects (including ICT); at which stage(s) of the project it would be relevant to incorporate such activities; and how and to what extent such activities should be implemented to strengthen project impact while not being overly taxing on implementation progress and resources.

22.   **Regular reporting and monitoring of CE results indicators would facilitate rapid CE mainstreaming into WBG operations.** Feedback from TTLs confirms that it would be useful to incorporate CE indicators based on their project's intended outcomes rather than the project's sector. Since CE activities are not necessarily sector specific, a proposed list of sector agnostic CE indicators accompanied by clear guidance would be helpful for TTLs to think through the results-chain of their project, including the project's results framework. Using such CE indicators would also foster a culture for proactive CE integration into project design and help to prevent cumbersome procedures to amend existing results frameworks to integrate new CE indicators during project implementation. These indicators will be made available as part of staff guidance.

23.   **There is scope for projects to close the feedback loop more consistently.** Overall, interviews with TTLs confirmed willingness and responsiveness on the part of project teams to make changes and undertake follow-up actions based on beneficiary/citizen feedback. At the same time, systematic efforts to inform citizens about how or if their feedback was utilized were found to be less prevalent.

24.   **Currently technology is not widely used to support CE activities in operations.** The use of ICT depends on the nature of the project, the size of the project area, and the number of beneficiaries. It also depends on approach and context since ICT is no substitute for personal interaction with beneficiaries and citizens to build familiarity and rapport, particularly during the

initial stages of the project. In projects where ICT is used to engage with citizens, the use of websites/web portals is most prevalent, followed by mobile SMS. Currently, 39 percent of TTLs interviewed said to have incorporated ICT into project implementation. The TTLs note that SMS messaging and cell phone usage is more prevalent than Internet connectivity in rural areas. Call centers are commonly used in WBG operations in sectors concentrated on service delivery in urban areas or for projects that are undertaken throughout the country rather than in a particular community or region.

Key Challenges

25. **Time is one of the most constraining factors.** Lack of time has been cited by TTLs as a key constraint. Citizen engagement requires adequate time for design, implementation, and reporting back on the inputs received to close the feedback loop. This also points to the need to adequately budget for staff time in all projects aiming to engage with citizens at any point of the project lifecycle.

26. **Capacity building is key to obtaining results**. The interviewed TTLs indicate that initial engagement activities can be slow to produce results due to limited engagement capacity of both citizens/community organizations and governments. The need for adequate capacity for engagement at the community level has also been highlighted in the World Bank's impact analysis of community-driven development projects (Wong, 2012).

27. **Most CE activities are financed through project components, but a consistent funding strategy and approach to costing is missing.** Evidence also shows that TTLs do not have a clear understanding with regard to available sources of funding for CE across the institution. According to data provided by the 142 TTL surveys, 53 percent of CE activities are financed by project components, 23 percent of activities are funded by Bank budget, 12 percent are financed through trust funds, and 12 percent are funded by counterparts. Additionally, team leaders pointed out that the government is willing to borrow and agree to CE activities for projects operating in a sector of high priority. Team leaders cite the government's willingness to engage as being highest when CE is incorporated into the project components, which are discussed and agreed upon at project design. Trust funds are primarily used to pilot CE activities (Figure A3.8).

Figure A3.8. Funding Sources Cited in Surveyed Projects

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
Annex IV: Summary of Regional Approaches

8.   **The OPCS stocktaking and work in other parts of the WBG confirm that citizen engagement (CE) mechanisms are being used by teams in all regions.**

A. Africa

9.   **The Africa region (AFR) adheres to the new corporate mandate to incorporate beneficiary feedback mechanisms.** The region has measured this experience by developing *Listening to Citizens: Learning from Projects in Africa*—a robust knowledge base on the modalities, enabling conditions, challenges, and outcomes of scaling up engagement with communities and beneficiaries. With the information from this assessment, project teams in the region will better understand the mechanisms of CE. This section provides a brief overview of the assessment.

1.   Experience and Lessons Learned

10.   *Listening to Citizens: Learning from Projects in Africa* **focuses on the use, effectiveness, and outcomes of CE mechanisms used during project implementation.** It consists of a four-tiered study: (a) a review of 250 Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) in 10 relevant sectors; (b) a survey sent to task team leaders (TTLs) for 205 projects with CE components; (c) semi-structured interviews with 21 of these TTLs; and (d) in-depth case studies for six projects. The in-depth case studies involved follow-up interviews with TTLs and interviews with other project team members, project implementation units (PIUs), other members of government, relevant civil society organizations (CSOs), members of the country management unit (CMU), and a sample of beneficiaries.

11.   **The review reveals that the prevalence of CE activities varied according to the nature/type of projects across the project portfolio.** CE was more prevalent in country-driven development (CDD) projects and projects involving government service delivery, resource management, or promotion of economic activity, and less prevalent in energy and water, trade, and transport projects.

12.   **The issue of funding has also played a significant role in the implementation of CE activities in the region.** Approximately 27 percent of survey respondents stated that the most significant barrier to executing CE tools was inadequate funding. Funding for CE is most available when it is built into the project components; the next most available funding is other Bank Budget that has not been earmarked for the CE mechanism at the design stage. In many cases, projects used multiple sources of funding.

13.   **The trends demonstrate that parallel funding—whether through counterparts, trust funds, or other external sources—tends to supplement shortfalls in project-based financing for CE tools.** The successful implementation of CE mechanisms in projects with dedicated funds also signals the importance of government buy-in, which is a requirement when financing is allocated for CE at the design phase as part of the Bank Budget or is integrated into project components.

a. *CE results and outcomes*

14.   **Given the small sample of projects and the many factors that contribute to the success of CE and project results, an evaluation is somewhat speculative;** randomized controlled trials or, at minimum, detailed survey work at the beginning and end of a project intervention would be required to draw rigorous conclusions.

15.   **For the 15 projects that were not selected for case studies, the supervision documents did not provide the evidence necessary to discern causality between CE applications and project results.** However, the Kenya Health Services Support Project and the Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Project, for example, offer some insights on linkages between CE and project results. Assessing the impact of CE on outcomes is complex: in the Kenya Health Services Support Project, for instance, although utilization rates of health services at public facilities increased from 24 million to 38 million a year over the project period, attribution to CE was not possible (although the TTL confirmed that it played an important role). Therefore, it is likely that CE did have some impact on improved client/service provider relations. Finally, individual visits to public health care facilities doubled from 1.7 (2004) to 3.7 (2013) per year; confidence in health facilities likely influenced the behavior change.

16.   **Beyond anecdotal testaments, the assessment rarely revealed concrete evidence of CE measures leading to "course corrections" or other changes in project implementation.** Only five of the TTLs interviewed were able to name a specific change in project implementation that could be attributed to CE. However, this does not mean that CE did not make a difference.

17.   **Most TTLs interviewed perceived that overall, CE has contributed positively to project implementation and outcomes**. In some cases, such as CDD projects in which contact between citizens and implementing agencies is frequent, "feedback loops"—that is sharing of information, preferences, and responses by both—were continuous, as, presumably, was corrective action. In these circumstances, the "course" was being guided by CE interventions throughout implementation rather than in midstream. Even when exchange between citizens and service providers was less frequent, it is likely that CE was one input among others—financial, technical, and organizational—that combined to induce shifts in implementation practice and behaviors. The challenge once again is attribution—discerning what role CE played in informing these practices.

b. *Factors affecting the performance of CE mechanisms*

18.   **This section reviews conditions or factors that promote or discourage the use of CE interventions in relation to country context, as well as project-level and Bank-level factors.**

(i) Country context

19.   **In the sample of 21 countries, country context appears to have played a significant role in willingness to include CE mechanisms in projects.** Among countries that have adopted vigorous decentralization legislation fairly recently, Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda have all registered significant use of CE instruments. However, decentralization has resulted in unevenness in embracing CE among local jurisdictions. Progressive local leaders found these approaches to be useful in demonstrating their commitment to citizens, while more traditional

local authorities (Benin, Ghana) or lower-level ministry staff (Nigeria) saw them as a threat to their authority (or rent-seeking opportunities) or simply as petty nuisances.

20. **The following elements of country context are particularly important for the success and sustainability of CE mechanisms:**
   - *Strengthening government capacity to engage*. As good governance has been increasingly demanded in recent years, it is possible that governments have felt vulnerable or at least unable to understand the purpose and content of CE instruments.
   - *Use of CSOs/NGOs in implementation.* CSOs can be useful intermediaries between citizens and governments and could build communities' capacity to engage with government.
   - *Attention to vulnerable groups.* CDD projects or general community consultation that addressed the local population at large sometimes initially overlooked vulnerable groups, including the extremely poor, women, and children.

(ii) Project-level factors

21. ***Project type*.** Not surprisingly, CDD projects generally had the most "evolved" instruments in terms of community involvement in decision-making. In addition, projects in sectors whose primary purpose is delivery of services at the "retail" level (e.g., providing direct services or stipends to individuals, such as local government, health and social protection) all incorporated instruments for consultation, feedback, and some forms of monitoring. Projects in irrigation and natural resource management (including promotion of income generation, as in Uganda Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources) also included some of the same approaches. The energy projects in the sample, all of which entailed large lump-sum investments, either did not use CE instruments (Mali Energy Support Project), dropped them almost entirely during implementation (Burundi Multisectoral Water and Electricity Infrastructure Project), or provided no indication of acting on them in their Implementation Status and Results reports (Regional Power). CE mechanisms in transport projects focused almost exclusively on Project Affected Persons.

22. ***Project design*.** The assessment shed light on aspects of project design that encouraged or discouraged the effective use of CE approaches.
   - *Pre-appraisal analysis*. Analysis before launching a project has proved to be valuable to ensure that the project design is responsive to the local context and the preferences of beneficiaries.
   - *Flexibility*. The Kenya experience is informative. While each of the nine demographically diverse pilot sites was allowed to experiment with a flexible approach in using CE instruments, it appears that no systematic analysis was undertaken to determine what worked well, where, and why. Such an analysis could have provided guidance on which practices it would be more prudent to adopt in different localities.
   - *Clear definition of CE instruments and associated indicators*. In many cases, good preparation work permitted greater specificity of the CE mechanisms and also led to incorporating monitorable basic or intermediate indicators in the results frameworks of the PADs. TTLs emphasized that establishing indicators was very important to focus attention and resources on CE during implementation. It also helped to improve accountability, since CE issues were being tracked and reported on.

- *Absence of instrumentality.* Many projects did not articulate the objectives of CE instruments or did not specify an explicit relationship between project development indicators and CE objectives or components.
- *Use of surveys.* Some projects use built-in baseline and end-project surveys. However, even with surveys, it is difficult to discern the role of CE in attaining the project development objectives, particularly in the absence of an underlying hypothesis or theory of change.

23. **Budget for implementation**. Some TTLs mentioned that implementation budgets were constrained, and they therefore prioritized the actions required to monitor and take corrective action related to the project indicators. Unless indicators related to CE are established at the outset, CE activities could be more easily overlooked during implementation: TTLs may perceive that there is not much to monitor or report.

(iii) Bank-level factors

24. **In overall responses to the assessment, there appeared to be a genuine commitment to expanding CE practices,** subject to adaptation to the sector at hand as well as to the creation of a supporting environment within the Bank for doing so.

25. **Skills of the project team.** Project team skills may be a project-level issue, but they ultimately reflect Bank-level incentives and prioritization. In addition to a committed TTL, most successful CE interventions can benefit from expertise by a social development or governance specialist with CE credentials or a sector specialist with strong experience and allotted time to work on CE issues.

26. **Leadership/management support**. TTL responses varied as to whether support by sector or country management was a more critical factor; some indicated the importance of commitment by both.

27. **Funding**. CE initiatives require funding, including additional time, at both preparation and implementation stages. Adding mandates without supplementary funding is self-defeating, as it results in cookie-cutter approaches and shortcuts that could jeopardize the legitimacy of CE efforts.

2. Going Forward

28. **To systematically mainstream CE into relevant projects, it is necessary to have a coherent, overarching strategy that helps to create the right incentives, including earmarked funding to engage with citizen beneficiaries.** Staff training to build awareness of CE and its importance to projects, written guidance, and training (e.g., self-paced online modules and workshops) are all important aspects of this approach.

29. **It would be useful to link AFR's efforts to mainstream CE at the project level with ongoing support to strengthen country systems to ensure that the capacity and performance of country systems to engage with citizens is factored in during the design of Bank-supported operations.** It is also advisable to clearly distinguish the Bank's role from the

government's in strengthening CE. The notion of mainstreaming this agenda has to consider the enormous variations in country context, capacity, and political will in the countries of the region.

30. **A pragmatic, gradual, context-specific approach to selecting appropriate entry points for CE would facilitate the process of mainstreaming.** Therefore, it would be useful to develop guidance that spells out what types of CE can be of benefit, and when and where.

31. **Developing a results framework or chain is important to specify what the CE objective is, what CE instruments will be used, how this will help achieve overall project results, and which indicators will be used to monitor implementation and results.** At the design stage, CE should be based on addressing the problem at hand and its value-added to achieving the project's objectives.

32. **Where the country context is constraining, the region also needs to pay attention to identifying entry points for building an effective enabling environment in the country.** This means coordinating with governance specialists working on broader country environment issues to both understand the challenges of the country context and assess how project processes could create externalities for the country environment.

33. **Indicators to measure the impact of CE mechanisms need to be built into projects.** Adequate incentives could ensure that there is regular reporting on the effectiveness and impact of CE mechanisms.

34. **Coordination with other regions to facilitate cross-regional learning would be useful for sharing relevant approaches, experiences, and recommendations.** In the immediate term, launching a few pilots will assess how these shared insights can usefully contribute in the context of projects. In addition, the Global Practices could be an important platform to facilitate this Bankwide initiative.

B. East Asia and Pacific

There is a long history of CE in Bank operations in East Asia and Pacific (EAP). The regional context offers experience in countries with different levels of receptivity to CE in decision-making and voicing of concerns.

1. Experience and Lessons Learned

The experience in EAP countries varies broadly. In some, CE is highly developed and processes are refined as governments strive for openness and accountability; in others, the CE processes are nascent, emerging in closed states with weaker governance; and in post-conflict settings, CE processes are fundamental for peace and stability. The CE agenda draws on experience in three areas: (a) community-driven development (CDD); (b) social accountability activities in such sectors as health, education, agriculture, justice, and security; and (c) beneficiary and citizen consultation and feedback for all people affected by a project as well as for environmental and social safeguards.

a. Community-driven development

35.   **In CDD operations, CE is the primary driving force of the activities and outcomes.** There is a range of such operations: (a) national flagship programs with engagement, as in Indonesia (1998-2017), the Philippines (2002-2020), and Cambodia (2003-2012); (b) operations that are limited in scope but that have the potential (if not the stated objective) for national scale-up, as in China, Myanmar, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea; and (c) operations that are targeted to specific regions or vulnerable groups, as in Vietnam, Thailand, Lao, or the Mindanao Region in the Philippines. The commonality here is the importance of continually refining the integrated CE approach for empowerment and instrumental ends. Robust evaluations have demonstrated the poverty impact of these programs and their contributions to the World Bank's twin goals.

36.   **The region's long history with this type of support means that the CDD projects of Indonesia and the Philippines can share a vast range of lessons on community participation.** In over a decade of experience both PNPM (Indonesia) and KALAHI (Philippines) have gained understanding of how communities become (and stay) engaged. This takes the agenda further from the basics of CE to specific ingredients: what works, when, and why. Project analyses and lessons have been shared among EAP countries and elsewhere on facilitation as the cornerstone of effective CE, the importance of establishing a code of ethics, information and transparency strategies for more empowered beneficiaries, localizing financial controls to empower communities to oversee budgets and expenditures, strategies to enhance the quality of women's participation, and grievance-handling mechanisms that actively involve villagers in the resolution of problems and disputes (see Box A4.1).

37.   **Many EAP operations have progressed beyond broad-based community empowerment and local investments to tackle critical areas of inclusion.** The CDD portfolio also constitutes a platform for engagement on aspects of governance, front-line service delivery, inclusion, livelihoods, legal empowerment, violence, and fragility. In particular, work on inclusion includes operations in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Lao that have developed strategies to engage ethnic minorities and indigenous people. The Philippines' outreach to marginalized groups and Indonesia's PNPM Peduli program have adopted an innovative approach to social inclusion by supporting a range of specialized CSOs to strengthen and scale up their work with groups living at the margins of society (street children, indigenous forest peoples, victims of political violence, sex workers, etc.).

38.   **EAP operations have also incorporated CE approaches in conflict and post-conflict settings to improve project outcomes, and promote peace and stability.** Through CDD operations in conflict-affected areas of the Philippines, southern Thailand, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands, CE is particularly concerned with strengthening trust between citizens and the state. Task teams' experiences underscore the importance of information sharing, dialogue, and citizen empowerment. In Indonesia, the Bank has acquired a wealth of experience in using CDD platforms to deliver assistance to conflict-affected communities. Experience in post-conflict Aceh included supporting civil society engagement in development planning, management of public funds, and legal empowerment. The Bank also supports the development of a publicly accessible violence dataset to help strengthen understanding and cooperation between government and civil society, and thereby make more progress toward mitigating the adverse effects of rapid economic, social, and political changes. In Myanmar, the Bank has contributed to

the peace process by undertaking related analytical work and developing violence monitoring systems.

Box A4.1. Shifting Gears: Bringing Accountability into CE

Cambodia. Bank support for CE was primarily established through the nationwide Rural Investment and Local Governance Project, in which 1,800 communes conducted annual participatory planning and operated a grievance redress system. A post-project review and political economy analysis in 2011 noted that CE in the planning process was often tokenistic, and that the grievance redress mechanism (GRM) had little traction and credibility. A window of opportunity to enhance the consequence of CE in local-level development arose when the national committee responsible for local governance and local development harmonized and aligned donor projects. This created an impetus for an integrated platform/framework that would empower and engage citizens in key development processes that affect them, and linked well with the downward accountability vision of decentralization reformers.

The landmark agreement between civil society and government on a Social Accountability Framework came about through an incremental, step-by-step approach. It builds on the results and lessons of three years of piloting through the Demand for Good Governance project, which helped clarify the space for social accountability in Cambodia and the areas where civil society and government could engage for development impact. The final version of the framework (which is now government policy) includes three substantive strategies: (a) improved local information and transparency, (b) open budgets, and (c) citizen monitoring of local administrations and basic services. In addition to prioritizing community facilitation, the framework defines complementary roles for both government (elected officials and service providers) and local civil society to meet objectives. The action needed by government, as well as by civil society, is presented in concrete terms, and the framework sets out dual, joint actions: government will generate data, and civil society will disseminate them; government will produce the budgets, and civil society actors will conduct budget literacy work; NGOs will conduct citizen monitoring (scorecard processes), and commune councils will see that action plans are agreed and carried out. The focus of the social accountability framework is multisectoral (it starts with local governments, health centers, and schools) in a rollout intended to reach 70 percent of rural districts in three to four years.

Myanmar. A key aspect of the National Community Driven Development Project (NCDDP) is the development of a comprehensive accountability framework to ensure that communities are identifying local interventions and funds are spent as intended. The project envisages a set of built-in checks and balances. The project accountability mechanisms and instruments, which are managed and carried out by staff, include (a) transparency and access to information, including the production and disclosure of project information and reporting; (b) a code of conduct for all project staff, including sanctions for noncompliance; (c) project monitoring and reporting, including project process oversight by township offices; and (d) procurement and financial management reviews and audits. These mechanisms are both ongoing and periodic. Under the umbrella of participatory beneficiary monitoring and oversight, the project also includes social accountability mechanisms and instruments: (a) transparency and access to information, including the village-level public display of all processes, decisions, budgets, and payments; (b) monitoring of project implementation by community subcommittees; (c) a GRM that allows the provision of feedback on noncompliance or complaints on any aspect of project decision-making or implementation; and (d) a "social audit" meeting that encourages the sharing of all project information and provides the opportunity for questions from community members. Given that all local stakeholders are new to these approaches in a new type of CDD project, the project design also envisages establishing a third-party monitoring process to check on project and social accountability mechanisms, and to provide an independent review/snapshot of project processes and outcomes.

b. *Social accountability activities*

39. **EAP has worked to enhance the quality of CE and the social accountability process.** There is increasing evidence of improved impacts when civil society efforts to bring about accountability are linked to formal systems, and when government and civil society act together. A key dimension in the approach to CE is fostering coalitions for change. Different actors bring different dimensions and skills (citizens, NGOs, the press, watchdogs, and donors), and this critical mass makes a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts. The analytical findings on voice and CE in Cambodia have now been operationalized through a social accountability framework that involves state and non-state actors in coordinated activities aimed at enhancing the quality and scope of CE in local service delivery and governance. Moving forward from discrete participatory planning and grievance redress mechanisms (GRMs) in CDD operations, the framework includes a sequenced and blended set of mechanisms that includes open budgets, access to (actionable) performance information, and citizen/beneficiary monitoring in local governments, schools, and health centers (see Box A4.1). The EAP experience highlights the importance of linking CE and social accountability with country systems to inform and empower citizens to better engage in annual planning and budgeting processes, and to establish access and working relationships with higher levels of government.

40. **This social accountability work has been increasingly embedded in the sectors.** Cross-sectoral collaboration has helped to enhance CE. For instance, Indonesia's PNPM Generasi Program highlights citizens' involvement in planning, implementation, and oversight of health, nutrition, and education services; and performance-based block grants encourage citizens, service providers, and local governments to work together to address bottlenecks in local service delivery. In Lao, China, Cambodia, and Myanmar, there are CE and social accountability initiatives in operations in such sectors as health, education, urban (floating village management), environmental protection, social protection, rural development, and agriculture. In Timor Leste, the Bank's Justice for the Poor Program has supported efforts to introduce social audit/monitoring functions in the wake of decentralization efforts, to strengthen relationships at the central level and local level (village). Linking grassroots efforts to the sector agenda is a challenge in some countries.

c. *Consulting with citizens and beneficiaries and collecting their feedback*

41. **Finally, the EAP region has drawn on the environmental and social safeguards components of its operations to engage in consultations with, and solicit feedback from, beneficiaries and broader citizen groups that may be affected in any way.** New efforts in Vietnam and Lao aim to move beyond compliance to support the development and implementation of domestic safeguards frameworks and strengthen national systems to manage safeguards. In conjunction with a risk-profiling exercise, the EAP team is also working to build country-specific capacity for effective CE. For example, in Vietnam and the Philippines, the Bank is contributing to Centers of Learning that will host multidonor training programs to build country capacity to manage social safeguards. In China, social reviews and safeguards are supporting efforts to improve consultations and the participatory design of projects, and enhancing complaints-handling mechanisms. In Myanmar, where in-depth knowledge on social issues such as (legacy) land issues and ethnic minorities is still emerging, the CDD operation has

incorporated consultations with beneficiaries, grievance redress approaches, and mechanisms for oversight and accountability (social audits, community scorecards, and third-party monitoring) to strengthen the positive impact of community investments (see Box 4.1).

2. Going Forward

42. **The EAP strategy for scaling up CE will be to expand and replicate efforts toward systemic reform in client countries.** The client engagement platform is already well developed and will build on existing efforts. While this may mean fewer and smaller engagements, EAP is now well positioned to move strategically to scale up CE. In Indonesia, the Law on Villages ratified by Parliament in December 2013 incorporates key client engagement principles such as participatory planning, community assemblies, social accountability, and community block-grants. On the basis of this national law, citizens and communities can explore avenues to actively participate in national development. Moreover, the institutionalization of PNPM gives new impetus to the need to empower communities to access and use national accountability systems, including legal and quasi-legal institutions such as courts, ombudsman, and public information commissions, to channel and address grievances.

43. **EAP will continue strengthening CE through CDD operations.** CDD projects are transitioning from pilots to programs, or from programs to institutionalized country policy (Indonesia). In this process, CE is not central just to Bank-financed operations, but also to the community and local development efforts of governments in the region. Moreover, CDD projects provide the primary platform for learning how to engage with citizens. Priority projects moving forward are:
- Indonesia: PNPM (2014-2017)
- Philippines: KALAHI –CIDSS (2002-2014) and NCDDP (2014-2020)
- Myanmar NCDDP (2013-2019)
- Lao PRF (2011-2016).

44. **The EAP region intends to implement a CE strategy, with mechanisms that are not tokenistic but are rooted in an understanding of context, and are more focused on inclusion of women and vulnerable groups.** To strengthen the links between CE initiatives and government accountability structures to lend impetus to reform processes, task teams' efforts will be geared toward integrating demand- and supply-side activities through national programs and work with multisector platforms. A central dimension of the facilitation/interface process is the strengthening of civil society, including CSOs and NGOs. The quality of this engagement will be informed by better understanding and use of vehicles for engagement, blended and sequenced to suit the specific sector. As appropriate, ICT-based mechanisms will be used to collect information and enhance opportunities for feedback from citizens.

45. **Work to enhance the quality of CE will not only occur in EAP's CDD programs but will focus on multiple sectors.** The social accountability work in EAP is a critical piece of the innovations in CE. Cross-sectoral collaboration, particularly with regard to front-line service delivery, will be a priority. It will involve efforts to (a) improve services for all by ensuring that they are responsive to local needs; (b) make the services/infrastructure more inclusive of women and vulnerable groups; and (c) empower citizens and communities so that they become more informed users/beneficiaries, more able to voice their needs and concerns, individually and collectively. In this regard, based on the experience of PNPM Generasi and global efforts to

improve local-level service delivery, Bank operations in Indonesia are increasingly geared toward supporting the Government in improving services delivered on the front lines (i.e., by the teachers and health workers who interact directly with rural community members in community clinics, schools, and other local facilities). Recognizing that the myriad causes of basic service delivery failures are not confined to a single sector or agency, Bank operations will focus on the front-line facility, the set of priority services that this facility is expected to deliver, and the people the facility is expected to serve. Therefore, priority projects will include the following:

- Cambodia: Social Accountability Framework, programmatic nationwide subnational rollout, multisector (health, education, local government);
- Indonesia: PNPM Generasi, programmatic nationwide rollout, multisector;
- China: social risk management in investment programs; farmers' cooperatives;
- Solomon Islands: community governance, grievance management, justice work;
- Vanuatu: natural resource governance, Fair Land Dealings Project.

46. **To support this multisectoral approach, the EAP team intends to complete the sector analysis of its project portfolio to profile and plan the design and implementation of CE.** A review of 50 projects in three countries has enabled the team to document how various CE mechanisms have been used (i.e., whether they have been designed, implemented, tracked, or budgeted). The remainder of this dataset will be completed in collaboration with country teams.

47. **Moving forward, the EAP team will strengthen country systems for safeguards--which implicitly includes beneficiary monitoring.** The shift from compliance checks to built-in/integrated thinking about "safeguard" issues is central to Bank business, a core that needs to be strengthened. The region has positive experience in Vietnam and Lao on capacity building and mainstreaming and plans to develop its strategy around the lessons learned. To this end, it will support specialized centers in Indonesia and the Pacific and will formulate a framework agreement with donors to support EAP governments' efforts to strengthen national systems for safeguards. In China, the Bank team has provided training for country consultants and project implementation units as well as local government staff engaged in safeguards. The team will also build on current efforts to build multi-stakeholder platforms that create coalitions of change.

C. Europe and Central Asia

48. **CE is not a new approach for Europe and Central Asia (ECA).** Many countries in ECA recognize the need to strengthen beneficiary feedback, not only to improve government effectiveness but also to support inclusive growth and stability. ECA has a strong potential to improve CE across its portfolio. The percentage of projects reporting on beneficiary feedback has increased 14 points from FY13 (29 percent) to FY14 (43 percent). Today 88 percent of projects refer to beneficiary feedback in the PAD.

49. **ECA has taken a gradual and targeted approach to fostering CE in its portfolio.** To understand the nature and scope of CE in ECA, it is important to acknowledge the heterogeneity of the region, the legacy of the past, and the nature of the contract between citizens and the state.

## 1. Common Legacy, Great Heterogeneity

50.   **Despite a common legacy, there is a great variation in the nature and level of voice and accountability in ECA.** Social services and infrastructure were well developed under the communist regimes that many ECA countries experienced, and citizens expect functioning services. However, decades of centralized decision-making, feedback-deficient environments, and marginally responsive governance can result in a "low expectations" culture, characterized by a citizenry less likely to complain (World Bank, 2014a). The service delivery entry point is often considered a more legitimate, less politicized, and less threatening domain of citizen-government interaction. However, there is great diversity among countries regarding CE (see Figure A4.1).

Figure A4.1. Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, and Political Stability in ECA Countries

Voice and accountability

Rule of law

Political stability and absence of violence

Source: WGI 2012.

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
2. ECA Portfolio Review on CE

51. **In FY14 ECA undertook a portfolio assessment of CE practices** to establish a baseline for achieving beneficiary feedback in 100 percent of projects by FY18, and to compile useful lessons for the future. The stocktaking used quantitative and qualitative approaches to document the extent and range of CE approaches in the ECA investment lending portfolio. The review of 212 active projects in the portfolio revealed that for 84 percent of projects, beneficiary feedback activities are described in the PADs or Project Operation Manuals. However, only 38 percent of the projects have beneficiary feedback indicators in their results frameworks.

52. **The CE tools used in ECA are very specific.** Focus group discussions, customer satisfaction surveys, and GRMs represent about 73 percent of the tools deployed, while CDD approaches and participatory monitoring represent only 14 percent (see Figure A4.2).

Figure A4.2. Frequency of most commonly used mechanisms in the ECA portfolio (% of total tools)

53. **Beneficiary feedback and CE levels differ significantly among the CMUs and the Global Practices (GPs)** (see Figures A4.3 and A4.4). The prevalence of beneficiary feedback activities in the portfolio is relatively even across CMUs, except in the Turkey country program. The distribution of beneficiary feedback and CE mechanisms varies among GPs. The practices with the highest prevalence of CE activities in the portfolio are those that have more immediate beneficiaries: Agriculture, Education, Health, Social Protection and Labor, Governance, Water, and the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practices. Portfolios that typically intervene at the national, regulatory, and/or infrastructure levels—such as those of the Finance and Markets, Poverty, Macroeconomics and Fiscal, and Energy Global Practices—score significantly lower on beneficiary feedback (BF) and CE activities or the corresponding indicators in the results framework.

Figure A4.3 Projects with BF indicator and CE mechanisms (%), by CMU

Figure A4.4. Projects with BF indicator and BF/CE mechanisms (%), by GP

54.   **The structure of the ECA portfolio (large infrastructure and service delivery projects and few CDD projects) favors beneficiary feedback over CE.** Mechanisms that potentially give beneficiaries and citizens a greater stake in decision-making are much less frequent (2-7 percent of all mechanisms) than mechanisms seeking beneficiary feedback through consultations, customer satisfaction surveys, and GRMs (respectively, 35 percent, 20 percent, and 18 percent of the total number of mechanisms employed). However, in some instances, CE is deemed useful to establish trust beyond the scope of the project. A small portfolio of CDD projects (Kyrgyz Republic, Azerbaijan) has demonstrated the value of community involvement as a platform for engagement on aspects of governance, front-line service delivery, inclusion, and livelihoods.

55.   **The review revealed the relevance of social safeguards as an entry point for CE activities.** Of the projects in the active ECA portfolio, 35 percent triggered OP 4.12, *Involuntary Resettlement*, and all of these projects have beneficiary feedback mechanisms, particularly

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GRMs. However, those GRMs rarely apply to the project as a whole and usually remain restricted to resettlement. Effective GRMs can help both mitigate risk and manage expectations around projects, but they can also greatly help advance project implementation. For instance, the Odra River Basin Flood Protection project in Poland involved the resettlement of 161 families. A GRM was designed to be managed at ministry level. Following strong opposition to relocation from local communities, the GRM was assigned to the local mayor, who enjoys the trust of the community. Complaints are now dealt with in a more timely, flexible, and transparent manner. The improved GRM has supported the lengthy and complex consultation and negotiation process that has culminated in communities finally agreeing to the resettlement.

3. Pilot Approaches

56.   Over the last decade, pilots on governance and CSO engagement have taken place in ECA. Since 2007, under the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF), studies and activities related to governance and accountability in public finances, health, education, legal rights and closing the feedback loop through an ombudsman, service delivery, and infrastructure have been supported in Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (see Box A4.2). In Tajikistan, activities focused on supporting greater CE in the budget process, and on improving the capacity of the Parliament, media, and citizens to access and analyze budget information. In Turkey, the GPF grant component provided an assessment of the Parliament's oversight role in the budget cycle. The grant also enabled examination of a gap analysis in relation to public finance reform.

Box A4.2. GPF Example: Expanding Space for Local Accountability in Perm Krai

In 2010-2012, a GPF-supported project was implemented in cooperation with the Ombudsman of Perm Krai by the Nicolaas Witsen Foundation (the Netherlands), with GRANY and other local NGOs, in four municipalities of Perm Krai: Okhansk, Suksun, Kizel, and Kosa. The project became a milestone on the path towards e-development of local accountability and facilitating citizens' access to better public services. The key result of the project is the transformation of a number of district libraries into unique communication platforms: meeting points and information and advice centers for the local community, NGOs, and municipal staff. The project tested new technologies for citizen outreach and public participation in local governance (such as public hearings, citizen surveys, and "upgrading" sites of local administrations), as well as mediation for resolving local conflicts. In addition, the project helped to create a unique troubleshooting technology that allows interaction between citizens of Perm Krai and relevant authorities on the information and communication platform "Street Journal." Another important result of the project is "We act together," – a web-based interactive platform for citizens, NGOs, and officials.

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57.   **Of the 39 countries that to date have opted into the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) initiative, five are in ECA** (Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Tajikistan). In Moldova and Tajikistan CSOs have been awarded grants through the first two calls for proposals. In Moldova, the GPSA is supporting monitoring of the performance of hospital and health care centers through beneficiary feedback mechanisms to ensure that the planned health reforms and performance-based financing will become more transparent and patient-centered. In Tajikistan, the GPSA is supporting Oxfam Tajikistan to strengthen the capacity of water associations to monitor the quality of water and sanitation.

4. Targeted Technical Assistance to Support CE

58.   **Over the past five years, ECA has developed a series of targeted technical assistance projects (TAs) to support CE in projects.** For instance, in Belarus and Georgia, TAs have identified CE mechanisms that can improve the efficiency of municipal services. In Moldova and Armenia, TAs have examined options to mainstream CE in rural services and the forestry sectors. In Russia, the World Bank implemented TAs and a RAS to support the demand side of open data and open government initiatives. In southeast Europe, municipal social accountability audits were conducted in five cities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia to encourage better access to municipal services through innovative citizen feedback mechanisms (hotlines, crowd-sourcing, citizen charters, etc.). These TAs were all closely coordinated with World Bank-supported operations to provide relevant operational recommendations to scale up CE activities in projects.

5. CE in Country Dialogue: the Central Asia CE Strategy

59.   **In Central Asia, where CE has been integrated to the level of the Country Partnership Framework (CPF), a systematic screening of the portfolio was conducted in FY14.** At the same time, the dialogue was reinforced internally (between GPs) and externally with some governments and civil society on CE. For instance, in Tajikistan, the dialogue was built on an earlier GPF initiative to engage with government counterparts and CSOs on governance recommendations for the new CPF (FY15-18). Similarly, CE and governance have emerged as central issues in the Kyrgyz Republic's Country Partnership Strategy, and several Bank-supported projects include community-driven approaches and governance dimensions. World Bank teams working on governance, social accountability, and CE coordinated the launch of a knowledge platform and established external partnerships with key CSOs. A joint work program was developed in FY14 with two regional CSO umbrella organizations—ARGO and Social and Ecological Fund—and a series of trainings and knowledge-sharing events on CE has been organized for Bank staff and clients and stakeholders (including state officials and non-state actors).

Box A4.3. Electricity Supply Reliability and Accountability Project

The Electricity Supply Accountability and Reliability Improvement Project (FY15 pipeline) aims to improve the reliability of electricity supply in three target areas and strengthen the governance of the electricity company's (Severelektro) operations. The project supports the strengthening of consumer feedback and the company's GRM through the installation of a Management Information System (MIS). The MIS will help the company gather accurate information about electricity use and inform customers about electricity outages through accessible channels. The MIS will also document and track the complaints received about the service and response times, and will help strengthen the customer hotline functions of the utility's service centers. A customer satisfaction survey—to be conducted before project effectiveness, six months after the incorporation of the MIS, and at project closure—will measure the evolution of customers' perception of the service. One of the core indicators of the project results framework measures progress toward improving customer satisfaction in the project area through targeted surveys (i.e., percentage improvements compared to the baseline).

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6. Key Bottlenecks to Effectiveness

60. **Despite this considerable progress, ECA still faces several challenges:**

- Many country contexts are not conducive to fostering beneficiary feedback and CE because of (i) the closed nature of the polities, and (ii) citizens' limited trust in their ability to affect change.
- Counterpart agencies, project implementation units, and Bank staff have limited capacity to design and implement beneficiary feedback and CE mechanisms.
- Lack of resources and time: (i) many clients do not want to finance CE initiatives from loans and prefer to use grant funding (except for less ambitious mechanisms, such as customer satisfaction surveys); (ii) the pressure to deliver projects in very short timeframes leads to poor ownership and poor-quality CE activities.
- Not all planned project or monitoring activities are fully carried out. Discrepancies were noted between beneficiary feedback and CE mechanisms at the design and implementation stages. For instance, a GRM may be created but not used in practice.

7. Going Forward

61. **ECA's strategy for scaling up CE will be to systematically support beneficiary feedback mechanisms in the pipeline portfolio while promoting more comprehensive approaches in select client countries.**

a. Beneficiary feedback

62. **Beneficiary feedback mechanisms will be systematically mainstreamed in the pipeline portfolio by ensuring that CE is considered during social assessments and project preparation and monitored during implementation.** This will entail integrating CE mechanisms into the design and results frameworks of Bank projects; prioritizing compliance with applicable safeguards requirements for grievance redress; and piloting beneficiary feedback mechanisms for priority projects, particularly for large service delivery projects in key sectors. Cross-GP collaboration will be a priority to ensure that the CE strategy's scope and mechanisms are better understood and more systematically used to improve project implementation, service delivery efficiency, and citizen feedback.

63. **Learning lessons from the most frequently used CE tools.** ECA will assess current customer satisfaction surveys and GRMs to evaluate their quality and identify best practices. In collaboration with the CE community of practice, an operational toolkit will be prepared to help task teams implement these tools more effectively. Specific attention will be given to the ECA context (middle-income countries, closed polities, legacy from the past). Findings and lessons learned will be disseminated across GPs and CMUs.

64. **Reinforcing the safeguards beneficiary feedback loops and country systems.** The safeguard reform provides an opportunity to shift from compliance checks to more integrated beneficiary feedback systems. There is a need for systematic relationship- building to ensure that clients not only comply with requirements, but also understand the value of those requirements with respect to meeting objectives. Special attention will be given to ensuring that minor

complaints are addressed in a timely manner before they escalate, and to providing support to agencies regarding beneficiary feedback mechanisms and reporting.

65.   **Support ECA staff's awareness of and capacity in CE.** FY15 and FY16 will be critical to develop the awareness and capacity of staff across the new GPs and CMUs on CE mechanisms. As part of these efforts, systematic knowledge-sharing events, guidance notes on CE strategy and tools, and careful monitoring of progress by CMUs and GPs will be essential. ECA is involved in the CE community of practice and will support the creation of a knowledge platform involving units working on CE, as well as external stakeholders, to share best practices on CE. Those efforts will be carried out jointly with the other regions to ensure cross-regional learning.

b. A more comprehensive approach on CE in selected countries

66.   **Lessons learned from the Central Asia CE strategy provide useful insights on how to better integrate CE in dialogues and programs with clients.** CMUs will provide knowledge exchange events to inform Bank staff and clients about the CE strategy and tools and to address country-specific context and programs. Upcoming Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCDs) should include a diagnosis of citizens' agency and voice and their ability to influence social, economic, and political domains. CPFs can also provide opportunities to identify specific programs for citizen feedback. Finally, efforts will be made to engage civil society, including CSOs and local institutions, to reinforce the interface processes. The use of ICT will also be considered and used where appropriate to create new opportunities for transparency and beneficiary feedback.

67.   **The CE strategy and mechanisms adopted should be rooted in a solid context analysis and should give systematic attention to the inclusion of vulnerable groups (women, ethnic minorities, youth, etc.).** For this purpose, more efforts will be needed to link CE strategies with government accountability structures and to lodge the in reform processes, as well as to systematically incorporate CE into projects and engage with beneficiaries during project design and implementation.

D. Latin America and the Caribbean

68.   **Compared with other regions, Latin America and the Caribbean (LCR) has an environment that is generally conducive to civic engagement.** Its population is both highly urbanized and highly connected: 98 percent of Latin Americans receive mobile phone signals. LCR is one of the fastest-growing social media markets—in 2012 it had 168 million Facebook users out of a population of roughly 581 million, 47 percent more than in 2011. On the whole, in the past 20 years the region has enjoyed substantial improvements in civil liberties and freedom of association, including the treatment of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). But since 2007, there has been some erosion in freedom of association, and in some countries citizens who speak out risk retribution. At the same time, the region hosts a significant indigenous and Afro-descendent population that is more likely to be marginalized and to live in remote rural areas. Finally, in spite of significant gains in poverty reduction and a 50 percent growth in the middle class between 2003 and 2009, trust in government at both the national and municipal levels is stagnating or declining; this situation may stem from the initially high expectations following the

emergence of more robust democratic regimes in the 1990s, and it may also be due to the availability of alternative sources of data (via social media) outside of government. Thus there is scope for increasing direct feedback from citizens, rather than the parallel conversations that can occur with growing social media.[1]

1. Experience and Lessons Learned

69.   **In recent years, the World Bank's involvement in CE in LCR has focused on project-level consultations or participatory mechanisms** (Boxes A4.4 and A4.5) and, in some countries (Dominican Republic, Honduras, Colombia, Bolivia), more intensified approaches to engaging citizens and civil society in social audit and third-party monitoring across a number of operations in the portfolio. Some countries' systems and legal frameworks already involve CE (e.g., participatory budgeting at the municipal level in Brazil, which has been linked to more pro-poor spending patterns). In other countries, legal frameworks exist but have not been fully implemented to lead to inclusive engagement (for example, the participatory budgeting law in the Dominican Republic). At the same time, a recent review of the use of grievance redress in Bank operations involving social safeguards found that almost three-quarters of a sample of projects triggering OP 4.10, *Indigenous People*, had either a brief or no mention of a grievance redress mechanism in project documents, suggesting that the GRM was not being actively used as a management tool.[2]   Only about 44 percent of a sample of projects triggering OP 4.12, *Involuntary Resettlement*, could show evidence of a well-functioning GRM.

70.   **The three most common types of CE innovations used by Bank-supported operations in LCR are** (a) ICT-enabled geo-referenced citizen feedback platforms, which are increasingly of interest to clients, to leverage more traditional and at times cumbersome forms of paper-based feedback; (b) creation of national-level observatories and participatory policy reform processes; and (c) discrete social audit by CSOs.

To date, the approach to scaling up CE in LCR has focused on identifying areas where there are (a) positive impacts on development outcomes, and (b) possibilities to benefit from economies of scale/replicability. With the establishment of the GPs, it is possible that economies of scale will be manifested across regional boundaries, as well. Thus, for example, in terms of sector-focused models (versus policies), Bank-supported operations have continued to develop ICT-enabled platforms for the road transport sector (the largest share of the LCR portfolio) in Uruguay, the urban transportation sector in Quito (including feedback on safeguards-related issues in addition to service delivery issues), a CDD-type rural development operation in Bolivia, and the energy sector in the Dominican Republic. Early lessons are already being shared with similar operations across countries (e.g., replication of the energy platform in Jamaica and in the water sector in Honduras, and sharing models for transport from Uruguay with Argentina), and are informing work in other regions, such as ECA. At the policy level, the Dominican Republic has emerged as one of the more active countries in this area, supporting a participatory anticorruption coalition and a Caribbean Growth Forum, and pursuing open and ICT-enabled procurement.

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[1]   LAPOP data analysis 2004, 2008, 2012.
[2]   This may stem in part from the focus on many other safeguards-related issues at project design, and in the over-triggering of OP 4.10. The higher percentage for OP 4.12 is still far from ideal.

2. Going Forward

71. **In FY14, LCR initiated the development of a regional CE action plan for FY14–FY16, staff and client training on both ICT-enabled and more traditional CE techniques, and preparation of the building blocks for more widespread use of CE techniques.** The final form and targets in the strategy will depend on the resources available and on consultations with the newly formed GPs. The draft strategy focuses on the following areas:

(a) *Support to mainstreaming CE in projects* with clearly identified beneficiaries, for which integration of feedback is likely to be critical to program/project results and which offer economies of scale based on their prevalence and size in the Bank portfolio. For example, urban water, energy, and municipal services often depend on consumers for cost recovery, maintenance of community infrastructure, and conservation; thus water and energy utilities that are equipped with tools to systematically integrate and respond to consumer feedback—or that have a culture of service to citizens—are more likely to be able to meet these goals. Along similar lines, large-scale urban transport operations depend on cost recovery and also involve significant construction in high-density areas; thus they require systems to quickly identify and address citizen grievances and also to ensure a client-oriented service once under operation. For decentralized rural CDD programs, the burden of supervision and risk of elite capture is minimized when end-beneficiaries are empowered to provide independent feedback. For conditional cash transfer programs, end-user feedback provides valuable insights into program effectiveness.

An integral part of this process will be to help clients more clearly define and publish standards of service delivery. By end-FY15, the objective will be to have at least one scalable CE model for energy, water, transport, urban, and social protection (assuming funding is available). Funding considerations for FY15 and FY16 will also determine support from the virtual CE team to proposals from among a list of priority projects identified during earlier regional consultations.

(b) *Compliance with consultations and grievance redress systems associated with World Bank social safeguards.* Three actions can address this deficit: (i) developing an app that can be offered to clients to get feedback from affected peoples under OP 4.12; (ii) experimenting with CE mechanisms targeting indigenous communities that have specific needs; and (iii) reinforcing staff capacity and time to ensure that such mechanisms are operational. Each year, about 30 projects trigger OP 4.10 and about 25 trigger OP 4.12. The priority will be to reach functional grievance redress and feedback systems (including more comprehensive institutional descriptions) for a majority of new operations triggering OP 4.12 by FY16. Where possible, it would be useful to integrate these grievance redress and feedback systems into platforms that solicit feedback on the services being provided.

(c) *SCD/CAS/CPS.* Teams will collaborate with the Southern Cone, Andean, and other CMUs to identify upstream entry points where CE is likely to be central to program results through diagnostics carried out as part of the CPS/CAS/SCDs in FY15. The region will also focus on further developing the methodology for analyzing CE in the SCD for Costa Rica.

(d) *Taking stock to understand the baseline on CE in LCR.* A more formalized survey will be used to establish a more systematic, LCR-specific baseline on CE.

(e) *Capacity building.* One of the greatest challenges will be how to quickly make information on CE activities accessible, comprehensive, and user-friendly by using both more traditional, low-tech mechanisms (e.g., community scorecards) and higher-tech, ICT-enabled tools. During FY15 LCR is planning to set up a Spark page, establish building blocks (e.g., terms of reference) for the design of effective CE activities, and provide training sessions for staff on ICT-enabled CE and the use of community scorecards. With the creation of the GP structure, this regional Spark Page is being consolidated into a Bank-wide Spark page.

Box A4.4. The Use of Citizen Engagement to Shift Incentives in Energy

With high levels of clientelism in bill payment combined with years of consumers making illegal connections, the Dominican Republic's electric utility was not receiving adequate payments and therefore did not consider itself accountable to provide a quality service. Consumers did not feel obliged to pay, given the abysmal service levels; as soon as networks were rehabilitated, they had little incentive to refrain from vandalizing new meters. An effort was needed to find a model that could reverse this downward spiral.

Accordingly, with the Energy Sector Rehabilitation Project, the World Bank supported the country in creating incentives both for consumers to pay, and for the utility to begin to focus on citizens as clients. Community monitoring committees comprising diverse members from both major political parties and consumers were offered 24-hour service if they could help to increase payment levels and reduce vandalism in their geographic circuits. Since the results framework for this project included an indicator on consumer satisfaction, surveys to gauge levels of satisfaction with the service were carried out before, during, and after rehabilitation. In addition, because surveys showed that community committees could reach only limited numbers of households, an ICT-enabled citizen feedback pilot, *VozElectrica,* was piloted that allows neighbors to observe and comment on feedback/complaints from their localities, which are continuously accessible to all. For the first circuits whose rehabilitation was completed, cost recovery increased and citizen satisfaction with the hours of service increased from 8 percent to 95 percent.

Source: World Bank. Latin America and the Caribbean region.

Box A4.5. Using Citizen Engagement to Promote More Participatory Policy Formulation

Under a multisectoral SWAp operation in the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, the team used a program called "The Government Asks" to crowd-source citizen feedback on policy solutions via web, mobile phones, Facebook, vans equipped with Internet access, and face-to-face meetings to elaborate policy proposals. Most recently, citizens were invited to co-design solutions to address health challenges; over 1,300 citizen proposals were generated, and more than 120,000 votes were cast on their prioritization. This contributed to an increase in the allocation for primary health care.

Source: World Bank. Latin America and the Caribbean region.

E. Middle East and North Africa

71.   **Through the mass protests that swept several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA), citizens united across ideological, demographic, religious, and ethnic lines to demand greater voice and participation and an end to elite capture and political and economic marginalization.** The Arab Spring has provided an opportunity for structural change in this regard and has positioned citizen participation in policy-making processes at the center of the regional agenda. Even in transition countries, space has been created for bringing citizens into the policy dialogue. This has fundamentally changed the nature of the opportunities for CE in MNA and the way the World Bank engages with its clients.

1.   Experience and Lessons Learned

72.   **In the midst of the post-Arab Spring transitions, MNA countries are trying to respond to citizens' demand for greater voice and participation in policy reforms, service delivery, and development programs.** In this respect, the World Bank MNA region has adopted CE as a new development approach in priority operations, seeking to incorporate citizen feedback and input in policy reform programs and public service provision.

73.   **The MNA initiative, "Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement in MENA" is one of the World Bank's flagship initiatives in this regard.** The main objective of this initiative is to identify CE entry points for MNA priority operations and adopt CE mechanisms that are tailored to the country context and to the sector-specific issue(s) being addressed by the operation. In close collaboration with all MNA CMUs, sector managers, and TTLs, MNA has identified 42 priority operations for FY14 and FY15 in which CE mechanisms are being integrated or strengthened.

74.   The priority operations for this initiative were selected on the basis of (a) potential to integrate and scale up citizen feedback mechanisms into country systems for more sustainability, and (b) direct impact on citizens and the ability for a critical mass of beneficiaries to provide feedback throughout project implementation. These priority operations have been endorsed by the country directors. The pilot for the initiative is implemented through an inclusive process across sectors and CMUs in MNA and in coordination with different units Bankwide. A CE team for MNA, comprising representatives from these units, has established a roster of engagement leaders, met jointly with task teams, and nominated an engagement leader for each priority operation to support TTLs in identifying CE entry points and designing tailored CE mechanisms in the project. Engagement leaders and task teams interact regularly to share updates and experiences, discuss bottlenecks, and address challenges collaboratively.

75.   **The MNA Citizen Engagement Briefing Note and Guidance Note for Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement have been useful to provide technical support to task teams across sectors.** The MNA internal Engagement Web-portal is also updated regularly to raise awareness on CE activities in the region and provide resources produced by teams across sectors and departments Bankwide. Additionally, to raise awareness of the MNA region's efforts to integrate CE in priority operations and solicit feedback, the MNA CE Team participated in various Bank events, including the 2013 Civil Society Forum's session on "Engaging with Citizens for Greater Development Impact" and the 2014 Social Development Forum and Citizen Engagement Workshop at the Spring Meetings.

76.   **MNA teams working with counterparts have defined several entry points and designed mechanisms for "listening" to citizens' voices and incorporating their feedback into policy reform programs and service delivery projects.** These mechanisms include consultations, third-party monitoring, participatory decision-making, and GRMs. Examples of projects from the MNA region's portfolio that have incorporated such mechanisms follow:

- *The Yemen CSO support project* integrates a system of user feedback and information collection based on a network of help-desks to track and monitor transparency and ease of use of the online and offline CSO registration process to be introduced under the project.

- *The municipal solid waste sector development policy loan in Morocco* includes a two-pronged consultation process, a communication strategy, and the introduction of Citizen Report Cards. The consultation process was highly effective and resulted in incorporating several specific actions into the policy matrix, including adoption of the Citizens Report Card pilot by the client which will be implemented in four municipalities.

- *The Yemen Social Fund for Development* took a proactive approach in consulting with local populations to design projects to ensure that the needs of the poor and marginalized are accounted for. It actively solicited citizen participation during project preparation, reviving traditional forms of community-level decision-making in issuing municipal-level grants. The Yemen Social Fund for Development IV is integrating various CE tools in two or three urban areas to conduct participatory planning.

- *The Djibouti Second Urban Poverty Reduction project* integrated CE mechanisms in the project design to foster community voice and ownership through geo-referenced citizen reports on infrastructure, neighborhood committee reports on community activities funded by the project, and an effective GRM. These CE mechanisms aim to improve responsiveness to residents' needs for improved access to urban services.

- *Tunisia Urban Development and Local Governance project* To strengthen governance through participation, transparency and accountability, a national web portal will be established to serve as a transparency platform, providing real-time information about financial transfers from central government to local governments (past, approved and planned). In parallel, the project will support the creation of venues for citizen participation at the local level. Municipalities will implement a participatory planning process, in which citizens will be consulted regarding the overall budget allocation at local level. They will also launch a participatory budgeting process that will allow citizens to decide on the allocation of a portion of the investment budget of the local government.

- Through the *Morocco Youth Entrepreneurship Training Project,* an e-platform was developed allowing for better monitoring of training and coaching activities across a large number of training facilities operated by different implementing partners across the country. The monitoring platform will be complemented by a SMS tool that will allow collection of beneficiary satisfaction data with regard to training activities as well as performance data on the micro-enterprises led by youth entrepreneurs.

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- *Egypt Labor-Intensive Public Works Additional Financing* seeks to enhance the GRM at the village level and standardize the methods to collect citizen feedback on infrastructure service provision, operations and maintenance, and infrastructure usage to assess citizen satisfaction. A formal complaints mechanism will be established to benchmark and monitor bottlenecks at the local level.

- *West Bank and Gaza Municipal Development Project II* provides for integrating CE mechanisms to strengthen the implementation/functioning of citizen service centers and one-stop shops to enhance citizen satisfaction. It also introduces an e-governance initiative to improve the responsiveness and quality of public services for a larger number of citizens. The initiative will support four pilot municipalities, using an Internet-based system for delivering services and information to citizens. It will promote knowledge sharing; enhance awareness of and accountability in service delivery (specifically e-licensing, e-participation, and e-payment); and increase revenue generation for different public agencies.

2. Going Forward

77.   **The MNA team will continue to integrate CE mechanisms in project design to enhance citizen feedback throughout project preparation and implementation**, with the goal of impacting country systems when the country and sector context allows it. MNA's efforts in this regard will continue across sectors during FY15, with the aim of incrementally integrating CE in all its operations by 2018.

78.   **Technical support to task teams will also continue through a series of clinics and capacity-building sessions.** During FY15 the team intends to focus specifically on fragile and conflict-affected situations. Institution-building in transition contexts, and service delivery, are important areas where the integration of CE mechanisms contributes to reducing social tensions and to building public institutions' legitimacy. Transition country contexts also provide a window of opportunity to impact country systems.

F. South Asia

79.   **The South Asia region (SAR) has a wealth of experiences with CE,** many linked to decentralization processes, access to information laws, management of public resources, and service delivery at the local level. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan have mandated decentralization by law and have used social accountability mechanisms to improve local governance. Most countries have adopted right-to-information laws, and civic groups and governments have increasingly come to realize the value of timely and relevant information for policy processes and outcomes. Laws such as India's recently ratified Service Delivery Act focus on the establishment of Citizen Charters, which inform the citizens about their rights, and local governments and their municipal corporations have also adopted citizens' charters. However, the transition to decentralization or devolution is fraught with difficulty. Governments are constrained by bureaucratic procedures, political interference, limited authority, lack of

accountability of service providers, and insufficient financial resources, while civil society grapples with inadequate capacity to engage with citizens.

1. Experience and Lessons Learned

In recent years, SAR has provided significant support to strengthen local governance and empower communities to promote accountable service delivery and demand better governance. Project Governance and Accountability Action Plans (GAAP) have strengthened accountability mechanisms and promoted greater transparency and stronger grievance redress, and helped increase awareness of people's rights to know and seek information and make government institutions accountable. Initiatives to strengthen CE include support for right to information, use of social accountability tools and beneficiary involvement in projects, use of grievance redress mechanisms, empowerment of communities, and participation in public financial management.

80.   **In Afghanistan, the World Bank is scaling up the integration of CE across its portfolio.** Since Afghanistan has been in conflict for over 30 years, the CE agenda has been driven in many ways by the level of fragility and the weakness of state structures, both of which have necessitated closer engagement of citizens and communities. These factors also determine how the Bank engages with citizens in rural and urban areas, given the different tribes, gender aspects, traditional structures, elite/power influence and displacement issues. Use of community monitoring and third party supervisory agents has been important to facilitate this engagement.

The large-scale use of third-party supervisory agents across five national programs that use ICT tools has been complemented by local monitoring in several projects to ensure immediate reporting during the construction phase. First piloted for the Irrigation Rehabilitation Development Project, local monitoring enabled the assessment of some 13 irrigation canal construction projects, affecting about 20 communities in 9 provinces. Furthermore, local monitoring has helped to ensure better social inclusion. Other projects including the National Solidarity Program (NSP) have introduced voluntary community monitoring of its sub-projects through citizen/community involvement during project planning, implementation and monitoring. These projects have also succeeded in increasing women's participation by making incremental policy changes such as setting targets for women's representation in community development councils, school management committees etc., and the number of female office bearers in community councils. The Bank has also supported the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum to pilot a small social accountability project in the Aynak copper mine to foster trust between the ministry, mining company and affected communities. There is an ongoing policy dialogue regarding Community Development Agreements in the extractive industries, which has also contributed to the recently amended Minerals Law.

81.   **In Bangladesh, the current Country Assistance Strategy mainstreams attention to good governance and citizen participation.** For example, at the program level, the World Bank initiated third-party monitoring by Bangladeshi CSOs to assess progress against CAS results targets. This was the first time that the World Bank had opened its CAS to public scrutiny, with the official endorsement of the Government of Bangladesh. This approach was intensified in 2012 through implementation of the Triple "S" Strategy, which aims to strengthen fiduciary

safeguards, build country systems for good governance, and let the sunshine in, through increased transparency and use of domestic accountability mechanisms.

At the project level, Governance and Accountability Action Plans are customized to sector/project circumstances, with the composition of "safeguards", "systems" and "sunshine" tailored to specific needs. A wide range of mechanisms to elicit citizen feedback are now incorporated in project design, including community scorecards, social audits, focus groups, and third party monitoring, among other social accountability tools. In a number of projects, technology and social media are also being used to facilitate citizen engagement. Within government, support is provided to implementing agencies to help them to comply with the national Right to Information Act and proactively share information with beneficiaries.

The Bank is also working directly with Bangladeshi CSOs to promote civic engagement. For example, the Citizen Action for Results, Transparency and Accountability (CARTA) project applies social accountability tools in the context of third-party monitoring in five ongoing Bank-supported projects in Bangladesh. This citizen-monitoring intervention is meant to improve the quality of service delivery, support local CSOs in promoting citizen capacity to respond to emerging issues, access information, identify vulnerabilities to corruption, and identify unintended consequences, by tapping into the knowledge of local communities. Additionally, Bangladesh was one of the first countries to opt into the World Bank's Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA). The GPSA engagement in Bangladesh is focused on strengthening citizen engagement in the open budgeting process at the lowest level of local government and monitoring how participatory budgeting is operating in practice. Two NGOs, CARE and the Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF), received grants in the past year and work began in 2014.

82. In India, the Bank has supported, via a range of different sectors, activities focused on citizen engagement with a strong emphasis on furthering inclusion and building on the pioneering Right to Information movement. The Government of India has promoted several landmark legislations that promote greater citizen engagement through the Right to Information Act, Right to Employment (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), Right to Education, Right to Food Security Act. The Right to Public Service Act has been enacted at the national level as well as in several states. Enactment of the Right to Information Act has encouraged several million requests for information disclosure from citizens, employees, users and civil society each year, and is proving to be an effective instrument in the hands of the citizens. Earlier, the constitutional amendments to local self-governance in Panchayati raj institutions and urban local bodies established a strong institutional foundation for citizens' participation in governance, planning and budgeting and service delivery. More recently, many state governments have stipulated 50 percent representation of women in local governments. This has resulted in more than a million women's representatives being elected in villages, districts, cities and states.

At the policy and program level, CSOs have been engaged in finalizing the Country Partnership Strategy, updating Bank's operational policies on Indigenous Peoples (Scheduled Tribes), and Land Acquisition and other studies. The India Program has focused largely on enhancing the voice of local beneficiary communities, service user groups and citizens in Bank-supported projects. Project teams have worked to strengthen the demand side of governance through the use of toolkits and state laws and mechanisms such as the Right to Information Act, citizen's

charters, and grievance redress mechanisms. The RWSS project in Uttarakhand has helped with the processing of RTI applications. The World Bank financed Affiliated Networks for Social Accountability (ANSA) supported two communities of practice in India on RTI and Accountability Tools, leading to 12 pilots on strengthening social accountability, third party monitoring, and NGO capacity building.

81.   There is a growing critical mass of operations linking CE, local governance/decentralization and pro-poor service delivery in Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Mizoram for instance. Participatory Identification of the Poor has been a core approach adopted by the rural livelihood projects, in which rural communities have collectively appraised the wealth and well-being of households to identify the poorest beneficiaries and prioritize their inclusion in project processes and benefits. This approach has worked particularly well in Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh.

82.   Strong beneficiary feedback and stakeholder engagement has been an integral part of the social assessments carried out for rural roads, water and sanitation, livelihood, nutrition and all other projects. During project preparation, all social assessments rely heavily on the feedback and perspectives of project beneficiaries and primary stakeholders, which are then integrated into the project's gender and social inclusion strategy. The Rural Livelihood Portfolio used community-based institutional platforms of poor women not only to access credit, plan and implement livelihood interventions, but also to leverage their collective bargaining capacity to access entitlements and services through panchayats. This approach has worked particularly well in Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh.

83.   In addition, a strong body of analytical work has been collected by the Bank on the role and impact of the range of CE efforts, including the RTI and social audits, confirming India's continued role as source of immense innovation in the CE field.

84.   Going forward, capacity building has been identified as a key element in strengthening citizen participation and social accountability in India. The Bank is designing a series of public service delivery projects that linking CE, local governance/decentralization and pro-poor service delivery, for instance in Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Mizoram. The Governance and Social GPs would collaborate to use CE and SA approaches to improve gender, equity and social inclusion outcomes for citizens. Efforts to enhance social accountability, citizen engagement and demand for good governance will be implemented through investment projects as well as AAA initiatives.

85.   **In Nepal, the Bank has supported efforts to bolster social accountability activities in public financial management, municipal governance, and public service delivery.** Over the past decade, the Government of Nepal has passed and promulgated a series of new acts, policies and guidelines related to improving local governance and promoting citizen engagement. These include: the Local Self Governance Act (1999), the Decentralization Implementation Plan (2002), the Right to Information Act (2007), the Good Governance Act (2008), Good Governance Action Plan (2012), Local Bodies Resource Mobilization and Management Guidelines (2012) and the Social Mobilization Guidelines (2014). Although these documents provide the critical institutional basis for strengthening transparency, accountability and inclusion of local governance processes, many challenges continue to persist, especially at the

district and village levels, with vulnerable groups continuing to contend with limited representation in decision making bodies, poor access to services and few opportunities to voice their concerns.

86.   Recognizing the need to build civil society's capacity to strengthen accountability measures to improve governance in Nepal, the World Bank launched the Program for Accountability in Nepal (PRAN) with support from the State- and Peace-building Fund. Since 2009, PRAN has been developing the capacity of civil society and government actors through practical training, action learning, and networking. In addition, the multi-donor trust fund has been supporting independent budget analysis by CSOs, think tanks and research institutes through PRAN.

87.   PRAN's recent work has led to increased citizen awareness about the local planning and budgeting process in 80 VDCs, closer examination of the distribution of Social Security Expenditures, greater participation by women and marginalized groups in local governance structures, improved community management of government schools and even the refunding of misused or misallocated funds back to the VDC and ward budgets. At the national level, PRAN supported the Office of Auditor General in Nepal by fostering support for collaboration of the Office of the Auditor-General with CSOs and media. The intervention has led to the establishment of a widely respected and on-going OAG-CSO collaborative process that has supported dissemination and follow-up of the OAG annual audit report, implementation of performance audits with community participation at the local level, and an innovative regional learning exchange process (led by the OAG in Nepal) among the senior staff of Supreme Audit Institutions in South Asia with the support the "Advancing Public Participation in the Budget and Audit Process" program.

88.   **Throughout the Nepal portfolio**, grievance redress is an integral part of not only infrastructure projects but also human development and social protection projects. Recently, an ICT based grievance redress mechanism was rolled out in one of the road projects. Through the Citizen Action for Results, Transparency and Accountability (CARTA) program, social accountability tools in the context of third-party monitoring were introduced in 6 projects.

89.   **To operationalize the GAC II strategy, Pakistan undertook the following:** (a) a mapping of social accountability interventions in Bank projects and identification of two or three pipeline projects to be supported with the design of CE components for demonstration effects in sectors (infrastructure-related) and areas (KP, FATA or Balochistan); (b) an assessment of external social accountability programs and mapping of CSOs at the province and district levels using GIS to understand the enabling environment for social accountability work in Pakistan, and to provide project teams with context-based information and potential for replication in Bank-funded operations; and (c) an assessment of youth in rural Pakistan on their role in their communities and their use of technology. The results and lessons learned were disseminated in TTL clinics on social accountability approaches and through the donor roundtable on social accountability, and were used in projects as part of Pakistan's GAC strategy.

90.   **The South Asia region has been using ICT tools to collect citizen feedback and geocode project locations.** In Pakistan, Punjab uses SMS and robocalls on public service satisfaction, providing feedback in a structured manner to decision makers. The Punjab Model represents a novel application to deterring corruption by collecting data on "bribe-taking" by

bureaucrats who administer basic services (e.g., property registration, the licensing of drivers, providing glucose drips). In India, the SLB Connect, a service-level benchmarking initiative, aims to strengthen CE in selected urban areas for provision of water and sanitation services and thereby help improve service outcomes. In addition to tracking service outcomes for specific projects and programs, SLB Connect allows for analysis by area, including the city's poorest neighborhoods. Following the success of a recent pilot initiative, plans are under way to expand the effort to other cities. In Nepal, WBI has piloted the Poverty Alleviation Fund Project's OnTrack initiative, an ICT-enabled mechanism that allows citizens and civil society to directly provide feedback to government implementing agencies and public service providers of Bank-financed programs. OnTrack uses a multi-mode approach to collecting citizen feedback by using innovations in technology (i.e., interactive mapping, SMS, mobile, and Web applications) embedded in a broader process of civic engagement and participatory monitoring of development outcomes. In India, IT-based governance schemes were embedded in about one-third of WB projects. The National e-Governance Program improved service delivery across its 27 mission mode projects, focusing on LISs. Efforts have also begun in some projects to leverage the UID e-identity scheme to promote better access for the poor to services and reduce financial leakages.

2. Going Forward

CE, if it is done well, has great potential in SAR, but since this region is complex and diverse, approaches need to be tailored to the context, and government buy-in needs to be secured. CE is not a new agenda in the region, and many activities already include it. To support overall mainstreaming of CE, project teams will need to understand contextual constraints and opportunities, and require technical assistance with incorporating CE in project design and implementation. Scaling up beneficiary feedback requires consistent support from all parties and better tracking. Advancing the CE agenda requires committed funding in projects and incorporation into design at an early stage, so that it is developed with the other elements of the project.

Annex V: Implementation Plan

Area	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	Responsible entities
Mainstreaming BF into IPF	• Definition of BF and monitoring approach	• Agreement on intermediate BF targets by regions and GPs • Start implementation of regional and GP action plans	• Implementation of regional and GP action plans	• Implementation of regional and GP action plans	OPCS, GPs, regions, PDU
	• Baseline established • Corporate scorecard reporting	• Corporate scorecard reporting • External launch of PDU website	• Corporate scorecard reporting	• Corporate scorecard reporting	GPs, OPCS, PDU
Scaling up context-specific CE across the engagement spectrum for improved development outcomes	• Strategic Framework developed to identify entry points for scaling up context-specific CE across the engagement spectrum	• Pilot opportunities for CE in preparation of SCDs • Implement CPF directive and guidance (stakeholder engagement throughout CPF process) • Identify context-specific opportunities for CE at country level	• Identify context-specific opportunities for CE in the country portfolios	• Identify context-specific opportunities for CE in the country portfolios	regions
		• Develop approach for CE in knowledge and advisory services, including developing guidance for task teams	• Pilot CE in knowledge and advisory services	• Scale up CE in knowledge and advisory services	OPCS, GPs, regions
Improve monitoring and results reporting		• Develop staff guidance on results chains in 5 outcome areas and use of CE indicators • Monitor use of CE results indicators in IPF • Pilot use of CE results indicators in CPF, DPLs where feasible	• Monitor use of CE results indicators in IPF • Monitor use of CE results indicators in CPF, DPL • Review lessons learned	• Monitor use of CE results indicators in IPF • Monitor use of CE results indicators in CPF, DPL • Review lessons learned	OPCS, GPs, regions
Build capacity of CSOs, governments, and staff	• Support to CSOs through trust funds like GPSA • Capacity building for governments in existing projects where relevant	• Include CSO/government capacity building for sustainable CE as appropriate in projects • Support to CSOs through projects and trust funds like GPSA • Launch Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) on CE	• Include CSO/government capacity building for sustainable CE as appropriate in projects • Support to CSOs through projects and trust funds like GPSA	• Include CSO/government capacity building for sustainable CE as appropriate in projects • Support to CSOs through projects and trust funds like GPSA	GPs, regions, GPSA
		• Mapping of available staff skills • Inclusion of CE in corporate operational training	• Deliver training on CE for staff (HQ and COs)	• Deliver training on CE for staff (HQ and COs)	OPCS, GPs, regions, Technical CE advisory group

Area	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	Responsible entities
		• Develop and deliver specific training on CE for staff (HQ and COs)			
Ensure external and internal knowledge flows and collaboration	• Dialogues in DC, Europe, and COs with external stakeholders to learn from experience with CE • Advisory Council guiding strategic framework established – first meeting on May 13, 2014	• Establish mechanisms for internal coordination and knowledge sharing • Second and Third Advisory Council meetings	• Fourth and Fifth Advisory Council meetings • Maintain CE knowledge platform	• Maintain CE knowledge platform	GPs/technical CE coordination body
Impact analysis		• DEC Policy Research Report • Piloting adaptive learning in India	• Additional research	• Long-term impact analysis	DEC, others tbd
Funding	• Funding provided for regional CE pilots	• Incorporate CE mainstreaming in program and project funding • Potential mobilization of additional external resources	• Incorporate CE mainstreaming in program and project funding • Potential mobilization of additional external resources	• Incorporate CE mainstreaming in program and project funding • Potential mobilization of additional external resources	• Regions/GPs as part of budget process • GPSA (for CSO capacity building), other grant sources
Regional approaches to mainstreaming CE in operations					
Africa	• "Listening to Citizens: Learning from Projects in Africa" - assessment of the modalities, enabling conditions, challenges and outcomes of CE in existing operations and lessons learned	• Finalize regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF • Building on assessment, determine best way to expand CE implementation and effectiveness	• Implement regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF	• Implement regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF	AFR region
East Asia and Pacific	**Core CE and BF** • Qualitative candid review of BF, GRM in operations. • Developed targeted sector action plans, and a structured approach to monitoring/ tracking to enhance quality	• Finalize EAP review of CE across country portfolios • Implement action plan to enhance quality of GRM and consultation processes in country portfolio. • Establish mechanism for improved monitoring and tracking of quality	• Expand BF monitoring and tracking	• Evaluate BF results and design follow on action plan	EAP region

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Area	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	Responsible entities
		and quantity of BF			
	Improving quality and impact of CE and social accountability in sectors • Developed EAP cross-sector workplan to mainstream and enhance quality of CE in 5 selected sectors (natural resource management, justice, health, education, agriculture) • Identified knowledge gaps and focused qualitative improvement on social inclusion, gender/youth etc. as identified. • Expanded coalition approach and mainstreaming in future work.	• Compile experience from sector operations in various contexts (including FCS) for sharing globally • Launch rollout of expanded CE / accountability agenda with 5 sectors • Undertake AAA work on CE on voice and accountability in 5 sectors	• Expand sectoral engagements in CE • Expand AAA work to deepen understanding of CE through local PE analysis in 3 sectors/3 countries	• Continued expansion in sectors • Continue AAA; undertake stocktake and formulate next phase of CE activity	
	Expanding and learning from CDD operations • Continued 3 nationwide CDD operations	• Collate CDD experience with sector experience above • Continue nationwide CDD roll-out, with enhanced lesson learning and sharing • Document learning	• Continue roll-out and CE learning through CDD activity	• Continue roll-out and CE learning through CDD activity • Continue AAA; undertake stocktake and formulate next phase of CE activity	
	Shifting to country systems in safeguards • Developed EAP strategy to shift from safeguards compliance to mainstreaming in country systems	• Shift to country systems in 2 EAP countries • Support specialized centers and cadres of skilled staff in 2 EAP countries • Framework agreement with donors to support client capacity building	• Continue mainstreaming and capacity-building process	• Continue mainstreaming and capacity-building process	EAP region
Europe and Central Asia	• Stock take of beneficiary feedback in ECA and identification of priority projects • Implementation of a CE strategy	• Finalize regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF • Reach functional grievance redress and feedback systems in operations	• Implement regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF • Develop an operational	• Implement regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF	ECA region

Area	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	Responsible entities
	in Central Asia (P145843) • Targeted assessments on CE and social accountability in selected CMUs and priority sectors across ECA	triggering OP 4.12 and OP 4.10 • Include minimum BF mechanisms in ECA pipeline projects and Results Framework for all new project in FY 15 • Conduct an assessment of the most common BF tools used in ECA (opinion surveys, GRM) • Consider CE entry points in new CPFs building on experience in Central Asia • Training events (clinics) and BBLs to provide toolkits and share best lessons between practitioners, together with other regions. • Support innovation across the GPs to promote a better CE mainstreaming into their operations • Close coordination within the CE communities of practice to pilot new approaches and mobilize resources	toolkit specific to customer satisfaction surveys and GRM for task teams • Training events (clinics) and BBLs to provide toolkits and share best lessons between practitioners, together with other regions.		
Latin America and the Caribbean	• Developed a preliminary list of projects with potential to increase CE, along with a first assessment of task team needs in terms of capacity support • Conducted informal review of GRM implementation • Set up a Spark page and building blocks (e.g., ToR) for design of effective CE activities • Training on ICT enabled CE (organized with SDV, WBI and TWICT)	• Finalize regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF • Virtual LCR CE team to facilitate knowledge sharing and lessons learned • Complete a stock-taking to clarify BF at entry • At least one scalable CE model for energy, water, transport, urban, and social protection (assuming funding is available in FY14 and FY15) by end of FY15 • Test CE indicators in projects going to the Board in FY15 • Ensure minimal level of beneficiary feedback for all new operations • Field-based BF training • Collaborate with the Southern Cone, Andean and Central America CMUs to identify upstream entry points	• Implement regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF • Reach functional grievance redress and feedback systems for new operations triggering OP 4.12	• Implement regional plan to mainstream CE and scale up BF	LCR region

Area	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	Responsible entities
		where CE is likely to be central to program results via diagnostics including those carried out as part of CPS/CAS/SCDs • Creation of SharePoint/Spark with TORs, links to reference materials, and development of unit costing to help guide project preparation – being integrated into Bank Wide CE CoP • Creation of an Advisory Peer Group to review TOR and provide just-in time advice/peer review to task teams (including TTLs, social specialists, WBI, TWICT, EXT)			
Middle East and North Africa	• Identifed 42 priority operations for FY14 and FY15 where CE mechanisms are being integrated or strengthened • Established MNA CE team (MNSSU, WBI, SDV, and ICT), establish an Engagement Leaders roster, and nominate Engagement Leader for each priority operation • Developed MNA CE Briefing Note, MNA Guidance for CE Mainstreaming, and MNA CE Web-portal	• Continue integrating CE in priority operations • Organize a Series of clinics and CE training sessions for task teams in coordination with GPSURR and GGP • Monitor CE mainstreaming in operations	• Continue integrating CE in project design of all pipeline operations • Monitor ISRs for FY15 projects	• CE integrated in MNA portfolio in FY17-18 (to the extent context allows) • Monitor ISRs for FY15 and FY16 projects	MNA region
South Asia	• Stock-take of lessons learned	• Engage with GPs to develop an appropriate plan to move forward on BF • Implement plan with SAR region, GPs			SAR region, GPs
Global Practices					
		• Take stock of sectoral operations with CE and BF, report on BF in sector operations; where relevant, develop sectoral actions plans to scale up CE and BF	• Implement sectoral action plans to scale up CE and BF • Identify and document lessons from sectoral approaches to scale up CE and BF	• Implement sectoral action plans to scale up CE and BF • Identify and document lessons from sectoral approaches to scale up CE and BF	GPs

Annex VI: Engaging with External Stakeholders

91.   The Strategic Framework is informed by the long-standing experience on citizen engagement (CE) by civil society, governments, and the private sector. The World Bank (WB) has actively sought inputs from them, as well as individual citizens, to learn from their experience in the context of developing and implementing the Strategic Framework. Three main avenues have been used to seek external inputs: online consultations, external advisory council, and face-to-face meetings with representatives from civil society groups and other stakeholders.

92.   Online feedback was sought through the [Engaging with Citizens for Improved Results](#) website created in the World Bank consultations hub. This hub is a one-stop shop for all ongoing and planned World Bank consultations. An online survey was included to seek inputs on examples of successful and unsuccessful CE activities, specific contextual factors affecting their outcome, and areas for future research. The CE consultation website was open for inputs from February 19 until June 13, 2014.

93.   An Advisory Council was established to offer expert external guidance and insights throughout the development and implementation of the Strategic Framework. The diverse membership of the Advisory Council captures a comprehensive range of global and specific stakeholder perspectives and specialized expertise. The Council comprises representatives from civil society (2), academia (2), private sector (2), governments (2), foundations (2) and donor organizations, including the WBG (2). The 12 members of the Advisory Council were selected through a transparent process[1] based on the following criteria: (a) experience with undertaking CE initiatives, combined with a track record of achieving improved development results through such activities; (b) level of representation of their respective constituencies; (c) geographic diversity; and (e) knowledge of WBG operations. The Advisory Council provides guidance and expertise on the development and implementation of the Strategic Framework on existing evidence and experience from CE in development interventions; how, where, and why CE has contributed to improved development outcomes; analyses of context factors for success; and other issues critical to CE mainstreaming in WBG operations for improved results. The Advisory Council meets every six months, or more often as needed, in person or virtually.

94.   A series of face-to-face and videoconference meetings were organized with relevant representatives from civil society and the private sector to learn from their experiences. These dialogues took place in Accra, Beirut, Brussels, Cairo, Freetown, Lima, London, Monrovia, Tunis, and Washington D.C. (Table A6.1). Summaries of these dialogues are also available on the CE web site.

Table A6.1.Summary of Consultations

|	
Society for International Development Civil Society Working Group	February 11, 2014
Dialogue with Europe-based CSOs	February 17, 2014
Multilateral Development Bank Aid Effectiveness Working Group	February 24, 2014
Dialogue with DC-based CSOs Hosted by Interaction	March 27, 2014
WB/IMF Spring Meeting The Parliamentary Network	April 9, 2014
WB/IMF Spring Meeting Civil Society Policy Forum	April 10, 2014

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[1] TORs were published and nominations sought through web CE consultation site. Council members are also listed on site at http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/engaging-citizens-improved-results.

Dialogue with Ghana, Liberia & Sierra Leone	April 24, 2014
Dialogue with Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia	May 12, 2014
Dialogue with Egypt	May 14, 2014
Dialogue with Peru	June 5, 2014

Overview of the Consultation Process

95.   As an integral part of the process to develop the Strategic Framework, the WB held global consultations from February to June 2014. More than 200 organizations—representing stakeholders from government, civil society, the private sector, and academia—commented on the development of this Strategic Framework in 9 face-to-face meetings around the world while another 22 submitted written comments through the on-line survey. The majority of organizations were from Part II countries (Figure A6.1).

Figure A6.1. Organizations Taking Part in Consultations

■ Part I
■ Part II

96.   As part of the consultations hub, the CE website provided background for the consultation process, including a concept note, Power-point presentation, and issue brief providing an overview of the Strategic Framework's objectives and approach and the schedule of consultation meetings. Stakeholders were encouraged to share their input through the online survey and a dedicated email account. Key materials were made available in Arabic, English, Portuguese, and Spanish.

97.   Participants in the face-to-face meetings were led (via videoconferencing for regional consultations) by either Mariam Sherman (Director, Results, Openness and Effectiveness) or Astrid Manroth (Operations Adviser, Openness and Aid Effectiveness) and moderated by WB Communications Officers. Through the consultations, Bank Management sought views from stakeholders in a range of areas:
- Where have you seen CE contribute to development outcomes? In which sectors has it worked best? What types of engagement mechanisms were used?
- Can you share examples of CE with impact in the following areas: service delivery; public financial management; governance and anti-corruption; social inclusion and empowerment; and natural resource management?
- In what ways have you seen the private sector effectively engage citizens to improve product and service delivery and benefit the wider society?

- In your experience, what contextual factors—such as civil society, political society and global dimensions—are critical to make CE efforts work effectively to enhance results?
- Where have you seen CE efforts fail? What happened? What lessons would you draw from these experiences?
- What mechanisms and context can best contribute to sustainable mechanisms for engaging citizens in service delivery, policy-making, and other development activities?
- Where do you see gaps in what is known about the contribution of CE in achieving development outcomes that could inform the future research agenda?

98.   Table A6.2 provides a summary of feedback, including online inputs and face-to-face meetings, received during these consultations. A more detailed summary of each meeting as well a summary of written online submissions are available on the Engaging with Citizens for Improved Results website. Points raised by a wide range of participants, some less frequently heard reflect the concerns of specific constituencies. The summary is intended as a reflection of what has been presented, without predetermining the content of the Strategic Framework itself. It was emphasized throughout the consultations that their purpose was not an attempt to develop a Strategic Framework that would meet with approval from all parties, but rather to ensure that the World Bank could learn from the extensive diverse experiences of those participating in the consultations.

99.   Throughout the consultations, it was evident that there were a range of views on the challenges and priorities in CE mainstreaming in WBG operations. It was clear throughout the feedback however, that CE should be included throughout the project cycle— from design to implementation to monitoring and evaluation.

Table A6.2. Summary of Feedback from Stakeholders

This is a summary of key inputs from the consultation dialogues held between February and June 2014, including the online feedback survey. It includes the World Bank's response to how the inputs are considered in the Strategic Framework. To view the extended summary of all feedback received, click here. Summaries from each consultation dialogue as well as a summary of the online feedback are also available on the website. We appreciate the inputs provided. The quality of the inputs attests to the wealth of experience in CE.

Area	*Key Inputs*	*Response in Strategic Framework*
Where have you seen citizen engagement contribute to development outcomes? In which sectors has it worked best? What types of engagement mechanisms were used?	• Local context is analyzed and taken into account, including information, capacity, and context-adapted tools. • Citizens are part of the project design. Involving them is important to make sure the project caters to their needs. • Citizens receive the relevant information in a timely manner and in local languages. • Closing the feedback loop is critical; citizens need to feel their inputs are valued and translate into real outcomes. • Strategies focusing on specific sectors can contribute to effective citizen participation. • Good understanding of what methods work in different contexts is important. Different methods require different levels of buy-in from government.	The elements of successful citizen engagement identified are consistent with the findings of the literature review of the impact of citizen engagement and stocktaking of experience with citizen engagement in World Bank operations undertaken as part of the Strategic Framework (see Chapter II: Summary of Evidence and Lessons Learned; Annex II: Background Literature Review; and Annex III: Summary of Stock Take). An overview of CE mechanisms is included in Annex I of the Strategic Framework.
Can you share examples of citizen engagement with impact in the following areas: service delivery, public financial management, governance and anti-corruption, social inclusion and empowerment, and natural resource management?	**Service delivery** • Increased citizen engagement has been used to improve the quality of education and health care services in many countries. • Community development projects were highlighted as good examples of working with local NGOs to deliver services. • In the water sector, citizen engagement can help build and maintain infrastructure in small communities. **Governance** • Increased citizen engagement has resulted in decreased mismanagement and corruption often associated with the delivery of health services. **Social Inclusion and empowerment** • Several participants noted successful examples where children participated in citizen engagement processes in the areas of child labor, health, and education. • Examples included citizen engagement in formulating pro-poor policies, and engaging marginalized and vulnerable groups.	Prepared as part of the development of the Strategic Framework, the background literature review on the impact of citizen engagement on development outcomes includes evidence reflecting the inputs provided by participants. Chapter II: Summary of Evidence and Lessons Learned and Annex II: Background Literature Review provides further details.

Area	Key Inputs	Response in Strategic Framework
	• Other examples succeeded in promoting poor and marginalized women's meaningful participation in decision-making processes as well as stronger gender focus in advocacy, and proposals for legislation. **Public financial management** • Citizen engagement in budget formulation, monitoring, and oversight can improve resource allocation, public expenditure, and direct resources to the most pressing needs. **Natural resource management** • There were examples where citizen engagement has worked well in the protection of forests and watersheds through the creation of management committees including the local communities. • Participants mentioned the Ghana EITI mechanism as successful citizen engagement in natural resource management.	
In what ways have you seen the private sector effectively engage citizens to improve product and service delivery and benefit the wider society?	• Create incentives to make the private sector more socially accountable. • Citizen engagement for private sector operations could be linked with the concept of 'shared value.' Some corporations are integrating sustainability into their value chains and this concept is strongly related to citizen engagement. • Citizen voice should be included in public-private dialogues. • Limited oversight of service delivery mechanisms in the private sector and hardly any independence verification of the impact of citizen complaints/concerns about their products and services. • The WBG should focus more on how projects affect communities and social justice, rather than focusing on private sector development.	The Strategic Framework refers to the WBG efforts to engage with citizens in the context of its work with the private sector (see Section III.I), including public-private dialogues (see Section VII: Conclusions and Next Steps). The Strategic Framework acknowledges the private sector's wealth of experience in feedback and measurement approaches that are increasingly utilizing mechanisms where consumers and suppliers have a central role (see Section I, Context and Objectives). It also mentions how the concept of shared value is useful to enrich the understanding of company performance. A broader review of private sector experience in citizen engagement is however beyond the scope of the Strategic Framework.
In your experience, what contextual factors—such as civil society, political society and global dimensions—are critical to make Citizen Engagement efforts work effectively to enhance results?	• Trust between the state and citizens is a key factor for citizen engagement and is important to establish buy-in for national citizen engagement programs. • Citizen and CSO capacity to engage. • Good governance and institutionalized mechanisms. • A functioning justice systems and access to justice are important, as well as ability of the justice system to tackle corruption. • Access to Information and technology. • A certain level of stability is necessary. • Gender-related aspects.	These inputs have been incorporated in the Strategic Framework. A comprehensive list of contextual factors is included in Table 2.1 of the Strategic Framework: Contextual Factors that Impact Outcomes of Citizen Engagement Initiatives, and Table 2.2. Additional Contextual Factors Impacting Outcomes of Citizen Engagement in Various Areas.

Area	Key Inputs	Response in Strategic Framework
	• Effective knowledge hubs are necessary for citizens to share global, regional experiences and best practices.	
Where have you seen citizen engagement efforts fail? What happened? What lessons would you draw from these experiences?	• Poor Design. • Lack of response to feedback. • Lack of strategic leadership. • Lack of civic space and low CSO capacity. • Shifting resources and counterparts. • Political inference and elite capture. • Lack of field management mechanisms, lack of research of power and context analysis, and lack of local knowledge of local cultures, norms and sensitivities.	These lessons are consistent with findings from the literature and experiences of World Bank practitioners (see Chapter II: Summary of Evidence and Lessons Learned; Annex II: Background Literature Review, Annex III: Summary of Stock Take; and Annex IV: Summary of Regional Approaches).
What mechanisms and context can best contribute to sustainable mechanisms for engaging citizens in service delivery, policy-making, and other development activities?	**Long-term sustainability** • Citizen engagement is a long-term process and cannot be seen within a shorter-term project cycle. • Resources for citizen engagement must be sustained over time as some types of citizen engagement require training in oversight activities or personnel dedicated to these duties. • The WBG should be cognizant of how citizen engagement in the context of a project impacts government-citizen relations at the country level, which is necessary for opportunities to scale and sustainability. • Ensure regular citizen engagement, flexibility in methods, and constant attraction of new members. • WBG should work through established structures and institutions such as multi-stakeholder forums, and national and local structures to avoid duplication of efforts, ensure sustainability and enhance ownership. **National systems** • Broader enabling environment – a policy (supporting transparency and participation), legal, and regulatory environment such as Freedom of Information and non-restrictive CSO legislations. • A technology and communications infrastructure is necessary. • Mechanisms should engage not only citizens, but also the private sector and the government.	One of the objectives of the Strategic Framework is to contribute to sustainable processes for citizen engagement with governments and the private sector within the context of WBG operations. It thereby acknowledges the need to build the capacity of WBG clients to design and implement sustainable systems for citizen engagement to contribute to improved development outcomes (Section VI. B.2).
Where do you see gaps in what we know about the contribution of	• Monitoring and evaluation • Citizen motivation – what motivates citizens to get involved and on models of successful citizen engagement.	The Strategic Framework emphasizes the need for more systematic monitoring and reporting on citizen engagement activities in WBG-supported operations, and therefore proposes the use of results chains and

Area	Key Inputs	Response in Strategic Framework
citizen engagement in achieving development outcomes that could inform the future research agenda?	• Barriers hindering citizen mobilization • Political will • ICT and data management systems • Fragile contexts • Engaging poor and marginalized	citizen engagement indicators in five development outcome areas--(i) improved service delivery, (ii) public financial management, (iii) governance, (iv) natural resource management and (v) social inclusion/empowerment--to enhance measuring and reporting on citizen engagement activities going forward (see Section V: Improved Monitoring and Results Reporting). It also proposes areas for further research including taking stock of adaptive learning pilots and lessons learned; longitudinal analysis of the impact of citizen engagement and the role of contextual factors, (see Section VIII: Conclusions and Next Steps).
Additional feedback	**Definitions** • Some participants expressed reservations with the term "beneficiary". The UNDP's concept of development "partners" should be considered, which implies greater ownership than the word "beneficiary". • Citizens should be defined as the primary owners and actors of development. • There should be agreement on the definition of citizen engagement between international financial institutions. • Participants requested clarity on the term "national systems". • It should be explained how civil society, academia, researchers, community activists, student and labor unions, and women associations fit within the definition of civil society. Cooperatives and labor unions should also be included. **Approach/methodology** • Citizen engagement should be mainstreamed in all WBG operations. • The WBG should consider a rights-based approach to citizen engagement. • The Strategic Framework should look at how citizen engagement can be developed over the long term to help client governments improve citizen engagement within national systems. • WBG citizen engagement should be broader, deeper, and more systematic than ad hoc consultations. Citizen engagement needs a clear process and real commitment. • The Strategic Framework should include a discussion of how the concept of citizen engagement has evolved since the 1990s. • The Strategic Framework should include measurable targets for citizen engagement, in particular in the context of the post-2015	On the **definitions,** the limitations of terminology are acknowledged (see section I.B). However, these are commonly used terms in the context of WBG-supported operations that required consistent definitions for the benefit of clients and task-teams. The Strategic Framework defines "beneficiaries" as a subset of citizens directly targeted by and expected to benefit from a development project. The definitions proposed in the Strategic Framework are consistent with the idea of citizens as the primary owners of development. The WBG Strategy, published in October 2013, emphasizes inclusion as part of the multidimensional agenda to reduce poverty and promote shared prosperity. Inclusion entails empowering citizens to participate in the development process, removing barriers against those who are often excluded, and ensuring that the voice of all citizens can be heard. The suggestion to clarify the term "national systems" was incorporated. The objective of the Strategic Framework was revised from the Concept Note to "strengthen existing engagement processes between governments, the private sector, and citizens at the national, regional, local, or sectoral level, as applicable" within the context of WBG operations. Finally, in the context of the Strategic Framework, the term "citizens" should be understood broadly and inclusively to refer to both individuals and organized groups, including NGOs, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, foundations, academia, associations, policy development and research institutes, trade unions and social movements. The definition of citizen, as applied in the Strategic Framework, is not about a person's legal status.

Area	Key Inputs	Response in Strategic Framework
	agenda. - Specify the relationship between the Strategic Framework and the WB safeguards. - Documents related to the Strategic Framework should be translated into other languages. - Citizen engagement by the WBG at the national level should receive more attention. Citizen engagement should also be included in country strategies and development policy lending, where beneficiaries are more difficult to identify. - Participants asked how the WBG is going to develop staff capacity and incentives. - The WBG should learn from experiences, such as the Global Partnership for Social Accountability. - Participants recommended the WBG to learn from academic studies and experience from civil society. **Feedback on existing WBG beneficiary feedback mechanisms** - The Bank could provide more information of the registered participants in a particular event or consultation, as well as the staff or specialists directly responsible for the particular operation or policy. - Citizen engagement is included in WBG projects in rural areas, but not as systematically in urban projects. - There is a consultation fatigue among CSOs especially when the organizations consulted are not informed of the next steps after consultations happen. The Bank could help close the feedback loop and report back to parties consulted on the decisions taken. - The WBG could provide more information on activities from start to implementation, and sustain engagement throughout. - Consultations could be more inclusive, advertised in a timely manner, and conducted at times when citizens are able to participate. - Some participants felt that vulnerable groups are able to engage in the context of WBG operations, but not in independently-led government processes. **Results indicators** - Important to define baselines for citizen engagement and conditions at country, regional and global level. One way to measure success is how much original plans change as a	On the **approach/methodology**, the Strategic Framework takes a comprehensive approach to mainstreaming citizen engagement in WBG operations for improved results and identifies entry points for citizen engagement across the WBG-supported strategies, policies, programs, projects, advisory services and analytics. The approach goes beyond consultations in the preparation of WBG operations, to include citizen engagement during program and project implementation. The proposed approach is based on the evidence of impact and experience to date, within and outside the WBG. Building on lessons of experience, the approach to mainstreaming citizen engagement in WBG operations is guided by the principles of being results focused, engaging throughout the operational cycle, and being context specific and gradual. Since citizen engagement is not without cost, opportunities for engaging citizens in WBG-supported operations will be sought where it can contribute to improved development results. The principle of strengthening existing engagement processes among governments, the private sector and citizens, within the context of WBG operations is reflected in the objective of the Strategic Framework and its guiding principles (see Section I.A: Objectives). The Concept Note, issue brief, and summary presentation of the approach to develop the Strategic Framework have been translated into Arabic, Portuguese, and Spanish, and are available on the online citizen engagement consultations website: (http://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/engaging-citizens-improved-results.) The Strategic Framework summarizes the evolution of citizen engagement in development thought (see Box A2.1) as well as the evolution of the approach in the WBG (see Box 1.1). Regarding inputs on existing **feedback mechanisms**, one of the sub-objectives of the Strategic Framework is to improve the quality and outcome of existing mandatory engagement mechanisms (see Section I.A: Objectives), including those triggered by environmental and social safeguards. The Framework acknowledges that good practice approaches in consultations, including closing the feedback loop, need to be applied more systematically. Going forward, greater use of results indicators will allow for tracking and documenting outcomes of consultations during the implementation of programs and projects (see Section IV.A: Consultations).

Area	Key Inputs	Response in Strategic Framework
	result of the agreement.	The focus on results entails strengthening monitoring and reporting, including greater use of *results indicators.* Staff guidance will be made available on sample results chains, intermediate outcome and outcome indicators that can be used in results frameworks and for reporting progress in implementing citizen engagement. The indicators will include tracking changes in laws, regulations, processes, and plans as a result of the engagement (see Section V: Improved Monitoring and Results Reporting).

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